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 ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores the way in which EU and U.S. antitrust rules address 
opportunistic conducts that emerge in the context of standard essential patents 
(SEPs). The analysis finds that the two systems have very different scopes in 
addressing those practices: conduct lawful under U.S. antitrust law is condemned 
by the EU competition law and vice versa. In contrast to other fields of antitrust, 
the differences between the EU and U.S. approach do not arise from the 
application of different legal standards, but rather reflect the core divergences in 
the statutory texts that address unilateral practices. The analysis also shows that 
both in the European Union and in the United States, competition authorities 
have tried to increase the scope of competition law—first, by stretching the 
antitrust doctrines outside established borders, and second, by advocacy measures 
designed to avoid opportunism related to SEPs. The thesis shows, nonetheless, 
that both approaches are problematic and a more cautious strategy is needed to 
avoid the risk of injecting imbalance in the standardization context. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. SETTING THE CONTEXT 
Standards are one of the main engines of today’s economy.1 Their use has 
important beneficial effects on consumers and the market.2 By conveying information 
about products and reducing the information asymmetry between buyers and sellers, 
standards facilitate business transactions.3 Safety and quality standards protect 
consumers from purchasing goods or services of suboptimal quality. Interoperability 
standards increase consumer convenience, by allowing a combined use of products 
from different manufacturers4 and reducing the lock-in effect.5 They might also allow 
consumers to use their goods from remote locations and enable them to exchange 
information with others who use the same standard.6 Standards might have 
considerable positive effects in markets with strong network effects.7  
Despite their substantial benefits, standards might provide the appropriate 
setting for anticompetitive practices that harm competition and consumer welfare. In 
                                                 
1 THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Towards an increased contribution from 
standardisation to innovation in Europe , COM (2008) 133 final (2008). (“[D]ynamic standardisation is 
an important enabler of innovation . . . A strong role for Europe in international standardisation is also 
a means of capitalising on European leadership in new markets and of gaining first-mover advantages 
in global markets.”); U.S. D.O.J. & F.T.C., ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION (2007) (“Industry standards are widely 
acknowledged to be one of the engines driving the modern economy.”). 
2 E. S. Mintzer and L. M. Breed, How to keep the Fox out of the Henhouse: Monopolization in the 
Context of Standard Setting Organizations, N. 9 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 
(2007). 
3 H. SCHEPEL, THE CONSTITUTION OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: PRODUCT STANDARDS IN THE REGULATION 
(Hart. 2005). 
4 H. J. Hovenkamp, Standards Ownership and Competition Policy, 48 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 87 
(2007). 
5 A. Soininen, Patents and Standards in the ICT Sector: Are Submarine Patents a Substantive Problem 
or a Red Herring?: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF IT STANDARDS AND STANDARDIZATION RESEARCH § 5 
(2007). 
6. M. A Lemley, Antitrust, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard Setting Organizations, 90 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 6 (2002). 
7 The network effect is related to the concept of network externality—a situation where the individual 
demand may be affected by the number of other people who have purchased the good. When there are 
positive network externalities, the value of the good increase when the number of users increases. For 
economic theory on network effects see: M. L. Katz and C.Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, 
and Compatibility, 75 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW (1985); J. Farrell & G. Saloner, 
Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS (1985); A. J. Devlin, 
Standard-Setting and the Failure of Price Competition, 65 New York University Annual Survey of 
American Law, 217 (2009).  
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the last few years, the antitrust debate on standards has focused on standard-
essential patents (SEPs) and the opportunistic conduct of their owners. Standards, 
particularly those adopted in innovative industries, often include technologies that are 
not available in the public domain, but that are protected by patent rights.8 Once a 
patented technology has been implemented in the standard, its use becomes 
“essential” for all manufacturers of standard compliant goods. “[I]t is not possible on 
technical grounds . . . to [produce goods] which comply with a standard without 
infringing that patent.”9 In other words, manufacturers cannot produce a good 
compliant with the standard without implementing the essential technology, and 
hence infringing the SEP.10 After the implementation of a patented technology in the 
standard, the SEP owner thus becomes an unavoidable trading party for all 
manufacturers of standard compliant goods. 
The ownership of a SEP might open the door for opportunism. The concerns with 
SEP owners’ opportunism initially focused on two practices: patent ambush and 
patent holdup. These are two distinct practices, with related harmful effects. Patent 
ambush refers to a situation where the patent owner participates in the 
standardization procedure, and intentionally conceals the existence of its patents that 
cover technologies that might be relevant for the discussed standard.11 Only once the 
standard-setting organization (SSO) implements the patented technology in the 
standard, and manufacturers start producing their goods in compliance with the 
standard, the SEP owner reveals the existence of its patent(s). Patent ambush is 
damaging because it undermines the integrity of the standardization process by 
harming competition between rival solutions that compete for implementation in the 
standard. It risks excluding competing technologies based on misinformation.  
                                                 
8 Standards can also include other intellectual property rights (IPRs). A survey conducted by Blind et 
al. nevertheless shows that patents are the most common IPR, whereas other IPRs, as for instance 
copyrights, play a very limited role. See: K. BLIND ET AL., Study on the Interplay between Standards 
and Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) (Tender No ENTR/09/015 2011). 
9 European Telecommunication Standards Institute [ETSI], ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy, 
Annex 6, § 3.1 (Nov. 30, 2011), available at http://www.etsi.org/images/etsi_ipr-policy.pdf [hereinafter 
ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy]. 
10 P. Chappatte, FRAND commitments−the Case for Antitrust Intervention, 5 EUROPEAN COMPETITION 
JOURNAL 319 (2009). 
11 D. Geradin & M. P. Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on 
Patent Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND, 3 EUROPEAN COMPETITION JOURNAL 
(2007) (“Patent ambush occurs where an IPR owner willfully and knowingly fails to meet its duty to 
disclose to a SSO ownership of IPR which are subsequently incorporated in the standard under 
adoption.”). 
 17 
 
Patent ambush can also lead to a second harmful practice: patent holdup.12 After 
the implementation of the technology in the standard, the use of the SEP becomes 
unavoidable for manufacturers of standard-compliant goods. The SEP owner might 
take advantage of the obtained position, by holding up manufacturers and impose on 
them exploitative licensing conditions. It might, for example, demand the 
manufacturer to pay excessive licensing fees, or agree on other licensing terms that 
the manufacturer would not accept in an ex ante licensing negotiation, that is, a 
negotiation of the licensing terms before the patented technology was implemented in 
the standard. Particularly when compliance with the standard is a de facto 
requirement for the participation in the market, manufacturers might have no other 
option than to accept the exploitative licensing conditions offered by the SEP owner.  
The phenomena of patent ambush and patent holdup were initially associated 
with “non-practicing entities” (NPEs), that is, companies that own patents, but do not 
exploit them commercially directly by producing final goods.13 An NPE generates its 
income from licensing its patented technologies to downstream manufacturers, that is, 
manufacturers of goods that implement the patented technology. Several authors 
maintained that the NPE’s business structure favors opportunistic conduct in the 
standardization context.14 In industries involving so-called complex goods, there has 
traditionally been a high level of cross licensing.15 Patents required for the production 
of a single product are not in the hands of an individual undertaking, but are normally 
spread among competitors. In order to produce a final good, a manufacturer thus 
                                                 
12 The term holdup is used in economics to describe the bargaining power of one party, when due to the 
gap between economic commitments and subsequent negotiation, that party is able to appropriate some 
of the benefits that accrue from the investment of the other party. The theoretical framework of holdup 
has been applied to IPRs by Shapiro and implemented by several academics. C. Shapiro, Navigating the 
Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE 
ECONOMY, Volume 1, pp. 119-150 (2001).  
13 The literature also uses other names to describe NPEs, such as pure patent holders, non-competing 
firms, non-assertion entities—all referring to undertakings that earn their revenue from licensing their 
patent rights (or other IPRs), but that are not involved in the production of final goods. 
14 P. Detkin, the first person to use the term “patent trolls,” defined an NPE as “somebody who tries to 
make a lot of money off a patent that he is not practicing and has no intention of practicing and in most 
cases he never practiced at all”—hence clearly referring to NPEs (See: The Patent Prospector: Patent 
Blog Troll (Dec. 8, 2007), available at http://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2007/12/patent_blog_troll.html). 
See also: C. V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation 
of High-Tech Patents, NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW, Vol. 87 (2009); A. Layne-Farrar and K. M. 
Schmidt, Licensing Complementary Patents: "Patent Trolls," Market Structure, and "Excessive" 
royalties 25 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 1121(2010). 
15 A cross-licensing agreement is a licensing agreement where two or more undertakings grant a 
license to each other. 
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needs to not only use its own patented technologies, but also use those owed by its 
competitors. This interdependence on each other’s patents resulted in a high level of 
cross licensing, which generally acted as a safeguard against the imposition of 
opportunistic licensing conditions. This pattern however changed with the appearance 
of NPEs. Given that an NPE is not involved in downstream production, it does not 
need to obtain a license from its own licensees. An NPE does not face constraints from 
cross licensing when setting its licensing conditions, and might be consequently more 
prone to hold up manufacturers.  
The Rambus case represents perhaps one of the most discussed cases concerning 
an NPE’s use of SEPs. Rambus operated as an NPE in the market for high-speed chip 
connection technologies. It developed a “Dynamic Random Access Memory” (DRAM 
technology), which became the most common form of computer memory. DRAM was 
an essential input into a variety of downstream products, such as personal computers, 
work stations, fax machines, printers, digital video recorders, and video games. The 
DRAM chips were standardized through the Joint Electron Devices Engineering 
Council (JEDEC), an SSO based in the United States. Rambus participated in the 
JEDEC’s standardization procedure, without however making any claim regarding the 
existence of its patents.16 Only once the standard was adopted and the manufacturers 
started producing goods in compliance with the JEDEC’s standard, did Rambus 
disclose the existence of its SEPs, and required manufacturers to pay a licensing fee 
that was considered excessive to the value of the SEPs.17  
Rambus’ conduct was challenged by competition authorities in the European 
Union and in the United States, as well as by private entities. In June 2002, the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed an administrative complaint against Rambus.18 
It maintained that by purposefully creating the materially false and misleading 
impression to JEDEC that it possessed no relevant IPRs, and later enforcing such 
rights against manufacturers, Rambus monopolized or attempted to monopolize the 
market for DRAM, or otherwise engaged in unfair methods of competition in violation 
                                                 
16 Rambus filed its patent application in 1990. During its participation in the standardisation 
procedure, Rambus did not hold patents, but it obtained them only in 1999, three years after it left 
JEDEC. All the amendments obtained by Rambus relate back to the 1990s, when the original 
application was field. 
17 Initial Decision, Rambus Inc., Docket No. 9302 (F.T.C. 2004). 
18 Administrative Compaint, Rambus Inc., Docket No. 9302 (F.T.C. 2002). 
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of Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA).19 In July 2007, the 
European Commission (the Commission) brought a parallel antitrust investigation, 
maintaining that Rambus’ imposition of unreasonable royalties subsequent to a patent 
ambush could amount to an abuse of dominant position in violation of Article 102 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Article 102 TFEU).20  
However, in none of the jurisdictions was Rambus’ conduct found 
anticompetitive. In the United States, the Court of Appeal for the D.C. Circuit finally 
rejected the complaint brought by the FTC, maintaining that the FTC had failed to 
provide adequate proof that Rambus’ patent ambush had anticompetitive effects.21 
The D.C. Circuit maintained that the SEP owner’s deceptive conduct during the 
standardization process is actionable under antitrust law only if there is evidence that 
it had an exclusionary effect and thus allows the SEP owner to unlawfully acquire or 
maintain market power. In the absence of such evidence, a mere deceptive conduct—
although coupled with the imposition of exploitative licensing terms—does not 
constitute a violation of U.S. antitrust law.22 Also in the EU, there was no 
determination whether Rambus’ conduct amounted to an abuse of a dominant 
position. The case was concluded with a commitment decision, through which the 
Commission made Rambus’ offer to put a cap on the royalties binding.23 Article 9 of 
Regulation 1/2003 provides that when an investigation is concluded with a 
commitment decision, the Commission determines that there are no longer grounds for 
action. There is no decision with respect to whether the challenged conduct constitutes 
a violation of Article 102 TFEU. The commitment decision may thus have helped the 
firms that relied on the standard, but it did not determine whether Rambus’ conduct 
constituted an abuse of a dominant position in violation of Article 102 TFEU.  
The Rambus cases initiated an intensive debate concerning the role competition 
law plays (and should play) in addressing the SEP owners’ opportunistic conducts. 
Commentators have recognized that doctrines developed in the field of patent or 
                                                 
19 Id. at. 1. 
20 Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Confirms Sending a Statement of Objections to Rambus, 
MEMO/07/330 (2007). 
21 Rambus Inc. v. F.T.C., 522 F.3d 456, 462 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  
22 Id. at. 464. 
23 Press Release, Anitrust: Commission Accepts Commitments from Rambus Lowering Memory Chip 
Royalty Rates, IP/09/1897 (2009). 
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contract law might be applied in addressing the SEP owner’s opportunistic conduct.24 
However, several authors emphasized that while patent and contract law remedies 
might be tailored to address the interests of the individual licensees, they do not 
protect consumers from the broader implications that a SEP owner’s opportunistic 
practices have on the market.25 They maintain that the SEP owner’s opportunism 
harms consumers directly (if higher royalties are passed on them in the form of higher 
prices) and indirectly (if the SEP owner’s opportunism undermines the confidence in 
standards and the standardization process, depriving consumers of the benefits of 
standardization).26 These authors consequently argue that there are strong policy 
reasons for addressing the SEP owner’s opportunistic conduct through the provisions 
of competition law. 
Other commentators have called for a more cautious approach.27 They express 
skepticism in the ability of competition law to address the SEP owner’s deceptive 
conduct during the standardization process.28 Hovenkamp, for example, emphasizes 
that antitrust law should apply only in cases where the deception allows the 
monopolization of the market, or where there is at least a dangerous probability of 
                                                 
24 Private entities have often relied on different non-antitrust doctrines when defending against the 
patent infringement suit brought by a SEP owner. Infringers can allege, that the enforcement of a SEP 
was in violation of a FRAND commitment, and thus represented a breach of contract. Further, where 
the patent owner’s misleading conduct leads the alleged infringer to reasonably infer that the patent 
owner does not intend to enforce its patent against the alleged infringer, the infringer can use the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel as a defense to a charge of patent infringement,. (See, e.g.: Apple, Inc. v. 
Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901 (ND Ill. 2012); Microsoft v. Motorola, 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023, (W.D. 
Wash. 2012)).  
25 See, e.g., S. Royall, A. Tessar & A. Di Vincenzo, Deterring “Patent Ambush” in Standard 
Setting:Lessons from Rambus and Qualcomm, 23 ANTITRUST MAGAZINE 3 (2009); R. Dagen, Rambus, 
Innovation Efficiency, And Section 5 Of The FTC Act, 90 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 4 (2010). P. 
Chappatte, FRAND commitments−the Case for Antitrust Intervention, 5 EUROPEAN COMPETITION 
JOURNAL 319 (2009). 
26 See, e.g., P. Chappatte, FRAND Commitments–The Case For Antitrust Intervention, 5 EUROPEAN 
COMPETITION JOURNAL 319 (2009); M. Jones, Permanent Injunction, a Remedy by Any Other Name is 
Patently Not the Same: How Ebay v. Mercexchange Affects the Patent Right of Non-Practicing Entities, 
14 GEORGE MASON LAW REVIEW 1035 (2007). J. Farrell, J. Hayes, C. Shapiro, and T. Sullivan, Standard 
Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 603 (2007). D. Culley, M. Dhanani & M. 
Dolmans, Learning from Rambus—How to Tame Those Troublesome Trolls, 57 THE ANTITRUST 
BULLETIN 117 (2012).  
27 See, e.g., D.Geradin & M. P. Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant 
View on Patent Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND, 3 EUROPEAN COMPETITION 
JOURNAL 101 (2007). J. M. Golden, 'Patent Trolls' and Patent Remedies, 85 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 2111 
(2007). J. G. Sidak, Patent Holdup And Oligopsonistic Collusion in Standard-Setting Organizations, 5 
JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 123 (2009).  
28 See, e.g., H. J. Hovenkamp, Standards Ownership and Competition Policy, 48 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW 
REVIEW 87 (2007).  
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success.29 In other cases, he argues that doctrines derived from patent law are 
generally more appropriate for addressing the holdup problem. Other commentators 
have expressed particularly strong concerns with the use of competition law as a tool 
to address excessive royalties. In the United States, charging excessive prices does not 
constitute anticompetitive conduct: courts have long recognized that charging high (or 
even excessive) prices is a legitimate business practice. Likewise, exploitative 
practices have rarely been subject to the scrutiny under EU competition law. Although 
Article 102 TFEU provides the legal basis to address exploitative conduct, the 
Commission’s enforcement has mainly focused towards practices of dominant 
undertakings that have exclusionary effects. Authors like Geradin and Rato suggested 
that a similar approach should be adopted in the context of SEPs. They emphasize 
that the application of competition law might result in false positives, which can in 
turn hinder the willingness of technology owners to take part in the standardization 
process.30  
Rambus was not an isolated example, and in the following years several cases 
arose that reanimated the already hot debate concerning the risk of the SEP owners’ 
opportunism. Those cases showed that the competitive concerns related to the SEP 
owners’ conduct go much beyond the phenomena of patent ambush and patent holdup. 
First, it became clear that the SEP owners’ opportunism is not necessarily limited to 
NPEs. A number of practicing entities (companies that own patents and produce 
downstream goods implementing those patents)31 have been accused of engaging in 
anticompetitive practices related to SEPs.32 For instance, in the dispute Apple v. 
Samsung, 33 Apple accused Samsung, the owner of several SEPs and the producer of 
mobile devices, of failing to disclose its patents to ETSI, and for breaching its 
commitment to license its patents on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms 
                                                 
29 Id. at 105. 
30 D. Geradin & M. P. Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on 
Patent Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND, 3 EUROPEAN COMPETITION JOURNAL 101 
(2007). 
31 Practicing companies are often defined also as vertically integrated companies.  
32 For the EU see, e.g., Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Opens Proceedings Against Samsung 
IP/12/89 (Jan. 31, 2012). Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Opens Proceedings Against Motorola 
IP/12/345 (Mar. 4, 2012). For US see, e.g., Research in Motion Limited v. Motorola Inc, 644 F.Supp.2d 
788 (ND Texas 2008); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics, WL 4948567 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2011); Apple 
Inc. v Motorola Mobility Inc, WL 7324582 (W.D. Wis., June 07, 2011).  
33 Apple Inc.. v. Samsung Electronics 2011 WL 4948567 (N.D. Cal.).  
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(so-called FRAND commitment).34 Apple maintained, inter alia, that Samsung’s 
conduct violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The case brought against Samsung 
thus shows that practicing entities might also engage in opportunistic practices such 
as patent ambush and patent holdup.  
Second, later cases showed that patent ambush (or other forms of deceptive 
behavior during the standardization process) is not a necessary condition for patent 
holdup to arise. The SEP owner might hold up manufacturers and impose on them 
exploitative licensing conditions even if it did not act deceptively during the 
standardization process.35 This became particularly clear during a wave of SEPs 
acquisitions in the mobile device industry. For example, Google acquired a large 
portfolio of Motorola Mobility’s patents, including several SEPs.36 Third parties raised 
concerns that the merged entity could use the position obtained through the 
acquisition of SEPs to force manufacturers to agree on onerous licensing terms. 
Although Google did not take part in the standardization process, and did not act 
deceptively during it, there was a perceived risk that Google could use its SEPs to hold 
up manufacturers.37  
Third, cases have shown that a SEP owner might not only use SEPs to hold up 
manufacturers and impose on them exploitative licensing conditions, but it might also 
use SEPs as a tool to harm competition in the downstream market. Particularly when 
the SEP is in the hands of a practicing entity that itself participates in the product 
market, the SEP owner might have the incentive to impose licensing conditions that 
affect the manufacturers’ ability of compete in the downstream market. For example, 
by licensing a SEP at excessive royalties, the SEP owner can increase its rival’s cost, 
and in this way hinder its ability to compete in the market for standard-compliant 
goods.  
Despite the high number of cases that have thus far discussed the antitrust 
aspects of the SEP owners’ opportunism, the scope competition law plays in 
                                                 
34 FRAND and RAND (reasonable and non-discriminatory) are normally used as interchangeable 
terms. Whereas the former is preferred in the EU, the latter is normally used in the United States. 
35 R. Schmalensee, Standard-Setting, Innovation Specialists, and Competition Policy, 35 THE JOURNAL 
OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 526, 530 (2009) (“[P]atent hold-up does not necessarily involve hiding the 
existence of intellectual property.”). 
36 Case No COMP/M.638 -Google/ Motorola Mobility. 
37 Id. at 108. 
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addressing the SEP owners’ opportunistic conduct remains unsettled. In the EU, the 
Commission initiated several investigations against SEP owners, evaluating whether 
their conduct constitutes an abuse of a dominant position in violation of Article 102 
TFEU. As of April 2014, the Commission however adopted only one infringement 
decision, providing little guidance on the limits EU competition law poses on SEP 
owners. Also in the United States, both private and public antitrust actions have been 
instituted to challenge the SEP owners’ opportunism. Although some basic principles 
have been identified, several questions remain open. In particular, it remains unclear 
when the provisions of Section 2 of the Sherman Act or of Section 5 of the FTCA might 
capture SEP’s licensing practices. The limits competition laws pose on the SEP 
owner’s conduct remain therefore unsettled both in the European Union and in the 
United States. 
The thesis aims to bring clarity into this filed. By analyzing the applicability of 
the competition law provisions, the thesis aims to clarify the role competition laws 
have (or should have) in addressing the SEP owner’s opportunistic conduct.  
 
 
2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The central question the thesis addresses is: what role should competition law 
play in addressing the disputes arising in the SEP context?  
To answer this question, there is a need to address several sub-questions. First, 
the thesis evaluates whether extant competition law doctrines allow competition 
authorities and private plaintiffs to effectively address a SEP owner’s opportunistic 
practices. In this respect, the thesis analyzes whether, and under what conditions, 
practices, such as patent ambush, patent holdup, and the violation of the FRAND 
commitment, constitute an infringement of EU competition law and U.S. antitrust 
law. Second, the thesis discusses whether there is a need to revise the antitrust 
doctrines. Is there a need for a more extensive interpretation of competition law that 
would allow to capture SEP owners’ opportunistic practices that fall outside the 
traditional antitrust doctrines? Third, the thesis evaluates whether competition law is 
able to prevent the SEP owner’s strategic conduct ex ante, for instance, by stimulating 
the adoption of mechanisms that would prevent the SEP owner’s opportunism. 
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The thesis compares the approach adopted in two jurisdictions: the EU and the 
United States. The two jurisdictions represent the systems in which there has been an 
extensive discussion concerning the antitrust liability for the SEP owners’ 
opportunistic practices. It thus provides a good basis for a comparative analysis and 
for the evaluation of the possible solutions that could be adopted in other jurisdictions. 
Given that the thesis focuses on applicability of competition law, it does not touch 
upon the ability of other bodies of law, such as contract law, patent law, equity 
principles, to address the SEP owners’ opportunistic practices. It also does not touch 
upon the discussion on the quality of patents,38 and the incentive they have on 
innovation. The thesis assumes that the patents that have been granted, are valid, 
and that the patents provide incentives for investments in the innovative process.39  
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The U.S. antitrust literature has provided some of the leading articles in the 
debate concerning SEPs. Carl Shapiro provided a pioneering article in this field, by 
applying the holdup theory to patent rights. In his 2001 article Navigating the Patent 
Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, Shapiro emphasized that 
an involuntary infringement of a patented technology opens the door to opportunistic 
practices: the patent owner can try to extract royalties well above the value of its 
invention, given the substantial sunk cost faced by the infringer. Shapiro argued that 
the risk of patent holdup might be particularly acute in the standard-setting context, 
where the risk of involuntary infringement is high. He suggested that both “patent 
and antitrust policy makers should regard holdup as a problem of first-order 
significance in the years ahead.”40 
                                                 
38 Patents of a poor quality cause unwarranted market power, and consequently hamper competition 
that would otherwise stimulate innovation (Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The 
Proper Balance Of Competition and Patent Law and Policy, at 5 (2003)). For discussion see: C. Shapiro, 
The Design and Use of Patents, IESE-BBVA Lecture, at 6 (2007), available at 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/madrid.pdf (“The patent hold-up problem is exacerbated by 
poor patent quality.”).  
39 For criticism of these assumptions, see discussion in Chapter III: 1.1.1. Patent rights. 
40 C. Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, 1 
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 127 (2001). See also: J. Farrell. M. Lemley & C. Shapiro, 
Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 2163 (2007). 
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Since Shapiro authored this paper in 2001, several other authors have discussed 
the problem of patent holdup. It is possible to identify two lines of theories. Some 
commentators supported the patent holdup theory presented by Shapiro, and 
maintain that patent holdup is real word phenomenon, which has strong negative 
effects on the market and consumers.41 Other commentators, such as Geradin and 
Sidak, reject the patent holdup conjuncture. Although they recognize that patent 
holdup is theoretically possible, they maintain that there is little evidence that the 
phenomenon occurs in practice.42 In their view, SEP owners are rarely able to hold up 
manufacturers and impose exploitative licensing conditions.  
The literature also appears to be divided with respect to the role that competition 
law should have in addressing a SEP owner’s conduct. First, there seems to no 
agreement concerning the desirability of antitrust intervention in cases when the SEP 
owner acts deceptively during the standardization process. Dagen, for instance, argues 
that there is a need for an antitrust intervention, given that consumer welfare is not 
always protected by private actions of the participants of the standardization 
process.43 Other commentators however suggest that competition law has a limited 
ability to address a SEP owner’s deceptive practices. Hovenkamp, for example, 
maintains that “antitrust law is a blunt instrument for dealing with many claims of 
anticompetitive standard setting.”44 In his view, antitrust law should apply only in 
cases where there is evidence that the SEP owner’s deception allowed the 
monopolization of the market, or there is at least a dangerous probability of success of 
such monopolization by the SEP owner. Along the similar lines, Kobayashi and Wright 
                                                 
41 See, e.g., T. F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34. THE JOURNAL 
OF CORPORATE LAW 1151 (2009). M. Dolmans, Standard Setting - the Interplay with IP and Competition 
Laws: How to Avoid False FRANDs, 11 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 791 (2010); (2008). J. 
Hayes, J. Farrell, C. Shapiro, T. Sullivan, Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-up, 3 ANTITRUST LAW 
JOURNAL (2007). 
42 D. Geradin & M. P. Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on 
Patent Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND, 3 EUROPEAN COMPETITION JOURNAL 101 
(2006); E. Dorsey & M. R. McGuire, How the Google Consent Order Alters the Process and Outcomes of 
FRAND Bargaining, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 979 (forthcoming 2013); J. G. Sidak, Patent Holdup And 
Oligopsonistic Collusion In Standard-Setting Organizations, 5 JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW AND 
ECONOMICS (2009). 
43 R. Dagen, Rambus, Innovation Efficiency, and Section 5 of the FTC Act, 90 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW 
REVIEW 1479, 1483 (2010) (“[…] there is concern that in the standard-setting situation, those 
implementing the standard will have little incentive to litigate”). 
44 H. Hovenkamp, Standards Ownership and Competition Policy, 48 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 87, 
87 (2007). 
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maintain that antitrust laws fail to provide a satisfying answer to the problem of 
patent ambush. In the view of these commentators, antitrust laws would provide only 
a marginal benefit over the application of other bodies of law.45 They consequently 
suggest that other areas of law might be more appropriate to address the problems 
that arise in the SEP context.46  
The literature does also not agree on the role competition law should have in 
addressing the SEP owner’s exploitative licensing practices. Several authors have 
strongly supported the application of competition law. Cary, Kaiser, Nelson and Sistla, 
for example, maintain that other bodies of law provide incomplete solutions, and only 
antitrust law can “ensure that private parties and government enforcement 
authorities can seek redress where the underlying abuse harms competition.”47 Fuchs 
similarly argues that patent holdup should be considered a per se violation of Article 
102 TFEU. He suggests that there are good reasons for competition authorities to 
control excessive prices, if, as in the case of industry standards, competition is blocked. 
In discussing the methods to identify excessive royalties, Fuchs suggests that the 
burden of proof to show that royalties are reasonable should be on the SEP owner.48 
Others authors have however discouraged the application of competition law towards 
exploitative conduct.49 Geradin recognizes that Article 102 TFEU provides a legal 
basis for the intervention, but he argues that such intervention is not desirable from a 
policy perspective. He argues that controlling the level of royalties involves several 
difficulties, and that wrong decisions may have detrimental effects on the economy. By 
                                                 
45 B. H. Kobayashi & J. D. Wright, Federalism, Substantive Preemption, and Limits on Antitrust: An 
Application to Patent Holdup, 5 JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 469(2009) (“Speciﬁcally, 
we ﬁnd that the application of the antitrust laws to patent holdup will provide little marginal beneﬁt 
over, and conﬂict with, other speciﬁc laws regulating the same area, and also will generate high risk for 
errors in the application of the antitrust laws.”). 
46 Id. (“[c]ontract and patent law are superior regulatory institutions for dealing with the problems 
associated with patent holdup.”). For similar positions see: B. D. Abramson, The Patent Ambush: 
Misuse or Caveat Emptor? , PTC RESEARCH FOUNDATION (2011). 
47 G. S. Cary, S. J. Kaiser, M. W. Nelson & A. R. Sistla, The Case For Antitrust Law To Police The 
Patent Holdup Problem In Standard Setting, 77 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL (2011). 
48 A. Fuchs, Patent Ambush Strategies and Article 102 TFEU, in MORE COMMON GROUND FOR 
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW (Warren S. Grimes Josef Drexl, Clifford A. Jones, Rudolph J. R. 
Peritz, Edward T. Swaine ed. 2011). 
49 J. Hillel, Standards × Patents ÷ Antitrust = ∞: The Inadequacy of Antitrust to Address Patent 
Ambush, 017 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 4 (2010). (“[Y]et at the same time, patent royalty 
windfalls are undeserved. Antitrust simply does not fit the patent ambush problem, and alternate 
remedies are required.”).  
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controlling the returns on innovation, competition intervention can reduce the 
incentives to innovate, and through this, impede dynamic competition.50  
The legal and economic literature has intensively discussed the meaning of the 
FRAND commitment. This is a commitment which the SEP owner makes to the SSO 
—normally before its technology is implemented in the standard—stating that the 
SEP owner is willing to license its technology on fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory (FRAND) terms to any person interested in using the standard.51 Also 
in this case, however, there seems to be no agreement on the exact limits that the 
FRAND commitment poses on the SEP owner’s licensing practice. There is, for 
example, no agreement on whether the FRAND commitment prohibits exploitative 
licensing practices. In the view of some scholars, such as Dolmans, Carrier, Mair and 
Maasdam, and Chappatte, a FRAND commitment aims to prevent both the SEP 
owners’ exclusionary and exploitative practices.52 They argued that a FRAND 
commitment aims to prevent the abuse of market power obtained by virtue of the 
implementation in the standard.53 Cary emphasizes that allowing SEP owners to 
charge whatever monopoly rate the market will bear would impose the very economic 
                                                 
50 D. Geradin, Abusive Pricing in an IP licensing Context: An EC Competition Law Analysis, EU 
Competition Law and Policy Workshop (2007), available at 
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2007(pdf)/200709-COMPed-Geradin.pdf 
51 The acronym RAND, referring to “reasonable and non-discriminatory,” is sometimes also used. 
Despite the elimination of the word “fair,” courts and commentators have not recognized major 
differences between the FRAND and RAND.  
52 See, e.g., M. Dolmans, EC Competition Law and IP licensing in a Standard-Setting Context, ABA 
Section of Antitrust Law, Brown Bag Seminar on Standards and IP (June 22, 2007) (“Economic 
principle underlying FRAND is well understood: essential patent holders should not exploit the added 
power gained as a result of being included in the standard.”); M. A. Carrier, A Roadmap to the 
Smartphone Patent Wars and FRAND Licensing, 2 CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE (2012) (“A popular way 
to address the holdup problem is to require patentees to agree before the standard is selected to license 
their technologies on reasonable terms.”); C. Mair & Y. Maasdam, Competition and Standardization on 
the Cutting Edge: the Commission's Views on Striking the Balance (2011), available at: 
http://120664.weblog.leidenuniv.nl/2011/02/04/competition-and-standardization-on-the-c (“The FRAND 
(“Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory” licensing terms) commitment (or “RAND” in the US) is 
found in the IPR policies of many SSOs, and is designed to address the problem of ‘patent holdup’”). 
53 P. Chappatte, FRAND Commitments–The Case For Antitrust Intervention, 5 EUROPEAN 
COMPETITION JOURNAL 319, 327 (2009) (“In committing to license on FRAND terms, the patent owner 
accepts the obligation to moderate its royalty demands in exchange for the benefits that will accrue 
from the increased licensing opportunities that are created by the inclusion of its technology in 
standard compliant products.” G. S. Cary, The Case for Antitrust Law to Police the Patent Holdup 
Problem in Standard Setting, 77 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 913, 916 (2011) ((“[T]he obligations imposed 
by SSOs are intended to protect the same interest: guarding against the anticompetitive appropriation 
and misuse of the ex post monopoly power that may result from selecting a standard […]. FRAND 
obligations preserve the ex ante condition (where the technology faced competition from alternatives) by 
requiring an essential patent holder to offer ex post licensing terms and royalties that are 
commensurate with the competitive terms that would have applied ex ante.”). 
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harm that the FRAND commitment was intended to avoid.54 Other commentators 
however argue that a FRAND commitment only aims at preventing exclusionary 
licensing practices. Brooks and Geradin suggest that the FRAND commitment 
represent a promise to engage in good-faith negotiations with any undertaking 
wishing to implement the standard.55 In their view, the FRAND commitment does not 
impose any specific limit on the level of royalties the SEP owner can charge, but only 
prohibits the imposition of a licensing fee that would amount to an actual refusal to 
license.56 Sidak similarly argues that “[t]he FRAND commitment ensures access to the 
standard. SSOs IPR policies do not say how to divide economic rents between the SEP 
holder and the licensee.”57 
Further disagreement arises in relation to the question whether a FRAND 
commitment precludes the SEP owner from requesting an injunction against an 
infringer of the SEP.58 Dolmans, Chappatte, Layne-Farrar, Miller, Lemley and 
Shapiro maintain that, by committing to license its SEP on FRAND terms, the SEP 
owner implicitly waves its right to an injunction.59 In their view, in a case of an 
infringement, the SEP owner has only the right to demand damages for the patent 
infringement. Others have however criticized such interpretation. Geradin and Rato 
emphasize that interpreting a FRAND commitment as a waiver of the right to an 
injunction violates the contract law principles in most jurisdictions, which generally 
require that the waiver of a right ought to be made explicit, or at least be derived from 
circumstances that cannot possibly be interpreted in any different way.60 In their 
                                                 
54 M. W. Nelson, G. S. Cary, S. J. Kaiser, & A. R. Sistla, The Case For Antitrust Law To Police The 
Patent Holdup Problem In Standard Setting, 77 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 913, 919 (2011). 
55 D. Geradin & M. Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on 
Patent Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND, 3. European Competition Journal 101 
(2007). 
56 A constructive refusal to license is the SEP owner’s offer to license its patents on unreasonable 
terms, such as extremely high prices, that are ultimately rejected by the potential licensee.  
57 G. Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND: Part I: Royalties, 9 JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS 
931, 995 (2013). 
58The term injunctions or injunctive relief refers to an order by the court that the defendant cease a 
specific behavior, in the context of SEP, an order to cease the patent infringement. 
59 M. Dolmans, Standards for Standards, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 163, 185 (2002); M. A. Lemley & C. 
Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1991 (2007); J. S. Miller, 
Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-In: Rand Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 INDIANA 
LAW REVIEW 351 (2006).  
60 D. Geradin & M. Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on 
Patent Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND, 3 EUROPEAN COMPETITION JOURNAL 
101, 117 (2006).  
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view, a FRAND commitment does not meet such requirements. They hence suggest 
that even subsequent to a FRAND commitment, a SEP owner might be still able to 
obtain an injunction against the infringer.61 Some commentators have also 
emphasized that categorically rejecting injunctions to SEP owners would not be a good 
policy solution, given that it would confer too much power on a potential infringer. 
“[A]n infringer would have nothing to lose, and everything to gain if he could count on 
paying only the normal, routine royalty non-infringers might have paid.”62 
There is also no agreement in the legal and economic literature of what 
constitutes a fair and reasonable royalty. Several authors attempt to provide a 
definition of FRAND terms. Sidak discusses different methodologies that can be 
applied to determine FRAND royalties, suggesting that past licensing agreements 
provide the best benchmark.63 Shapiro and Varian maintain that a fair and reasonable 
royalty is a royalty that the SEP owner could have obtained in a negotiation before the 
standard was adopted.64 This position has been accepted by the DOJ and the FTC, as 
well as some other authors.65 Finally, some commentators have not made any attempt 
to define the exact meaning of FRAND. In their view, the terms “fair” and 
“reasonable” were intentionally left open to interpretation, so as to allow the parties to 
                                                 
61 Id. at 117 (2006)). See also G. Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties, 9 JOURNAL 
OF COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS 511 (2013) 
62 A. Layne-Farrar, Be My FRAND: Standard Setting and Fair, Reasonable and Non-discriminatory 
Terms, LECG Working Paper, 12 (2010); J. S. Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-In: 
Rand Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 INDIANA LAW REVIEW 351 (2006). 
63 G. Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties, 9 JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS 
931, 1000 (2013). 
64 C. SHAPIRO & H. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY, 
Harvard Business School Press, at 241 (1999).  
65 The DOJ and the FTC suggested that: “Courts should recognize that when it can be determined, the 
incremental value of the patented invention over the next-best alternative establishes the maximum 
amount that a willing licensee would pay in a hypothetical negotiation. Courts should not award 
reasonable royalty damages higher than this amount[.] Courts should apply the hypothetical 
negotiation framework to determine reasonable royalty damages for a patent subject to a RAND 
commitment. Courts should cap the royalty at the incremental value of the patented technology over 
alternatives available at the time the standard was chosen.” US D.O.J. & THE F.T.C., THE EVOLVING IP 
MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION at 21-23 (2011). See also: 
D. G. Swanson & W. J. Baumol, Reasonable and Non-discriminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standards 
Selection, and Control Of Market Power, 73 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 1, 5 (2005) (suggesting that the 
objective of the FRAND commitment is to prevent IP holders from setting royalties that exercise market 
power created by standardization. “The patent holder should thus be able to obtain the incremental rent 
that arises from standardization with respect to the next best alternative, but not the value arising 
from the standardization). 
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determine the specific content of the agreement by taking into account the specific 
circumstances of their relationship.66 
In discussing the problems of patent ambush and patent holdup, some 
commentators have discussed the role of NPEs, and the way in which competition 
laws should address their conduct. Also in this respect, the legal and economic 
literature seems to be divided. Several authors maintained that the NPE’s business 
structure favors opportunistic practices in the standard-setting context. Rajkumar 
believes that by engaging in baseless litigation and enforcing patents of dubious 
validity, NPEs not only overwhelm the legal system, but also increase the 
manufacturers’ production costs.67 He also argues that the litigation initiated by NPEs 
reduces the manufacturers’ funding (and personnel) available for innovation.68 In the 
same vein, Shapiro argues that NPEs provide little contribution to the innovative 
process.69 On the contrary, other authors have been more supportive towards NPEs. 
Mann and Geradin for example maintained that NPEs can increase competition in the 
upstream market, given that the entry costs incurred only in the upstream market 
might be substantively lower than the costs incurred when starting an entire 
production process.70 Several authors have also maintained that NPEs provide 
liquidity to the market for patents, and through this, they stimulate innovation.71 
Schmalensee has also argued against a competition policy that would favor practicing 
entities over NPEs. He noted that although NPEs face a more severe double 
marginalization problem than practicing entities would, the latter have the incentive 
                                                 
66 R. G. Brooks & D. Geradin, Interpreting and Enforcing the Voluntary FRAND Commitment, 9 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF IT STANDARDS AND STANDARDIZATION RESEARCH 1, 13 (2012). 
67 V. Rajkumar, The Effect Of Patent Trolls On Innovation: A Multi-Jurisdictional Analysis, 1 INDIAN 
JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 33 (2008). 
68 Id. at. 
69 C. Shapiro, The Design and Use of Patents, IESE-BBVA Lecture (2007), available at 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/madrid.pdf ([T]he so-called “patent trolls” who may do little or 
nothing by way of actual innovation and may not even sell any products, but who are expert at 
exploiting patents and, some would say, holding up their victims using the patent system.) 
70 D. Geradin. A. Layne-Farrar‡ and A. J. Padilla, Elves or Trolls? The Role of Non-Practicing Patent 
Owners in the Innovation Economy, Industrial and Corporate Changes (2011); R. J. Mann, Do Patents 
Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 961 (2005).  
71 A. Layne-Farrar & K. M. Schmidt, Licensing Complementary Patents: “Patent Trolls”, Market 
Structure, and “Excessive Royalties”, Discussion, 15 GOVERNANCE AND THE EFFICIENCY OF ECONOMIC 
SYSTEMS (2009); J. F. McDonough, III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the 
Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY LAW JOURNAL 189 (2006). 
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to diminish competition by raising rivals’ costs.72 Similarly, Schmidt has emphasized 
that practicing entities may tend to charge higher prices than NPEs, given that they 
have the incentive to raise rivals’ costs, and in this way, gain a competitive advantage 
against downstream rivals.73  
Relatively little attention has been devoted to the role competition law should 
play in preventing the SEP owners’ opportunism. Hovenkamp noted that given the 
limited ability of antitrust law to capture all potential opportunistic conduct, the 
institutional design of standard-setting procedures provides perhaps the best remedy 
to prevent the SEP owners’ opportunistic practices.74 In 2001, Lemley conducted a 
study on the IP policy adopted by various SSOs.75 While the study showed that the IP 
policies vary considerably from one SSO to the other, it nonetheless helped in 
identifying some common features. Lemley made a few suggestions for preventing 
opportunism by a SEP owner. He suggested that SSOs should adopt mechanisms that 
will stimulate participants to declare their FRAND licenses ex ante and introduce 
penalty defaults for the failure to comply with SSOs’ rules. Lemley also suggested 
some reforms in patent law, mainly suggesting limiting abuses to the continuation 
practice, and limiting the right to an injunction.76 These commentators however do not 
discuss what role (if any) competition law should play in stimulating these changes.  
 
 
4. GOALS OF THE RESEARCH  
The present thesis aims to contribute to the existing literature in several ways. 
First, the thesis contributes to the field of comparative law, by providing a 
comparative analysis of the application of the EU competition law and U.S. antitrust 
                                                 
72 R. Schmalensee, Standard-Setting, Innovation Specialists, and Competition Policy, 57.3 THE 
JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 526 (2009). 
73 K. Schmidt, Licensing Complementary Patents: "Patent Trolls," Market Structure, and "Excessive" 
Royalties, Discussion Paper 275 (2009), available at http://www.sfbtr15.de/uploads/media/275.pdf.  
74 H. J. Hovenkamp, Standards Ownership and Competition Policy, 48 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 
87 (2007). See also: F. Leveque & Y. Ménière, Technology Standards, Patents and Antitrust, 9 
COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES 29 (2008). 
75 M. A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIFORNIA LAW 
REVIEW 1889 (2002). 
76 M. A. Lemley, Ten Things to do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not To), 48 BOSTON 
COLLEGE LAW 149 (2007). 
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law when addressing the SEP owner’s unilateral conduct. In both jurisdictions, the 
SEP owner’s conduct has been addressed through the provisions of competition law. 
Not only have competition authorities addressed similar conducts, but they have often 
prosecuted the same licensing practices undertaken by the same SEP owner. Cases 
addressing the SEP owner’s behavior thus provide an excellent basis for a general 
comparison on the EU and U.S. enforcement practices in the context of unilateral 
conduct. By comparing the applicability of the competition law in these two 
jurisdictions, the analysis therefore contributes to the general discussion on the 
similarities and divergence between the EU and the U.S. competition law. 
Second, the thesis contributes to a more practical discussion on the antitrust 
liability for SEP owners. Although several authors have discussed the SEP owner’s 
antitrust liability under EU competition law and U.S. antitrust law, the discussion is 
often scattered in individual articles. To my knowledge, there is no comprehensive 
analysis of the antitrust liability a SEP owner might face in the two jurisdictions. The 
present research aims to fill this gap. By reviewing past cases and analyzing the 
applicability of competition law to the various licensing practices, the thesis aims to 
define the circumstances in which a SEP owner might face antitrust liability under 
EU competition law, U.S. antitrust law, or both. The research might be thus helpful 
for practicing lawyers and companies, in identifying the limits that competition law 
poses on the SEP owner’s conduct. 
The thesis also adds a different perspective to the discussion of SEPs, by 
separately analyzing the antitrust liability for the SEP owner’s deceptive practices 
during the standardization process and the liability for the SEP owner’s engagement 
in strategic licensing practices after the standard has been adopted. The extant 
literature rarely distinguishes between the two types of conduct. To the contrary, some 
authors (and sometimes even competition authorities), discuss the SEP owner’s 
deceptive practices and the strategic licensing conduct under the same heading, seeing 
them as a different resurgence of the same problem.77 However, there are important 
                                                 
77 See, e.g., V. Torti, IPRs, competition and standard setting: in search of a model to address hold-up, 
33(9) EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW REVIEW 387 (2012) (“From a competition law perspective, patent 
hold-up is problematic as it may lead to distortions of the competitive process (i.e. the selection of the 
optimal technology by SSOs), to the ultimate detriment of consumer welfare.”); B. D. Abramson, The 
Patent Ambush: Misuse Or Caveat Emptor? , PTC Research Foundation (2011). (“The patent ambush 
[is] a particular iteration of the patent holdup problem”); Statement of the Department of Justice’s 
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differences between the two types of conduct, which necessarily requires a different 
antitrust analysis. The thesis points out those differences, and analyzes their 
implications on the SEP owner’s antitrust liability.  
Finally, by providing its own perspective, the thesis contributes to the broader 
policy discussion on the role that competition law should have in addressing the 
disputes arising in the context of SEPs.  
 
 
5. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS  
The thesis is divided in three parts. Part I provides a background, which is 
necessary to understand the issues that are discussed in the second and third parts. 
To provide context, Chapter 2 sets out an overview of the different types of standards, 
SSOs, and the processes through which standards are adopted and implemented by 
market participants. Next, the chapter identifies the principal antitrust concerns that 
might arise in the standardization context, particularly when standards rely on 
technologies protected by patent rights. The chapter distinguishes between 
anticompetitive practices that (1) arise during the standardization process, and (2) 
those that occur after a patented technology has been implemented in a standard. 
Chapter 3 provides the reader with an overview of the relationship between patent 
rights and competition law. The analysis reviews the past case law and identifies the 
limits that competition law imposes on the exercise of patent rights. The chapter 
provides a comparative analysis, pointing out the differences in the approaches 
adopted in the European Union and in the United States.  
Part II focuses on the SEPs owners’ antitrust liability. Chapter 4 discusses the 
SEP owners’ market power—one of the core elements of the antitrust offence. The 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigations of Google Inc.’s Acquisition of Motorola 
Mobility Holdings Inc. and the Acquisitions of Certain Patents by Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp. and 
Research in Motion Ltd., U.S. D.O.J. (2012) (“The threat of an injunction allows a SEP holder to 
demand and realize royalty payments reflecting the investments firms make to develop and implement 
the standard, rather than the economic value of the technology itself. In addition to harming incentives 
for the development of standard-compliant products, the threat of an injunction can also lead to 
excessive royalties that may be passed along to consumers in the form of higher prices. Alternatively, 
an injunction or exclusion order could ban the sale of important consumer products entirely. This type 
of “patent ambush” (emphasis added) harms competition and consumers and is rightly condemned by 
the Commission.”). 
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chapter identifies the elements that competition authorities and courts should take 
into account in evaluating the SEP owner’s market power. It emphasizes that the 
implementation of a patented technology in a standard is not sufficient to prove the 
existence of significant market power, leading to a dominant position or monopoly.  
The two following chapters discuss the applicability of competition law to the 
conduct of a SEP owner found to possess significant market power. Chapter 5 analyzes 
the applicability of competition law to a SEP owner’s deceptive practices during the 
standardization process. It identifies the circumstances under which the SEP owner 
might face liability under EU competition law and U.S. antitrust law. The analysis 
shows that the application of competition law provisions is likely to lead to different 
outcome in the two jurisdictions. Surprisingly, however liability is more likely to arise 
under U.S. antitrust law, whereas most deceptive SEP owners will escape the liability 
under EU competition law. Next, Chapter 6 evaluates the applicability of competition 
law to the strategic use of SEPs. In this case as well, it is evident that the SEP owner 
faces different constraints under EU competition law and U.S. antitrust law. The 
results of the analysis are nevertheless more predictable. The SEP owner faces stricter 
constraints under EU competition law than under U.S. antitrust law. The final 
chapter of this section provides a short summary of the analysis, and identifies the 
gaps that each competition law system faces when addressing the SEP owner’s 
opportunistic practices. 
Part III focuses on two main issues. Chapter 7 examines the available antitrust 
remedies that could be imposed on a SEP owner whose conduct violates competition 
laws. In this respect, the chapter provides an overview of the solutions adopted in 
practice, and evaluates their effectiveness in achieving the goals of the antitrust 
intervention. Next, Chapter 8 evaluates whether the mechanisms available outside 
the competition law domain could be more effective in addressing the concerns related 
to SEPs, and examines what role competition law should play in stimulating the 
development of such mechanisms. Chapter 9 provides an overview of the research 
results and discusses the policy implications that arise from the study.  
The thesis was finalized on May 31st, 2014. Therefore, the discussion only reflects 
cases, the literature and data available until that date.
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Chapter II 
STANDARDS AND STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS  
To provide the reader with a good understanding of the future analysis, this 
chapter introduces the concepts of standards, standardization process, and SEPs. 
First, the chapter discusses the different types of standards, SSOs, and explains the 
process through which standards are implemented by market participants. The 
chapter then focuses on the antitrust concerns that might arise in the standardization 
context, particularly when standards rely on technologies protected by patent rights. 
The chapter identifies the main kinds of conduct that can trigger antitrust concerns 
and analyzes the effects that such conduct might have on the market. Finally, the 
chapter provides a brief overview of industry developments, with the aim to present 
the reader the possible explanations for the numerous disputes related to SEPs.  
 
1. INDUSTRY STANDARDS 
1.1. Standards 
Standards are “documents that define technical or quality requirements with 
which current or future products, production processes, services or methods may 
comply.”78 The requirements determined in the standard can range from general 
product characteristics to detailed and exact specifications. Standards can have two 
distinct functions: (1) to guarantee the quality or safety of a product, or (2) to control 
interoperability in a network market.  
Standards can be determined through different channels. It is possible that the 
standard arises from the market. A company might develop its own standard 
specification that becomes so successful that other market participants start adhering 
to it. The classical example of such standard is the QWERTY system for typewriters 
and keyboards. The system has never been selected as a market standard. 
Nevertheless, manufacturers complied with it, and nowadays, most keyboards 
                                                 
78 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, A Strategic Vision for European Standards: Moving Forward to Enhance 
and Accelerate the Sustainable Growth of the European Economy by 2020, at 1.1. (2011)  
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available in the market follow the QWERTY format.79 Other standards, normally 
defined as de jure standards, are developed by SSOs, organizations where interested 
stakeholders meet and agree on the standard to which adhere in the future.80 
Examples of de jure standards are the Portable Document Format (PDF) and the 
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM).  
The determination of a de jure standard can take place in the private sphere or in 
the public sphere. In sectors where the need for consumer protection, public health, or 
safety considerations is strong, the standardization process generally lies in the hands 
of a public authority.81 Here, standards are set by, or on behalf of, a legislator. The 
adherence to such standards is generally legally binding for all market participants. 
There are, on the other hand, areas in which the legislator may not find it necessary to 
adopt a specific standard, but private parties have nonetheless done so. The purpose of 
the standards adopted in the private sphere is, generally, to facilitate business 
transactions at the national, regional or transnational level. The adherence to 
standards set by private SSOs is voluntary. Manufacturers are not legally bound to 
produce their goods in compliance with the selected standard.  
The distinction between a standard set by a public body and a private body is not 
always clear. The adequate elaboration of a technical standard often requires 
expertise in specific fields—a knowledge that public institutions do not always 
possess. The legislator might consequently decide to rely on the expertise of private 
entities, and delegate to them the selection of a specific standard. The legislator might 
also decide to implement in the legislation, a standard that has been already adopted 
in the private sphere. This is particularly common in the United States where the 
legislator often relies on standards developed in the private sphere.82 
 The thesis focuses primarily on standards set by private SSOs. Although 
anticompetitive concerns may arise also in the context of standards set by public 
                                                 
79 The literature sometime labels such standard as de facto standards. However, in this thesis, the 
term “de facto standard” is used to refer to standard whose compliance is a de facto requirement for a 
player’s the participation in the market. For discussion see: Chapter II, section 1.2. 
80 There are different definitions of de jure standards, some referring to standards adopted by the 
government, and others referring to standards developed by accredited SSOs. For the purpose of this 
thesis, the term de jure standard refers to any standard adopted by an SSO.  
81 J. M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards, 17 BERKELEY 
TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 623 (2002). 
82 For discussion see: Chapter II: 1.2. Standard-setting organizations. 
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authorities, they might require a different antitrust analysis. In the EU, for example, 
competition law provisions address only the conduct of undertakings performing an 
economic activity. On the contrary, public bodies do not perform an economic activity 
are not subject to the limitations set by Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.83 In the United 
States, the scrutiny of public standardization activities might follow a different path, 
given the considerations of state-action and petitioning-immunity doctrines.84  
 
1.2. Standard-setting organizations 
The structure and modus operandi of private SSOs can differ considerably from 
organization to organization. SSOs are generally industry based. Their members are 
often representatives of the industry affected by the discussed standard. This includes 
manufacturers of standard-compliant goods, technology suppliers, but often also 
consumers, representatives from academia or regulatory bodies.  
SSOs can operate at the national, regional or international level. Most countries 
have a national standardization organization active in the field of standardization. 
Examples of such organization are the British Standards Institution (BSI) and the 
Deutsches Institut für Normung (DIN). The structure of the organizations varies from 
                                                 
83 The Court made this clear in SELEX Sistemi Integrati Spa v. Commission, where it rejected to apply 
provisions of competition law to the activities of the European Organization for the Safety of Air 
Navigation (Eurocontrol). Eurocontrol is an international organization established by various European 
states involved in, among other things, the adoption and implementation of common standards and 
specifications in the sector of air navigation. The Court emphasized that the adoption of standards by 
the executive organ of Eurocontrol—made up of state-appointed directors of the civil aviation 
administration of each contracting Member State—represented a legislative activity, and not an 
economic one. It consequently determined that the provisions of competition law could not be applied to 
the activity of Eurocontrol. (See C-113/07 SELEX Sistemi Integrati Spa v. Commission ECR P. I-02207 
(2009)). 
84 The Standard Development Organization Advancement Act of the 2004 confirmed that standards 
developed by government entities are not subject to challenge under U.S. antitrust rules. The Supreme 
Court confirmed this in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, by maintaining 
that“[w]here a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid governmental action, as 
opposed to private action, no violation of the Act can be made out.” (Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference 
v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc, 365 U.S. 127, 136-137 (1967)). The immunity includes the activities of 
private standard-setting bodies that operate under a government supervision. At the same time, the 
antitrust immunity also extends to the participants’ conduct during the standardization process. The 
participants’ effort to alter the outcome of the process performed by a public body is protected from the 
antitrust liability by the doctrine in the Noerr case. The immunity of SSOs based outside of the United 
States are, on the other hand, based on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which determines that 
public acts of foreign governments have sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court nonetheless clarified 
that the immunity does not apply to private SSOs that do not operate under government supervision, 
even if their standard are regularly implemented in the legislation (Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. 
Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499-500 (1988)). 
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country to country, and so does their degree of dependence from the government. In 
some countries (for example, France), the SSO has the status of a public body. The 
adopted standards are considered administrative acts, and compliance with them is 
mandatory for all market players. In other countries (for instance the United Kingdom 
and Germany), the SSO has no legislative power. The decision to produce goods in 
compliance with the standard set by those SSOs is therefore left to the market, unless 
provided differently by a specific legal enactment.  
Several SSOs operate at the regional level. In the EU, for example, the 
standardization activity lies in the hands of the three organizations: the European 
Committee for Standardization (CEN), European Committee for Electro-technical 
Standardization (CENELEC), and the European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (ETSI).85 Each organization is active in its own field. CENELEC is 
responsible for standardization in the electro-technical area, ETSI is in charge for the 
standardization in field telecommunications, whereas CEN is active in multiple 
sectors, except in the ones covered by the other two organizations. Member states play 
an important role in the activities of CEN and CENELEC. ETSI, on the contrary, is an 
industry-based SSO and its work is mainly driven by private parties. The European 
Commission can request each of the three organizations to develop specific standards 
in support of its policies. Most standards are nevertheless adopted at the request of 
industry, and therefore in the private sphere. In the latter case, the compliance with 
those standard is voluntary.  
Three major organizations are involved in the development of standards at the 
international level. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is the 
world's largest developer and publisher of international standards.86 Other important 
international SSOs are the International Electro-technical Commission (IEC) and the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), in charge of the standardization in the 
electro technical and the telecommunications fields respectively. The adherence to 
international standards is voluntary. The level of compliance is nonetheless often high. 
                                                 
85 The ESOs have been recognized as formal European Standard Organizations (ESOs) by the Directive 
98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998, Laying Down a Procedure for 
the Provision of Information in the Field of Technical Standards and Regulations and of Rules on 
Information Society Services (OJ L 204 of 21.07.1998) [hereinafter Directive 98/34/EC].  
86 International Organization for Standardization (ISO), http://www.iso.org/iso/about.htm (last visited 
September 2013). 
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Standard developed by international SSOs frequently become a market requirement. On 
some occasions, international standards are implemented in national regulations, and in 
this way, compliance with them becomes mandatory.  
An increasing number of standards are set by informal SSOs that do not follow in 
any of the mentioned categories. In the information and communication technologies 
(ICT) sector, for instance, 60% of the standards applied in the EU are developed through 
an informal standardization procedure.87 Informal SSOs play a particularly relevant role 
in the United States, where there is no central government agency responsible for 
standardization comparable to the European organizations.88 The work of private SSOs 
has been promoted in 1995, by the adoption of the National Technology Transfer and 
Advancement Act (NTTAA), which required federal agencies to use—to the extent 
possible—consensus-based voluntary standards as alternatives to the standards 
developed only for government use.89  
Past cases showed that antitrust concerns with the SEPs arose in relation to 
standards set at any level. In Rambus (discussed in chapter 1) for example, the 
standard was set by the JEDEC, a U.S.-based private SSO. Other cases concerned 
patents essential for standards set by a regional SSO (for example ETSI), or by an 
international one (for example ITU). The common feature of these standards was their 
wide market implementation. The use of standards adopted at the regional level is, in 
fact, not necessarily limited to the borders of the region. Some of the standards 
adopted at the regional level enjoy a truly international acceptance. Therefore, 
anticompetitive concerns are not tied to the geographical level at which the standard 
has been set, but rather are related to the market success of the standard. 
Anticompetitive concerns are particularly likely to arise where adherence to the 
standard is a de facto requirement for the participation in the market. 
                                                 
87 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, White Paper, Modernising ICT Standardisation in the EU – The Way 
Forward, COM (2009) 324 final (2009). 
88 The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) acts as an overall coordinator and certifier of the 
so-called voluntary national standards system. ANSI oversees the creation of standards, but it does not 
adopt the standards itself. Not all SSOs are however members of ANSI. 
89 The NTTAA was enacted in response to private sector concerns that federal agencies were 
developing government standards when similar or identical standards already existed in the private 
sector, or that such standards could be developed in the private sector with appropriate government 
input. Private sector stakeholders claimed that the government’s reliance upon government-unique 
standards greatly increased procurement costs and severely limited the government’s ability to obtain 
off-the-shelf and state-of-the-art technology. 
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1.3. De facto standards 
 Although manufacturers have no duty to produce their goods in compliance with 
voluntary standards, some of these standards enjoy wide market acceptance. There 
are several factors that may stimulate manufacturers to produce their goods in 
compliance with a voluntary standard.  
 Manufacturers might derive important benefits from complying with a voluntary 
standard. For example, compliance with a quality standard may be a tool for a 
manufacturer to convey to its consumers information about the quality of the good and 
differentiate the product from those of its competitors.90 Manufacturers might also 
decide to implement quality standards in order to avoid possible liability claims. In the 
case of interoperability standards, which allow one product to work together with 
those of other manufacturers, the standard generally increases the value consumers 
attribute to the product. Introducing a product into a market where the standard is 
already established often results in a greater acceptance and faster uptake of the 
product. Consequently, most firms will comply with a standard adopted in the market, 
rather than develop their own alternative.91  
In some circumstances, a standard might be so widely adopted by the market 
that compliance with it becomes a de facto requirement for the participation in the 
market—a de facto standard.92 De facto standards are particularly likely to arise in 
markets with strong network effects, where interoperability among products plays a 
fundamental role.93 Where network effects are strong, the market often “tips” towards 
an individual standard, which becomes the predominant market solution.94 Even if 
                                                 
90 G. Howells, The Relationship Between Product Liability and Product Safety — Understanding a 
Necessary Element in. European Product Liability Through a Comparison with the US Position, 39 
WASHBURN. L J 305 (2000).  
91 M. L. Katz & C. SHAPIRO, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 THE AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC REVIEW 3 (1985) (discussing private and social incentives for producing goods in compliance 
with voluntary (interoperability) standard). 
92 The word “de facto” is a Latin expression that means “by fact”. In the legal context is often used to 
describe something that is a rule by fact, although not necessarily mandated by law.  
93 P. Anderson & M. L. Tushman, Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Designs: A Cyclical 
Model of Technological Change, 35 ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 604 (1990).  
94 Katz & C. Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AMERICAN ECONOMIC 
REVIEW 424 (1986); P. Van Eecke & M. Truyens, Standardization in the European Information and 
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alternative standards exist, they often retain only a marginal relevance. In such 
circumstances, a single manufacturer risks losing a significant number of its 
customers if it decides to produce goods that do not comply with a de facto standard. 
The choice of whether or not to comply with the winning standard thus becomes a 
choice between adoption of the standard or exit from the market.95  
An example of a de facto standard is the Global System for Mobile 
communication (GSM) standard. The standard was developed by ETSI in the early 
1990s as a voluntary standard.96 Nonetheless, in 2009, 80% of mobile handsets were 
based on the GSM standard, which allowed mobile devices to interoperate among each 
other.97 Alternative standards did exist. Compliance with the GSM standard was 
nevertheless a de facto requirement for mobile manufacturers entering the EU 
market.98 A device that did not comply with the GSM standard was unable to 
interoperate with the large number of handsets that relied on the GSM standard, and 
was consequently of low value to a consumer.99  
When compliance with the standard is de facto mandatory, the standard 
becomes−in economic terms−a bottleneck. Market access is contingent on the access to 
the standard. This might give raise to several concerns, particularly if the standard 
relies on a technology protected by a patent right. In such circumstances, the SEP 
owner not only controls the access to the SEP and the standard in question, but also 
the access to the entire market. This might in turn give rise to anticompetitive 
practices. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Technology Sector: Official Procedures on the Verge of Being Overhauled, 5 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH 
11 (2009). 
95 C. F. Kemerer, C. Z. Liu, S. A. Slaughter, & M. D. Smith, Standards Competition in the Presence of 
Digital Conversion Technology: An Empirical Analysis of the Flash Memory Card Market, Heinz 
Research (2010), available at 
http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1057&context=heinzworks 
96 European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), http://www.etsi.org/technologies-
clusters/technologies/mobile (last visited December 2013). 
97 Wikipedia, Mobile Telephony, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_telephony (last visited 
December 2013). 
98 See, e.g., Patrick Traynor, CS 8803 - Cellular and Mobile Network Security: GSM - In Detail (Sep. 
2012), available at http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~traynor/cs8803/f12/slides/lecture06-standards.pdf 
(maintaining that the GSM standard “is the de facto standard for wireless communications”). 
99 The situation was different in the US where the GSM standard competed heavily with other 
standards, such as the Code Division Multiple Access standard (CDMA). 
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2. ANTITRUST CONCERNS WITH INDUSTRY STANDARDS 
2.1. Traditional antitrust concerns: collusion and foreclosure  
Competition authorities and courts have been traditionally suspicious of 
standard-setting activities. The standardization process necessarily involves 
competitors meeting to discuss their future behavior in the market. There is an 
inherent risk that participants will use the standardization process for 
anticompetitive purposes. Participants might collude on price or output. They might 
also use the standardization process as a tool to foreclose competitors from the 
market.100 By restricting the access to the standardization process, or making a biased 
selection of technologies, participants can exclude rivals’ technologies from the 
standard.101 Further, if the standard becomes a de facto requirement for the 
participation in the market, participants might use the standard as a tool to foreclose 
companies from the downstream market. It is thus clear that standardization 
activities might be considered unlawful under competition law, particularly under 
Article 101 TFEU in the EU and Section 1 of the Sherman Act in the United States.102 
Economists have nonetheless explained that standardization agreements have 
also substantive procompetitive effects.103 By allowing a combined use of products 
from different manufacturers, standards can increase consumer choice and 
convenience.104 This is particularly true in network markets, where the value that an 
individual consumer derives from a product increases with the number of consumers 
that use the same standard.105 Standards can also decrease switching costs and 
                                                 
100 Foreclosure refers to cases where an undertaking or a group of undertakings denies to its rival or 
rivals the access to a needed input, source of distribution, or market.  
101 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, X-Open Group § No L 35 (OJ 1986). 
102 For EU see: EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty 
to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, Official Journal C 003 06/01/2001, 165 (2001). For US see: 
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. 
Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 660 (1961); American Society of Mechanical Engineers v 
Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 571. (1982).  
103 See, e.g., J. Farrell & G. Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 THE RAND 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 70 (1985); H. J. Hovenkamp, Standards Ownership and Competition Policy, 48 
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 87 (2007).  
104 H. J. Hovenkamp, Standards Ownership and Competition Policy, 48 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 
87 (2007).  
105 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, A YEAR IN THE LIFE OF A HIGH TECH 
STANDARDS SETTING ORGANIZATION (2002) available at http://apps.americanbar.org/antitrust/at-
committees/at-ip/pdf/past-prog/04-25-02.pdf.  
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prevent consumers from being locked into a specific system.106 Further, when a 
standard reduces differentiation, it generally tends to intensify price competition.107 
Standards have also positive effects for producers. They allow economies of scale to 
occur, with a consequent reduction in the unit cost of production. Standards also allow 
producers to shift their resources to the development of end-user applications, instead 
of focusing their resources on establishing competing formats.108 In this way, 
standardization activities can foster innovation. Finally, international standards play 
a crucial role in facilitating trade among states, an effect that is particularly welcomed 
in the EU context, given its positive effects on the development of the internal market.  
Principles of economic theory are reflected in the competition law approach 
towards standard setting. Both in the EU and in the United States, competition 
authorities and courts have recognized that standard setting can have considerable 
procompetitive effects and it might be consistent with the goals of competition. In the 
EU, the Commission has expressed such view in the Guidelines on the Applicability of 
Article 101 of the EC Treaty to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements (2001 Guidelines), 
where a special section was devoted to standardization agreements.109 The 
Commission emphasized that when the standardization process is conducted in 
respect with specific procedural requirement (such as unrestricted and transparent 
participation) the standardization agreement is unlikely to have considerable 
anticompetitive effects. It is consequently unlikely to trigger the application of Article 
101 TFEU.110 Also U.S. courts have recognized that standardization agreements might 
have substantive procompetitive effects. They consequently clarified that a 
                                                 
106 A. Soininen, Patents and Standards in the ICT Sector: Are Submarine Patents a Substantive 
Problem or a Red Herring?: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF IT STANDARDS AND STANDARDIZATION 
RESEARCH § 5 (2007). 
107 R. Schmalensee, Standard-Setting, Innovation Specialists, and Competition Policy, 57.3 THE 
JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 526 (2009). 
108 H. SCHEPEL, THE CONSTITUTION OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: PRODUCT STANDARDS IN THE REGULATION 
(Hart. 2005). 
109 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements § C (2010) 9274/2, ¶ 263 
(2010).  
110 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Horizontal 
Cooperation Agreements, C 3/2 2001/C 3/02, ¶ 163 (2001). Even standardization agreements that do not 
meet the criteria of the safe harbor, can be still exempted under 101(3) TFEU (at the time 81(3) EC), if 
they have economic benefits, the restrictions they impose are indispensable, and they do not result in 
the complete elimination of competition (id. at 169-175). 
 44 
 
standardization agreement is not a per se violation of antitrust law, but its effect can 
be evaluated under the rule of reason.111  
 
2.2. New antitrust concerns: standard essential patents 
Although the risk of collusion and foreclosure is still present, the legal framework 
seems to strike an appropriate balance between facilitating procompetitive cooperation 
and deterring collusion. In the 2000s, however, the use of standards raised new 
concerns. The focus was not on the collusive practices among participants, but rather 
on unilateral conducts.112 Concerns have arisen particularly in relation to the conduct 
of SEP owners. The next paragraphs will first explain the main feature of SEPs, and 
then explain the possible opportunistic conducts that may arise in relation to their 
use.  
2.2.A. Standard essential patents 
Industry standards often rely on technical solutions that are not available in the 
public domain, but are protected by patent rights. Several reasons might motivate the 
SSO to implement a patented technology in the standard. For example, a standard 
may rely on a patented technology, because the technology provides a unique solution 
for a specific function. It is also possible that alternative solutions existed, but that a 
specific technology was selected and implemented in the standard, because it was 
considered the optimal way to perform a specific function, in terms of quality, cost 
efficiency or other factors. Once a patented technology has been selected and 
implemented in the standard, the use of the patent covering that technology becomes 
essential—a SEP.  
                                                 
111 See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 US 492, 501 (1988) (“When … 
private associations promulgate safety standards based on the merits of objective expert judgments and 
through procedures that prevent the standard-setting process from being biased by members with 
economic interests in stifling product competition […] those private standards can have significant pro-
competitive advantages. It is this potential for pro-competitive benefits that has led most lower courts 
to apply rule-of-reason analysis to product standard-setting by private associations”).  
112 See, e.g., R. Dagen, Rambus, Innovation Efficiency, and Section 5 of the FTC Act, 90 BOSTON 
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1479, 1484 (2010) (“Until recently, antitrust issues involving standard setting 
have involved collusion among competitors. […] More recent attention has focused on anticompetitive 
unilateral conduct.”). 
 45 
 
The concept of SEPs is strictly related to the FRAND commitment. Just like any 
other patent owner, the SEP owner would have, in principle, the statutory right to 
exclude third parties from the use of its patented technology. It could thus decide to 
refuse to license its SEP to manufacturers interested in producing standard-compliant 
goods, and in this way, make the standard inaccessible. In order to avoid this outcome, 
SSOs generally adopt specific rules that aim to facilitate the access to the standard. 
SSOs generally require the participant of the standardization procedure to disclose 
upfront the existence of any patent that might be relevant for the discussed 
standard,113 and clarify whether it is willing to license the patent on FRAND terms.114 
Only if the owner agrees to license its patent on FRAND terms, will the SSO typically 
consider implementing the patented technology in the standard. If, on the contrary, 
the patent owner refuses to license its technology under the required terms, the SSO 
will have to redesign its standard in a way to exclude the SEP in question.115  
FRAND commitments have allowed the successful development of industry 
standards for several decades. Although standards often relied on technologies 
protected by patent rights, the presence of SEPs did traditionally not represent a 
major limitation. SEP owners and manufacturers of standard-compliant goods have 
been generally able to come to a mutual agreement on licensing terms for the SEPs. In 
the last decade, however, the situation has changed. There have been an increasing 
number of disputes concerning SEPs. As explained in this part, there is an increasing 
concern that the SEP owner might engage in opportunistic practices which are 
harmful for the manufacturers, the standardization process, and ultimately the 
consumers. 
                                                 
113 See, e.g. ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy, supra note 9, § 4.1; International 
Electrotechnical Commission, International Organization for Standardization, International 
Telecommunication Union [IEC/ISO/ITU], Guidelines for Implementation of the Common Patent Policy 
for ITU-T/ITU-R/ISO/IEC, § 3 (Feb. 24. 2012), available at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-
t/oth/04/04/T04040000010003PDFE.pdf [Guidelines for the ITU patent policy] 
114 See, e.g. ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy; some SSOs, as for instance the World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C), have stricter rules and require the patent owners to agree to license the technology 
on a royalty free basis, if implemented in the standard. (World Wide Web Consortium [3WC], 3WC 
Patent Policy Overview, § 2 (Feb. 4th 2004), available at http://www.w3.org/2004/02/05-
patentsummary.html [hereinafter 3WC Patent Policy]). 
115 See, e.g. The International Telecommunication Union [ITU], Common Patent Policy for ITU-T/ITU-
R/ISO/IEC, § 8.1., available at http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/ipr/Pages/policy.aspx (last visited on June 2, 
2013) [hereinafter ITU Patent Policy]; 3WC Patent Policy, supra note114, §2. 
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2.2.B. The SEP owner’s opportunism 
The SEP owner might engage in various opportunistic practices. Although those 
practices differ among each other, it is possible to differentiate two major groups: (i) 
the SEP owner’s deceptive behavior during the standardization process, and (ii) the 
strategic use of SEPs.  
The first group includes the SEP owner’s deceptive practices during the 
standardization process. Such practices arise ex ante, that is, before the SSO has 
selected the technologies to be implemented in the standard. The SEP owner might, 
for instance, make a false statement during the standardization process, by claiming 
that it does not own patents relevant for the discussed standard. Alternatively, the 
SEP owner might make no false statement, but might hide the existence of its patent 
by remaining silent about its patent rights. It is also possible that the SEP owner 
discloses the existence of its patent, but falsely commits to license its patented 
technologies on FRAND terms if implemented in the standard. In this way, the SEP 
owner might persuade the SSO to implement its technology in the standard. The 
different forms of deception generally aim at achieving a common goal: obtaining the 
implementation of the patented technology in the standard.116 
The SEP owner’s deceptive conduct has several undesirable effects. Most 
importantly, it might subvert the outcome of the standardization process. By 
                                                 
116 There are other possible deceptive conducts that the SEP owner might undertake during the 
standardization process, both collective and unilateral. Participants in a standard setting procedure 
might for instance agree to threaten a patent owner with a boycott of its technology, unless the owner 
agrees to make it available for free or at below-competitive royalties. (See, e.g., Sony Electronics, Inc. v. 
Soundview Technologies, Inc., 157 F.Supp.2d 180 (D.C. D Connecticut 2001).) Over-disclosure of SEPs 
might be also considered a deceptive conduct. The SEP owner might intentional claim more patents to 
be essential than they actually are, and in this way to obtain bargaining power in the licensing 
negotiations. A company that has a large portfolio with hundreds of patents is more likely to obtain 
favorable cross-licensing conditions that the licensee with a limited patent portfolio or no SEPs at all. 
Most SSOs do not check whether the declared patents are valid and essential: it hence possible that 
there is higher number of patented declared to be essential than in practice is. In 2005, Goodman and 
Myers examined patent and patent applications declared essential for the 3GPP and 3 GPP standards, 
and found that only about 21 % of the declared patents were actually essential. Although the research 
was criticized on several grounds, it nonetheless indicate the serious problem of over-disclosure of SEPs. 
(R.A. Myers & D.J Goodman, 3G Cellular standards and patents, IEEE Wire-lessCom2005 (2005), 
available at http://eeweb.poly.edu/dgoodman/wirelesscom2005.pdf. For criticism see: C. De Meyer & D. 
L. Martin, Patent counting, a misleading index of patent value: A critique of Goodman & Myers and its 
uses (De. 4, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=949439). For reasons 
of space, I will focus on the three identified types of deceptive acts, which constitute the major concerns 
today. Some of the general conclusions might nonetheless apply also to deceptive conducts that have not 
been directly discussed in the thesis. 
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conferring incorrect information that a specific technology is available at no cost, or on 
FRAND terms, the SEP owner might induce the SSO’s participants to implement its 
technology in the market, whereas different technologies could have been selected for 
the standard if accurate information were made available to the SSO’s participants. 
The deception might thus distort competition in the technology market, that is, in the 
market where technologies compete for the implementation in the standard.  
The second type of conduct includes the SEP owner’s strategic licensing practices. 
This kind of conduct takes place ex post, after the patented technology has been 
implemented and the use of the patent becomes essential. At this point, the SEP 
owner becomes an unavoidable trading party for all manufacturers interested in the 
production of standard-compliant goods. This might open the door to opportunistic 
practices. The SEP owner might for instance refuse to license its SEP, and in this way 
foreclose a manufacturer’s access to the standard. Alternatively, the SEP owner might 
license its SEP, but require the manufacturer to pay royalties that are considered 
excessive to the value of the SEP. The SEP owner might also impose on the 
manufacturer other onerous licensing conditions, such as mandatory cross licensing or 
non-assertion clauses. Finally, the SEP owner might also impose licensing conditions 
that harm the rival’s ability to compete in markets that are related to the standard. 
For example, by licensing its SEP only at exorbitant royalties, the SEP owner can 
increases rivals’ costs and in this way obtain a competitive advantage in the product 
market.117  
The SEP owner’s strategic licensing practices might have thus, negative welfare 
effects. First, there might be exclusionary effects, if by refusing to license its SEP, the 
SEP owner is able to exclude manufacturers from the downstream market. Second, 
there might be exploitative effects, whereby the SEP owner is able to extract rents 
from manufacturers. Third, the SEP owner might use the SEPs in a way that affects 
the rivals’ ability to compete in a secondary market that is related to the standard.  
The two types of conduct (the SEP owner’s deceptive behavior during the 
standardization process, and the imposition of strategic licensing conditions) impose 
undesired effects on different markets. On one hand, the SEP owner’s deceptive 
                                                 
117 Statement of the DOJ Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigations of Google Inc.’s 
Acquisition of Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc. and the Acquisitions of Certain Patents by Apple Inc., 
Microsoft Corp. and Research in Motion Ltd. (2012). 
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conduct during the standardization process affects competition in the technology 
market—the market where technologies compete for implementation in the standard. 
The SEP owner’s strategic licensing practices, on the other hand, mainly affect the 
product market. Those effects are graphically represented in Picture I.  
  
PICTURE I: EFFECTS THAT THE SEP OWNERS’ OPPORTUNISTIC PRACTICES MAY HAVE ON 
MARKETS 
 
 
 
 
Both types of opportunism might have, nonetheless, broader negative consequences. 
Some commentators suggested that the SEP owner’s opportunism might undermine 
the success of the standard. Manufacturers might be hesitant to produce their goods in 
compliance with the standard, if they fear that the SEP owner will hold them up and 
try to extract excessive royalties. The SEP owner’s deceptive conduct might also 
undermine the confidence in standard-setting procedure, and decrease the 
participants’ incentives to take part in further standardization activities. Further, 
commentators suggest that patent holdup might lead to the problem of “royalty 
stacking.” A final product relies in fact on several SEPs. A manufacturer of a 
standard-compliant good must thus pay the royalties for all SEPs “stacked” together. 
Royalty stacking might consequently “magnifies the problems associated with . . . 
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patent holdup,”118 if the cumulative royalties for all SEPs included in an individual 
standard are too high. Finally, the SEP owner’s opportunism might also harm 
consumers. Patent holdup might harm consumers directly if excessive prices are 
passed on them. Additionally, an indirect harm might arise if, by harming the success 
of the standard and of the standardization process, the SEP owner’s opportunism 
deprives consumers of the benefits brought by the standardization process. 
 
2.3. The criticisms of the holdup theory 
The patent holdup theory is controversial and several commentators have 
questioned its plausibility. They suggest that, although the SEP owner’s opportunism 
is theoretically possible, it rarely occurs in practice.119 Commissioner Wright notes 
that “the decision to engage in hold-up results in short-term gains than can easily be 
overwhelmed in a 'repeated game' setting.”120 Sidak maintains that “patent holdup is a 
conjecture, not a real-world fact.”121 Geradin similarly argues that a SEP owner faces 
several vertical, horizontal and dynamic constraints that prevent the SEP owner from 
imposing opportunistic licensing conditions on manufacturers.122 Therefore, although 
these commentators acknowledge that the SEP holder could behave opportunistically, 
they argue this rarely occurs in practices. 
Commentators also argue that there is little evidence that cases of (alleged) SEP 
owner’s opportunism have had a negative effect on standards, on the standardization 
process, or consumers. Commissioner Wright for instance maintained, “I am not aware 
                                                 
118 M. A. Lemley & C. Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1991, 1993 
(2007). 
119 See, e.g., D. Geradin & M. P. Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant 
View on Patent Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND, 3 EUROPEAN COMPETITION 
JOURNAL 101 (2006); E. Dorsey & M. R. McGuire, How the Google Consent Order Alters the Process and 
Outcomes of FRAND Bargaining, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 979 (2013); G. Langus, V. Lipatov & D. Neven, 
Standard Essential Patents: Who is Really Holding Up (and When)?, 9 JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW & 
ECONOMICS 253 (2013); J. D. Ratliff & D. L. Rubinfeld, The Use and Threat of Injunctions in the Rand 
Context, 9 JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS 1 (2013). 
120 J. D. Wright, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at The Inaugural Academic Conference: 
The Commercial Function of Patents in Today’s Innovation Economy, George Mason University School 
of Law (Sep. 12, 2013), at 20. 
121 G. Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties, 9 JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS 
931, 1021 (2013). 
122 D. Geradin, Abusive Pricing in an IP Licensing Context: An EC Competition Law Analysis, EU 
Competition Law and Policy Workshop/Proceeding, at 6-7 (2007), available at 
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2007(pdf)/200709-COMPed-Geradin.pdf. 
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of any reliable evidence that indicates royalty rates and final end-use prices are higher 
for standardized technologies.”123 Abramson and Mariniello emphasize that SEP 
owners (including NPEs and practicing entities) are generally interested in the widest 
implementation of the standard, and are consequently not interested in imposing 
licensing fees that could slow down the adoption of the standard or harm its success.124 
Commentators maintain that empirical evidence shows a trend opposite to holdup. 
The telecommunications industry—an industry that relies extensively on standards, 
and where disputes with SEP owners are most common—had since 2005 an 
impressive growth that was rarely matched in other industries.125 There seems to be 
hence no evidence of a serious market failure due to patent holdup. 
Finally, some commentators have also criticized the negative approach towards 
NPEs. Mann, Geradin and other authors have pointed out that the presence of NPEs 
does not necessarily have negative effects on the market. NPEs can increase 
competition in the up-stream market, given that the entry costs incurred if entering 
only in the upstream market might be substantively lower than the one incurred when 
starting an entire production process:126 NPEs can also provide liquidity to the market 
for patents, and through this, they stimulate innovation.127 Finally, Schmalensee and 
Schmidt point out that NPEs might tend to charge lower royalties, given that on 
difference of practicing entities, they do not have the incentives to increase rivals’ 
cost.128 
                                                 
123 Joshua D. Wright, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at The Inaugural Academic 
Conference: The Commercial Function of Patents in Today’s Innovation Economy, George Mason 
University School of Law (Sep. 12, 2013), at 22. 
124 B. Dean Abramson, The Patent Ambush: Misuse Or Caveat Emptor?, PTC RESEARCH FOUNDATION 
(2011). M. Mariniello, Fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms: a challenge for 
competition authorities, 7 JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS 523 (2011). 
125 D. Geradin, Moving Away from High-Level Theories: A Market-Driven Analysis of FRAND in the 
Context of Standardization, ANTITRUST BULLETIN (forthcoming 2014). 
126 D. Geradin. A. Layne-Farrar‡ and A. J. Padilla, Elves or Trolls? The Role of Non-Practicing Patent 
Owners in the Innovation Economy, Industrial and Corporate Changes (2011); R. J. Mann, Do Patents 
Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 961 (2005).  
127 A. Layne-Farrar & K. M. Schmidt, Licensing Complementary Patents: “Patent Trolls”, Market 
Structure, and “Excessive Royalties”, Discussion, 15 GOVERNANCE AND THE EFFICIENCY OF ECONOMIC 
SYSTEMS (2009); J. F. McDonough, III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the 
Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY LAW JOURNAL 189 (2006). 
128 R. Schmalensee, Standard-Setting, Innovation Specialists, and Competition Policy, 57.3 THE 
JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 526 (2009); K. Schmidt, Licensing Complementary Patents: 
"Patent Trolls," Market Structure, and "Excessive" royalties, Discussion Paper 275 (2009), available at 
http://www.sfbtr15.de/uploads/media/275.pdf. 
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Therefore, there is a considerable disagreement in the legal and economic 
literature with respect to the likelihood that patent holdup will arise in practice, and 
what consequences it might have for the standard, the standardization process, and 
ultimately consumers. 
 
 
3. INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENTS AND THE ROLE OF COMPETITION LAW 
Before starting the legal analysis, it might be useful to discuss some of the most 
important developments that took place in industries where the use of SEPs has 
become particularly controversial. Some of the changes might provide a possible 
explanation for the increased number of disputes related to SEPs. 
The inclusion of patented technology in industry standards is not a new 
phenomenon. Already in the past, standards relied on technologies covered by patents. 
However, the inclusion of patented technologies in standards did not traditionally 
represent a major source of concern. In industries involving the production of complex 
technologies,129 which rely on multiple patented technologies, patent owners did not 
assert normally their patents in an offensive way. Patent licensing did not represent a 
major source of income.130 Patents were used as a defensive tool to secure protection 
against infringement suits from other patent owners, or to block rivals from patenting 
related inventions. Patents were also used a bargaining tool in cross licensing 
negotiations.131 As a result, in markets of complex products, there were relatively few 
patent infringement suits related to SEPs. Nonetheless, this pattern has gradually 
                                                 
129 The distinction between the complex and simple technologies was suggested by Cohen, Nelson and 
Walsh. Complex products are those comprised of numerous separately patentable elements, versus 
relatively few elements in the case of simple products. New drugs are normally protected by a single 
patent. In contrast, electronic products tend to be comprised of a larger number—often hundreds--of 
patentable elements and, hence, are considered complex. (W. M. Cohen, R. R. Nelson, & J. P. Walsh, 
Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms 
Patent (or Not), NBER Working Paper Series 7552, at 21 (2000). 
130 Choen, Nelson, & Walsh performed a survey on the how firms use patents across industries. 
According to the survey only ten industries reported licensing revenue as a motive for patenting. These 
are printing/publishing, petroleum products, drugs, steel, metal products, motors/generators, 
semiconductors, communication equipment, TV/radio, and aerospace (id. at 21). 
131 F. M. Scott-Morton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General For Economic Analysis, The Role of 
Standards in the Current Patent Wars (2012), Presented at Charles River Associates Annual Brussels 
Conference available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/289708.pdf (“[T]he natural outcome 
was a cross-license at low royalty rates. Litigation was often not a practical way to gain advantage 
because the other side could retaliate symmetrically”).  
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changed. Particularly in the mobile handset industry (including smartphones and 
tablets), SEPs are enforced more aggressively, and litigation is more common.132 We 
are now observing what has been defined by some commentators as one of the biggest 
patent wars, where almost every company active in the mobile device industry is 
involved in one or more litigations, often involving claims about SEPs (see Picture 
II).133  
 
 
PICTURE II: PATENT WAR IN THE MOBILE INDUSTRY 
 
 
Source: Droid Matters, http://www.droidmatters.com/news/smartphone-patent-lawsuits/ (last visited 
Dec. 2012) 
 
Although it is difficult to state what the exact reasons for a more assertive use of 
SEPs are, we can observe some important market developments which can explain—at least 
partially—the change in the enforcement practice related to SEPs. First, products in technology 
                                                 
132 C. Shapiro, The Design and Use of Patents, IESE-BBVA Lecture (2007), available at 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/madrid.pdf (discussing the general trend of a stronger 
enforcement of patents).  
133 See, e.g., D. Rowinski, The Mobile Patent Wars: Are We Ready for This to Go Thermonuclear? (Feb. 
14, 2012), available at http://www.readwriteweb.com/mobile/2012/02/the-mobile-patent-wars-are-
we.php. 
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industries such as mobile handsets, increasingly rely on patented technologies.134 
Today, an individual standard, such as the 3G standard, might rely on hundreds or 
even thousands of patents, all (declared) essential for the production of a standard-
compliant good.135 Although a high number of SEPs does not provide an explanation 
for a more aggressive use of SEPs, it certainly makes infringement—and consequently 
litigation—more likely.  
Second, SEPs are increasingly used as a tool to generate income. This can be 
attributed partly to NPEs, which have increased their legal actions against 
infringers.136 Historically, NPEs emerged as result of the information technology 
bubble in the 1990s. The income generated from the stock market has been often 
invested in innovation activities, which has resulted in an increased number of 
inventions protected by patent rights. As the bubble burst, many companies lost their 
capital and ended up having large patent portfolios. A market where patent rights 
were traded as commodities started to develop, leading to the emergence of companies 
that focused exclusively on enforcement of patent rights. NPEs have now become a 
common business structure in industries, such as the mobile-device sector. Given their 
business structure, NPEs, irrespective of whether they are involved in the innovative 
process, or if they focus merely on the enforcement of their patent portfolio (patent 
assertion entities—PAEs), are not interested in using SEPs for defensive purposes or 
as a bargaining tool in a cross-licensing negotiation. Rather, they use their patents as 
a tool to generate income by licensing it to downstream producers. Consequently, a 
higher number of NPEs is likely to result in a more assertive use of SEPs.  
At the same time, also practicing entities have been making an increasingly 
assertive use of SEPs. This might be partially attributed to the changes in the market 
structure that have arisen in the last decade. Companies such as Nokia, Motorola, and 
Ericsson were in past the major players in the market for mobile handset. They were 
                                                 
134 M. A. Lemley, Ten Things to do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not To), 48 BOSTON 
COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 149 (2007). 
135 See, e.g., Submission by CISCO, Certain Wireless Communications Devices, Portable Music and 
Data Processing Devices, Computers, and Components Thereof, Investigation No. 337-TA-745 and 
Certain Gaming and Entertainment Consoles, Related Software, and Components Thereof, 
Investigation No. 337-TA-753, § 1 (June 7, 2012), available at http://essentialpatentblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/Cisco-Public-Interest-Statement-337-TA-752.pdf. 
136 Litigation Over Time, Patent Freedom (Jan 2014), available at 
https://www.patentfreedom.com/about-npes/litigations/ (reporting that patent lawsuits involving NPEs 
have increased on average 22 percent per year from 2004 to 2014). 
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also the major innovators in the industry, and contributors of technologies to the 
standards developed by SSOs. They owned significant patent portfolios, generally 
including a significant number of SEPs.137 In the last decade, however, several of these 
companies have lost their position in the product market (see picture III). New 
companies, like Apple and Microsoft, entered the market, becoming important market 
players. Those companies did not take part in the past standardization activities, and 
did not contribute their technologies to SSOs. They consequently own only a limited 
number of SEPs. There is understandably a strong disagreement between the SEP 
holders and the new entrants about the way in which SEPs should be enforced. Older 
market players that have extensive patent portfolios (including SEPS), typically argue 
in favor of strong protection of SEPs. To the contrary, companies that have only 
recently entered the market, and have a lower number of SEPs, argue in favor of a 
more interventionist approach with less emphasis on the protection of SEPs.  
 
PICTURE III: CHANGES IN MANUFACTURERS’ MARKET SHARES 2007–2010 
 
 
Source: Asymco, http://www.asymco.com/ (last visited Dec. 2013) 
 
 Further, some market players have changed their business structure in a way 
that favors a more assertive use of SEPs. Companies that were previously practicing 
                                                 
137 R. Bongard, R. Bekkers & A. NuvolariI, An empirical study on the determinants of essential patent 
claims in compatibility standards, 40 RESEARCH POLICY 1001, 1008 (2011).  
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their patents, and thus active in the downstream market, have exit the manufacturing 
business and become NPEs. Perhaps, the clearest example is Nokia, which was the 
major producer of mobile devices only a few years ago, and, in 2013, sold its 
manufacturing business to Microsoft.138 Nokia now focuses exclusively on licensing its 
technologies to manufacturers of mobile devices. At the same time, there were several 
cases of the so-called “privateering”, where practicing companies transferred their own 
SEPs to NPEs, with the alleged intention to engage in patent litigation against 
competitors in the downstream market. A good example is the Rockstar Consortium, 
an organization formed by Apple, Microsoft, BlackBerry, Ericsson, and Sony, to which 
those companies transferred the patents that they acquired from bankrupt Nortel.139 
In the view of some commentators, Rockstar was established with the purpose to 
assert patents, including SEPs, against companies that compete in the downstream 
market.140 These structural changes in market have contributed to a more assertive 
use of SEPs. 
 Finally, the more assertive use of SEPs can be also explained by the impressive 
growth the mobile industry had since 2000. New products, such as smartphones and 
tables, have obtained great success, opening new markets, and have generated 
considerable income (see Picture IV). The mobile-handset industry, has achieved 
impressive growth that has been rarely observed in any other market. In other words, 
there is a lot of money at stake in the industry, and there is strong competition among 
how market players ought to divide the rents generated by growth in the market. The 
assertion of SEPs plays a fundamental role in the dispute on how to divide the 
generated revenue. 
 
                                                 
138 M. Scott, Handset Unit Nearly Sold, Nokia Now Looks to an Uncertain Future, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/20/technology/nokia-shareholders-vote-to-sell-cellphone-unit-to-
microsoft.html?_r=0. 
139 G. Ng, Apple/Microsoft Consortium Sues Google, Samsung Over Nortel Patents, IPHONE IN CANADA, 
Oct. 31, 2013, http://www.iphoneincanada.ca/news/apple-microsoft-rockstar-sues-google-samsung/. 
140 J. Mick, Apple and Microsoft Expand Patent Trolling, Sue TWC, Cisco via Subsidiary, DAILY TECH 
(Dec. 2013), 
http://www.dailytech.com/Apple+and+Microsoft+Expand+Patent+Trolling+Sue+TWC+Cisco+via+Subsi
diary/article33987.htm. 
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PICTURE IV: SALES IN THE MOBILE-DEVICE INDUSTRY 2000-2016 
 
Source: App Clover, http://appclover.com/about/industry-landscape/ (Dec. 2013) 
  
 In sum, although patented technologies have been implemented in industry 
standards already in the past, concerns with the SEP owners’ strategic conducts are a 
relatively new phenomena. The concerns arose when, due to the changes in the 
market, companies started asserting their SEPs in a more aggressive way. 
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Chapter III 
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPETITION LAW 
The tension between competition law and patent rights is not a new issue. Courts 
and competition authorities have discussed on several occasions the line between the 
legitimate use of IPRs and an antitrust violation. The present chapter reviews the 
doctrines developed in past cases and tries to delineate the relationship between the 
two bodies of law. The aim of the chapter is to remind the reader what is settled and 
what is not in the relationship between competition law and patent rights.  
 
 
1. PATENTS: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Patent rights 
IPRs are “rights . . . that exclude non-owners for a specified duration and over a 
specified breadth from commercially exploiting the IPR without the owner’s 
permission.”141 IPRs protect the property of intangible goods, such as creative 
expressions, ideas, symbols, information, music, and design. The three best known 
forms of IPRs are copyrights, trademarks, and patents, although other forms of IPRs, 
such as trade secrets, geographical indications, and industrial designs also exist. The 
present thesis focuses on patent rights, as this is the most common form of IPR that is 
invoked in the legal issues covered in this thesis. 
Patents protect inventions. In order to be patentable, the invention must fulfill 
specific conditions. The requirements vary from country to country. In general, 
however, an invention can be patented if it meets the following criteria: “[i]t must be of 
practical use; it must show an element of novelty, that is, some new characteristic 
which is not known in the body of existing knowledge in its technical field . . . . [and 
                                                 
141 UNITED NATIONS (TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD COMMISSION ON INVESTMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND 
RELATED FINANCIAL ISSUES), COMPETITION POLICY AND THE EXERCISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS (2008). 
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the] subject matter must be [also] accepted as patentable.”142 An additional 
requirement for the patentability is the disclosure of the invention. In order to qualify 
for patent protection, the inventor must disclose the technical information of its 
invention to the patent office, and apply for protection.  
Once granted, a patent confers to the owner the right to exploit the invention for 
a determined period of time, normally 20 years from the date of application of the 
patent.143 This includes two basic prerogatives: (1) the right to exclude third parties 
from the use of the protected technology,144 and (2) the right to set the conditions for 
the use of such patented technology. The patent owner can refuse to license its 
patented technology to other undertakings and retain its use to itself, or not use the 
technology at all. If the patent owner decides to license its technology, it has the right 
to freely determine the licensees, as well as the licensing conditions under which it 
will license its technology. The patent owner can thus license its patent on exclusive 
terms or on discriminatory licensing conditions. Those basic prerogatives are granted 
to all patent owners irrespective of the way in which they obtained the patent right. 
Firms have as much of a right to enforce an acquired patent as to enforce a patent 
developed internally.145  
The justifications for granting patent rights are well known. Together with other 
instruments, such as grants, subsidies and public research, patents represent a policy 
instrument to promote innovation and technological progress.146 This innovative 
process results in the production of knowledge, which has the characteristic of a public 
good.147 Knowledge is non-excludable148 and non-rival,149 both characteristics that 
                                                 
142 WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/patentscope/en/patents_faq.html#inventions (last visited July 4th 
2012). 
143 C. COLSTON & J. GALLOWAY, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Third ed. Routledge 2010). 
144 This prerogative is subject only to the exceptions established by the relevant domestic and 
international laws. Such exceptions can be compared to what constitutes expropriation for a tangible 
property. 
145 P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR 
APPLICATION, § 3A, 2nd Ed., 159 (Aspen Publ. 2002).  
146 For a discussion of the virtues of patent rights over policy instruments see: D. Encaoua, D. Guellec 
& C. Martinez, The Economics of Patents: from Natural Rights to Policy Instruments (Aug. 2003), 
available at http://www.nber.org/criw/papers/encaoua.pdf. 
147 For definitions of public goods see: H. R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 3rd Ed, (W. W. Norton 
& Company 1992). 
148 Non-excludable goods are goods where no one can be effectively excluded from using the good. An 
example of a non-excludable good is the use public lights: it is not possible to exclude individuals from 
the use of public lights available of the streets.  
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make it difficult to obtain adequate compensation. Once knowledge becomes publicly 
available, market participants could replicate the knowledge at low costs, and thus 
sell the invention at a price that equals the marginal cost. They would hence be able to 
capture much of the inventor’s profit, leaving the inventor with little possibility to 
recoup its past investments. In the long run, this would lead to a situation where no 
one would invest in research activities.150 Patents address this problem. By conferring 
on the patent owner the exclusive rights over the invention, they prevent others from 
appropriating much of the value derived from the inventions, and facilitate the 
inventor’s compensation.151 In this way, patents stimulate investments in innovation 
and allow the development of new products that would otherwise remain undiscovered 
or underdeveloped.  
Several authors have expressed skepticism towards claims that market forces are 
not sufficient to compensate innovators.152 Economists have for a long time challenged 
the notion that knowledge is a public good.153 They have also rejected the argument 
that inventors cannot profit from their innovation in absence of a legal protection. 
Although these criticisms are in no way obsolete, the thesis will not go into this 
discussion. It will base its further analysis on the assumption that patents are a tool 
to stimulate innovation. The rejection of such assumption would not only require the 
revision of the applicability of the rules on competition law, but also the revision of the 
entire patent rights system.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
149 A non-rival good is a good which consumption by one individual does not reduce availability of the 
good for consumption by others.  
150 The concept of underproduction of innovation is manly related to the theory of public goods. The 
economic theory explains that public goods tend to be undersupplied in a free market. The production of 
knowledge in the free market would be thus below what is socially desirable. 
151 U.S. D.O.J. & F.T.C., ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION (2007). 
152 The impact of patents on incentives to innovate has been questioned by several authors. For 
instance, Mansfield, Levin, and Scherer suggest that patent protection is important only in specific 
industries, most notably in the pharmaceutical one. (R. R. Nelson and J. P. Walsh W. M. Cohen, 
Protecting their Intellectual Assets Appropriability Conditions and Why US: Manufacturing Firms 
patent (or not), NBER Working paper Series (2000). See also: I. HARACOGLOU, COMPETITION LAW AND 
PATENTS: A FOLLOW-ON INNOVATION PERSPECTIVE IN THE BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (Edward Elgar 
Publ. 2008); A. K. Klevorick, R.C. Levin, R.R. Nelson, & S.G. Winter, Appropriating the returns from 
industrial R&D, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 783 (1987); M. A Lemley, Ex Ante Versus 
Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 UNIVERSITY CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 129 (2011). 
153 See. e.g., D. Encaoua, D. Guellec & C. Martinez, The Economics of Patents: from Natural Rights to 
Policy Instruments (Aug. 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/criw/papers/encaoua.pdf. 
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Even when we accept that patent rights are an essential tool to stimulate 
innovation, such benefits do not come without costs. A patent creates a static 
distortion in the market. The patent owner might be able to charge a monopoly price 
for its invention for the period of the patent protection. As a result, not all consumers 
valuing the innovation above its marginal cost will be able to buy it.154 At the same 
time, a patent imposes a barrier to the access and to the use of knowledge. When 
innovation is cumulative, a patent may thus impede access to the knowledge 
embedded in previous inventions, and slow down technological development.155 
Finally, patent enforcement itself requires a large amount of financial resources that 
could be used for research and development itself.156 The legislator has nonetheless 
considered the costs imposed by the patent system as justified, since it assessed that 
they are outweighed by the benefits arising from innovation. 
 
1.2. Patent rights and competition law  
Courts and competition authorities have recognized that patent law and 
competition law are complementary policies aiming at the achievement of same 
objectives: promotion of innovation and improvement of consumer welfare.157 Both 
bodies of law encourage market players to offer new products and services to 
consumers. By preventing the unauthorized use of protected innovations, patents 
encourage competition by substitution, and thus stimulate dynamic competition.158 At 
the same time, by requiring disclosure and publication of the inventions, patents 
stimulate the dissemination of knowledge, facilitate the development of further 
inventions, and encourage their commercialization. Competition law aims at keeping 
the market competitive. Competition among companies stimulates them to perform at 
their best, by offering consumers new, innovative products, and/or adopting more 
                                                 
154 Id. at. 4. 
155 J. Bessen & E. Maskin, Sequential innovation, patents and imitation, No. 00-01 MIT Working 
Paper Department of Economics (2000), available at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/patent.pdf. 
156 D. Encaoua, D. Guellec & C. Martinez, The Economics of Patents: from Natural Rights to Policy 
Instruments (Aug. 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/criw/papers/encaoua.pdf. 
157 For the EU see: EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC 
Treaty Technology Transfer Agreements, OJ C 101 (2004). For the US see: F.T.C, To Promote 
Innovation: The Proper Balance Of Competition and Patent Law and Policy (2003). 
158 S. ANDERMAN & H. SCHMIDT, EC COMPETITION LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE 
REGULATION OF INNOVATION (Oxford University Press 2011). 
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efficient production processes.159 Competition law thus promotes static and dynamic 
competition.  
The two bodies of law nonetheless apply different tools to achieve their goals. 
Patent law relies on the incentive system. By limiting, for a short period of time, the 
competition that the invention faces in the market, patents facilitate the patent 
owner’s compensation for the innovative contribution, and in this way, stimulate 
further investments in research and innovation.160 Competition law, on the other 
hand, prohibits an undertaking’s conduct that unnecessarily limits competition. In 
this way, competition law aims to keep the market as competitive as possible. The 
competitive market conditions then force undertakings to invest in innovation, with 
the aim to gain or maintain a strong market position.  
The use of divergent tools might lead to some tensions between the two bodies of 
law. The conflict does not arise as a default conflict. In most cases, the exercise of a 
patent right does not trigger antitrust concerns.161 There are nevertheless situations 
where the exercise of a legitimately obtained patent right may impose anticompetitive 
effects.  
In such circumstances, both EU competition law and U.S. antitrust law have 
recognized that patent owners are not immune to the competition law provisions, and 
that, in specific circumstances, competition law can limit the patent owner’s freedom 
in exercising its patent right. The ECJ ruled that the use of a patent might degenerate 
in an abuse.162 Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that “the fact that a patent 
is obtained does not wholly insulate the patent owner from the antitrust laws.”163 As 
                                                 
159 F.T.C., To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy. 
(2003). 
160 W. CORNISH AND D. LLEWLYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARKS AND 
ALLIED RIGHTS, 6th ed. (Sweet and Maxwell 2007). 
161 For EU see: Case 238/87 AB Volvo v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., ECR 06211, at 8 (1988). See also 
Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings OJ C 45/02, ¶ 75 (2009). For US see: Atari 
Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
162 Case 24-67 Parke, Davis and Co. v. Probel, Reese, Beintema-Interpharm and Centrafarm, ECR 
00055, at 72 (1968). The ECJ and the European Commission confirmed this approach in several 
occasions. The Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, which stressed 
the importance of having effective means of enforcing intellectual property rights, emphasizes that the 
Directive should not affect the application of the rules of competition, and in particular Articles101 
TFEU and 102 TFEU. The measures provided for in this Directive should not be used to restrict 
competition unduly in a manner contrary to the Treaty.  
163 United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948).  
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in the context of tangible goods, the exercise of a patent right might also thus amount 
to an anticompetitive conduct. 
 
1.3. The Relevant Antitrust Provisions  
The next paragraphs will discuss in greater detail the circumstances in which the 
exercise of a legitimately obtained patent right can constitute an anticompetitive 
behavior. Given that the conduct of SEP owners has been addressed mainly through 
rules of unilateral conduct, the evaluation will primarily focus on Article 102 TFEU, 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and Section 5 of the FTCA. It might thus useful to 
briefly review the prohibitions embodied in the three provisions. 
1.3.A. Article 102 TFEU  
Article 102 TFEU prohibits a dominant undertaking, including a dominant 
patent owner, from abusing its dominant position. In order to prove a violation of 
Article 102 TFEU, the Commission needs to show that the undertaking under 
investigation (1) holds a dominant position, and (2) it has engaged in an abusive 
behavior.  
Article 102 TFEU does not define the concept of abuse, but only provides a non-
exhaustive list of examples.164 The ECJ has nonetheless clarified that the prohibitions 
of Article 102 TFEU encompass both exclusionary and exploitative practices. In other 
words, the provision prohibits a dominant undertaking from excluding competitors by 
engaging in conducts “other than competition on merit”,165 and it also prohibits the 
                                                 
164 Article 102 TFEU provides 
  
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions;  
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;  
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage;  
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
subject of such contracts. 
 
165 See, e.g., Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, 85/76 ECR 00461, ¶ 91 (1979); Case T-
228/97 Irish Sugar v Commission [1999] ECR II 2971, ¶ 5 (1999); Case 322/81 NV Nederlandsche 
Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission, ECR 03461, ¶ 54 (1983). 
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dominant undertaking from abusing its position by directly exploiting consumers.166 
The focus of the analysis is thus on the way in which the dominant patent owner uses 
its market power. As clarified by the ECJ, having a dominant position confers a 
special responsibility on the dominant undertaking, which has the duty to abstain 
from “any conduct that would impair undistorted competition on the market”.167 
1.3.B. Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, considered the counterpart of Article 102 TFEU, 
prohibits “monopolization, attempts to monopolize, as well as conspiracy to monopolize 
any part of the trade or commerce between several States, or with foreign nations.” In 
order to prove a monopolization offence, the plaintiff needs to show that the 
undertaking has (1) a monopoly power in the relevant market, (2) that such power has 
been acquired or maintained in an anticompetitive way, and (3) with an 
anticompetitive intent.168 There is no need to prove the undertaking’s subjective intent 
to monopolize the market, but it is sufficient to show that the act of monopolization 
was intentional and not accidental or inadvertent.169  
Bringing a claim for attempt to monopolize, on the other hand, requires evidence 
that (1) the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a 
specific intent to monopolize, and (3) that there is a dangerous probability of 
success.170 The prohibition of “attempted monopolization” thus addresses situations 
where the danger of an anticompetitive monopolization is clear and present, but it has 
not necessarily been accomplished. There is a lower threshold for monopoly power, 
                                                 
166 See, e.g., Case 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission 
of the European Communities, [1978] ECR 207; Case 26/75 General Motors Continental v Commission 
[1975] ECR 1367. COMP/C-1/36.915 British Post office v. Deutsche Post AG., OJ L331/40 [2001]. 
167 See, e.g., Case 322/81 NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin NV v Commission, ECR 3461, 
¶ 57 (1983); Joined Cases C 395/96 P and C 396/96 P Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports & Others 
v. Commission, ECR I 1365, ¶ 37 (2000); Case C-280/08 Deutsche Telekom AG v European Commission, 
ECR I-09555, ¶ 83 (2010); Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB, ECR I-00527, ¶ 
25 (2009). 
168 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).  
169 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431-32 (2nd Cir. 1945). The existence of 
intent is often inferred from evidence of monopoly power plus exclusionary practice. (See H.  
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE, 3rd ed. (West, 
Thomson Publ. 2005).  
170 Crossroads Cogeneration Corp. v. Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc., 159 F.3d 129, 141 (3rd Circuit 
1998). 
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which is nonetheless counterbalanced by a stronger requirement of anticompetitive 
intent.171  
Therefore, the analysis in Section 2 cases focuses on the way in which the patent 
owner obtains market power. Undertakings are allowed to compete in the market, and 
thus acquire market power, by producing better, cheaper and more attractive 
products. However, they cannot protect (or gain) their market power by engaging in 
anticompetitive practices that distort the competitive process. 
1.3.C. Section 5 of the FTCA 
U.S. antitrust law has another weapon through which it can address the patent 
owner’s unilateral conduct: Section 5 of the FTCA. Section 5 of the FTCA prohibits 
undertakings to engage in “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” and “unfair methods 
of competition”. The prohibition of unfair acts has traditionally been considered a 
consumer protection statute, applied mainly to address cases of misleading 
advertising, abusive debt collection practices, and other conduct that directly affected 
consumers. The prohibition of “unfair methods of competition” on the contrary 
addresses conduct that is typically prohibited by the antitrust statutes.172 The FTC 
does not have the competence to enforce the Sherman Act. Nevertheless, it can 
prosecute anticompetitive conducts prohibited by the Sherman Act through the 
application of the FTCA.173  
The Supreme Court held, nonetheless, that the prohibition Section 5 of the FTCA 
goes beyond the scope of the Sherman Act.174 The provision captures also methods of 
unfair competition that do not violate the exact letter of the antitrust laws, but are 
                                                 
171 See, e.g., Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905); Cal. Computer Products v. Int'l 
Business Machines, 613 F.2d 727, 737 (9th Cir. 1979); National Reporting Co. v. Alderson Reporting 
Co., Inc., 763 F.2d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir. 1985).  
172 The FTCA is strictly speaking not part of the antitrust corpus. 
173 K. A. DeMasi and Jonathan J. Clarke, Section 5 of the FTC Act and the End of Antitrust Modesty, 
BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS (2010). 
174 F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233., 244 (1974) (“[T]he Federal Trade Commission 
does not arrogate excessive power to itself if, in measuring a practice against the elusive, but 
congressionally mandated standard of fairness, it, like a court of equity, considers public values beyond 
simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws”); F.T.C. v. 
Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U. S. 392, 394 (1953) (“The "unfair methods of competition", 
which are condemned by § 5 (a) of the Act, are not confined to those that were illegal at common law or 
that were condemned by the Sherman Act”); F.T.C. v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 , 454 
(1986) (“The standard of "unfairness" under the FTC Act is, by necessity, an elusive one, encompassing 
not only practices that violate the Sherman Act and the other antitrust laws, but also practices that the 
Commission determines are against public policy for other reasons”). 
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nonetheless against its “spirit”. One example of a Section 5 standalone offence is the 
“invitation to collude.” A mere invitation to collude does not constitute a violation of 
either Section 1 or Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The FTC has nonetheless challenged 
such invitations as a standalone violation of Section 5 of the FTCA.175  
However, the reach of Section 5 of the FTCA remains unsettled. There are very 
few cases where the FTC has successfully challenged a conduct as a Section 5 
standalone offence. Besides the cases concerning an “invitation to collude”, courts have 
been restrictive towards the FTC’s efforts to develop an independent Section 5 
claim.176 They have dismissed a number of cases where the FTC tried to address 
conduct falling outside the scope of the Sherman Act as unfair methods of 
competition.177 As result, past cases did not identify a clear test to be applied when 
challenging a conduct as a Section 5 standalone violation. Therefore, even if one 
accepts that the reach of Section 5 goes beyond the limits of the Sherman Act, it 
remains unclear what conduct could constitute a standalone violation of Section 5 of 
the FTCA. 
Courts have nonetheless delineate some limiting principles for the application of 
Section 5 as a standalone offence. First, they emphasized that, when challenging a 
conduct as a Section 5 standalone violation, the FTC needs to prove that the 
challenged conduct had an adverse effect of competition.178 This includes restrictions 
of competition in their incipiency—that is, acts which, when full blown, would violate 
                                                 
175 Stone Container Corp., 125 F.T.C. 853 (1998); Precision Moulding Co., 122 F.T.C. 104 (1996); YKK 
(USA) Inc., 116 F.T.C. 628 (1993); A.E. Clevite, Inc., 116 F.T.C. 389 (1993); Quality Trailer Products 
Corp., 115F.T.C. 944 (1992). 
176 See, e.g., Opening Remarks of Chairman William Kovacic, FTC Workshop, at 10 (Oct 17, 2008), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/section-5-ftc-act-competition-
statute/transcript.pdf (“it is difficult to find even ten successfully litigated Section 5 antitrust cases over 
the Commission’s nearly hundred-year history.”); Daniel A. Crane, Reﬂections on Section 5 of the FTC 
Act and the FTC’s Case against Intel, THE BERKELEY ELECTRONIC PRESS (2010) (“Courts have 
frequently quashed the FTC’s efforts to develop an independent Section 5, even while paying lip service 
to the independence principle.”).  
177 See, e.g., Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F. 2d 920 (2nd Cir. 1980); Boise Cascade Corp. v. 
F.T.C., 637 F. 2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980). 
178 See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 US 447, 456 (1986) (where the Supreme 
Court evaluated whether a conspiracy among dentists to refuse to submit X-rays to dental insurers 
harmed competition); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v F.T.C., 432 F.2d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 1972) (maintaining 
that the FTC “cannot rest its case solely on the determination that injury to a competitor exists”); Boise 
Cascade Corp. v. F.T.C., 837 F. 2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (maintaining that the FTC needs to prove 
“either collusion or actual effect on competition to make out a Section 5 violation”).  
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the antitrust provisions.179 Courts have however not clarified whether there is a need 
to prove actual harm to competition, or whether it is sufficient to prove that the 
competitive injury is suspected or embryonic.180 Further, the FTC needs to prove that 
the undertaking’s conduct is unfair. 181 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
suggested that the challenged conduct should have at least some indicia of 
oppressiveness.182 This requires (1) some evidence of the undertaking’s 
anticompetitive intent or purpose, or (2) the absence of an independent legitimate 
business reason for the undertaking’s conduct.183  
Having sketched the key elements of these offences, we now analyze under which 
circumstances the exercise of a legitimately obtained patent right can violate any of 
the three provisions.  
 
 
                                                 
179 F.T.C. v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 US 392, 395 (1953); F.T.C. v. Brown Shoe Co., 
384 U.S. 316, 323 (1966); Fashion Guild v. F.T.C., 312 U. S. 457, 463, 466 (1941).  
180 Concurring Opinion Of Commissioner Jon Leibowitz, Rambus, Inc., Docket No. 9302. (Aug 2, 2006) 
(“[A] showing of an actual anticompetitive effect is unnecessary to prove a violation of Section 5 because 
that section was designed to stop [in] their incipiency acts and practices that could lead to violations of 
the Sherman or Clayton Acts. While conduct violating Section 5 must bear a realistic potential for 
causing competitive harm, more manifest injury should not be required.”).  
181 Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v FTC, 432 F. 2d 146, 150 (5th Cir. 1970) (“[T]he Commission cannot rest 
its case solely on the determination that injury to a competitor exists”); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 
729 F.2d 128, 136-138 (2nd Cir. 1977) “. . . the practice complained of must be more than a mere 
restraint of competition.”). 
182 The FTC held that du Pont, Ethyl and two other antiknock compound manufacturers engaged in 
unfair methods of competition, when each firm independently adopted business practices as: (i) the sale 
of the product at a delivered price which included transportation costs, (ii) the giving by Du Pont and 
Ethyl of extra advance notice of price increases, over and above the 30 days provided by contract, and 
(iii) the use by Du Pont and Ethyl (and infrequently by PPG) of a “most favored nation” clause under 
which the seller promised that no customer would be charged a higher price than other customers. The 
FTC found that there was no collusion between the undertakings; it nonetheless found that, by 
removing some of the uncertainties over price determination, and by facilitating price parallelism, the 
practices had the collective effect of substantially lessening competition, and thus violated Section 5 of 
the FTCA. The FTC took the view that “because § 5 is not confined to the strictures of the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts but prohibits a broader range of conduct, it can be violated even in the absence of 
agreement if the firms engage in interdependent conduct that, because of the market structure and 
conditions, facilitates price coordination in a way that substantially lessens competition in the 
industry”. (E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. F.T.C., 729 F. 2d 128, 135 (2nd Cir. 1984). 
183 Id. at. 139-140. (“In our view, before business conduct in an oligopolistic industry may be labelled 
“unfair” within the meaning of § 5 […]at least some indicia of oppressiveness must exist [...] such as (1) 
evidence of anticompetitive intent or purpose on the part of the producer charged, or (2) the absence of 
an independent legitimate business reason for its conduct […] In short, in the absence of proof of a 
violation of the antitrust laws or evidence of collusive, coercive, predatory, or exclusionary conduct, 
business practices are not “unfair” in violation of § 5 unless those practices either have an 
anticompetitive purpose or cannot be supported by an independent legitimate reason.”). 
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2. THE PATENT OWNER’S ANTITRUST LIABILITY 
2.1. Patent owner’s market power 
In both jurisdictions, the antitrust scrutiny of a patent owner’s conduct first 
requires the evaluation of the patent owner’s market power. Under EU competition 
law, Article 102 TFEU addresses only the conduct of dominant undertakings. 
Similarly, under U.S. antitrust law, the offence of monopolization and the offence of 
attempted monopolization require the plaintiff to show that the patent owner has 
monopoly power in the relevant market, or at least evidence that there is a dangerous 
probability that the anticompetitive conduct would allow the patent owner to acquire 
or maintain such power.184  
EU competition law and U.S. antitrust law have adopted different definitions of 
dominant position and monopoly power. EU competition law defines a dominant 
position as a “position of economic strength which enables the undertaking to impede 
effective competition in a relevant market, by allowing it to behave substantially 
independently of competitors, customers, and consumers.”185 The U.S. Supreme Court 
has, on the other hand, defined monopoly power as the “power to control prices or 
exclude competition.”186 If a firm can profitably raise prices without causing competing 
firms to expand output and drive down prices, that firm has monopoly power in the 
sense of the Sherman Act.187 
There are some similarities in the two definitions in that both ask to what extent 
a dominant player may exploit its position without the market punishing it. Both 
jurisdictions will consider questions such as the presence of competitors and barriers 
to enter the market.188 However, the EU definition also includes an assessment of the 
firm’s power to harm rivals, which is not present in the U.S. test. In part this may 
                                                 
184 See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). 
185 See, e.g., Case 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of 
the European Communities, ECR 207, ¶ 65 (1978); Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission, ECR 
00207, at 65 (1978); Case 322/81 NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin NV v Commission, ECR 
03461, ¶ 30 (1983). Commission Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market for the Purposes of 
Community Competition Law, C 372 1997, P. 0005 – 0013, ¶ 3 (1997). 
186 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).  
187 See, e.g., Harrison Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int’l, Inc., 423 F.3d 374, 380 (3d Cir. 2005). 
188 In evaluating cases of alleged attempted monopolization, US courts often relied on the same factors 
as the one used in evaluating whether a patent owner monopoly power, although recognizing that a 
lesser quantum of market power can suffice to prove an attempted monopolization. (United States v 
Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
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explain why an undertaking may be found dominant under EU law with a lower 
market-share threshold than the threshold found in the United States. Generally, in 
the EU, dominance is presumed with a market share of 50%, while in the United 
States the threshold to show the existence of monopoly power is generally higher. The 
Third Circuit has ruled that a market share between 75 percent and 80 percent is 
“more than adequate to establish a prima facie case of market power.”189 A market 
share between 50 and 70 percent may, on the contrary, indicate the existence of 
monopoly power, but the court will generally require additional factors to support the 
inference of monopoly power.190 The quantum of 50% is generally sufficient in cases of 
attempted monopolization.191 
Neither EU competition law nor U.S. antitrust law provides a presumption of 
market power for a patent owner. Both jurisdictions emphasize that the mere 
possession of a patent right does not necessarily confer significant market power.192 A 
patent confers a monopoly over the invention. However, it does not necessarily confer 
the ability to “behave independently from their competitors and consumer”, and 
“control prices or exclude competition”. The actual market power of the patent owner 
depends on several other factors, such as the interest of the market in the patented 
good, the existence of substitutes, whether alternative goods are protected by the 
patent, and their relative costs. Even after a patent has been granted, the owner 
might still face considerable constrains from patented and non-patented substitutes 
available in the market, and it might be consequently unable to exercise any 
significant level of market power.193  
In sum, EU competition law and U.S. antitrust law adopt different definitions 
and different legal standards in the evaluation of the patent owner’s market power. 
Both jurisdictions however reject the presumption of market power for a patent owner, 
                                                 
189 United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2005). 
190 See, e.g., Pepsico, Inc. v Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 109 (2d Cir. 2002). 
191 Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F. 3d 1421, 1438 (9th Circuit).  
192 For EU see: Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent 
Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission of the European Communities, ECR I-00743, at 46 
(1995). For US see: Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc, 547 US 28, 46 (2006). 
193 J. TEMPLE LANG, THE APPLICATION OF THE ESSENTIAL FACILITY DOCTRINE TO INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW, IN ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT; EU 
AND US PERSPECTIVE (François Lévêque and Howard Selanski, Edward Elgar Publ 2005). 
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and require that the patent owner’s market position is evaluated on a case-by-case 
basis.  
 
2.2. The anticompetitive conduct 
Evidence of strong market power is not sufficient to prove an antitrust violation. 
Neither EU competition law nor U.S. antitrust law prohibits the mere possession of 
strong market power.194 The existence of market power is only one of the elements of 
the offence. The next step in the application of the provisions on unilateral conduct 
requires the court or the competition authority to evaluate whether the patent owner 
has engaged in an anticompetitive conduct. 
In evaluating whether a specific licensing practice constitutes an anticompetitive 
behavior, both EU competition law and U.S. antitrust law apply the principles 
developed in the context of tangible goods. In the United States, this position is clearly 
stated in the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property Rights, a 
non-binding document which lists the enforcement priorities of the DOJ and the FTC 
in addressing the patent owner’s conduct.195 The two agencies recognized that there 
are important differences that distinguish IPRs from other forms of property. They 
emphasize, however, that those differences do not require the application of different 
antitrust principles.196 In the EU, none of the courts’ decisions or Commission’s 
documents provides a comparable general statement. While there are cases where the 
court emphasized that the application of competition law provisions to the IPR owners 
might require a stricter legal standard,197 the analysis of the cases as a whole suggests 
that the approach adopted in the context of IPRs generally follows the principles 
adopted in the context of tangible goods. 
                                                 
194 For the EU see: Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings § 2009/C 45/02, ¶ 1 (2009). See 
also: T-201/04 Microsoft v. Commission, ECR II-03601, ¶ 229 (2007). For the US see: U.S. D.O.J. AND 
F.T.C., Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, § 2.2 (1995). 
195 U.S. D.O.J. AND F.T.C., Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, § 2.1 (1995). 
196 Id.  
197 See, e.g., T-201/04 Microsoft v. Commission, ECR II-4463, ¶¶ 284, 334 (2004) (“[The] case might not 
be a mere refusal to supply a product or a service indispensable to the exercise of a specific activity but 
a refusal to license intellectual property rights, and thus chose the strictest legal test. The Court notes 
that the circumstance that the refusal prevents the appearance of a new product for which there is 
potential consumer demand is found only in the case-law on the exercise of an intellectual property 
right.”). 
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2.2.A. Refusal to license 
A refusal to license a patent represents one of the most controversial issues in the 
patent-competition law relationship. A patent right confers to its owner the right to 
exclude others from the use of the patented technology. However, by refusing to 
license its technology, the patent owner might foreclose its competitors from the 
market and eliminate competition. The patent owner’s refusal to license might thus 
raise anticompetitive concerns. The question that arises is whether a refusal to license 
can amount to an anticompetitive conduct actionable under the provisions of 
competition law. 
Both EU competition law and U.S. antitrust law recognize that a mere refusal to 
license does not constitute an anticompetitive conduct.198 Just like other undertakings, 
a patent owner is free to choose its trading parties, and antitrust law does not limit 
such right. The ECJ emphasized that “an obligation . . . to grant to third parties, even 
in return for a reasonable royalty, a license . . . would lead to the proprietor thereof 
being deprived of the substance of his exclusive right.”199 It thus concluded that a mere 
refusal to license cannot constitute an abuse of a dominant position. Similarly, also the 
U.S. Supreme Court noted that “in the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a 
monopoly, the [Sherman Act] does not restrict the right of a trader or manufacturer to 
freely exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.”200 
Hence, even when the patent owner has monopoly power, it has no obligation to 
license the patented technology to other market participants.201 
The right to refuse to license is nonetheless qualified. Both jurisdictions have 
recognized that, in specific circumstances, a refusal to supply a patented technology 
might constitute an anticompetitive conduct and thus trigger an antitrust liability. 
Nevertheless, as it will be explained, the two jurisdictions have adopted different 
approach when recognizing an exception to the general rule.  
                                                 
198 For the EU see, e.g., Case 238/87 AB Volvo v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., ECR 06211, at 8 (1988); Case 
24/67 Parke, Davis & Co. v Probel, Reese, Beintema-Interpharm and Centrafarm, ECR (English special 
edition) 00055, at 71 (1968); Case C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co., 
I-05039, at 34 (2004).; For the US see, e.g., United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919); 
Intergraph Corp. v Intel Corp, 195 F.3d 1346, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
199 Case 238/87 AB Volvo v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., ECR 06211, para 8 (1988). 
200 United States v. Colgate & Co. 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). 
201 See, e.g., Intergraph Corp. v Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1362 (Fed. Cir 1999) (even where it exists 
“market power does not ‘impose on the intellectual property owner an obligation to license the use of 
that property to others.”). 
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2.2.A.1. The “exceptional circumstances” test under EU competition law 
In the EU, the ECJ determined that a refusal to license an IPR constitutes an 
abuse of a dominant position if it meets four cumulative conditions: 202 (1) the access to 
the input protected by the IPR is indispensable to compete in the market,203 (2) the 
refusal to license excludes effective competition in the market,204 (3) it prevents the 
emergence of new products,205 (4) and the refusal is not objectively justified.206  
The ECJ adopted the exceptional circumstances test for the first time in the 
Magill case.207 The case concerned three broadcasting companies which refused to 
license its program-related information to Magill TV Guide Ltd, (Magill), a company 
interested in publishing a comprehensive weekly television guide. The ECJ found that 
the three companies used their IPRs as a tool to “to exclude any potential competition 
from [a secondary] market.”208 In this way, they prevented the development of a new 
product—a comprehensive weekly television guide—for which there was potential 
consumer demand. The ECJ maintained that the refusal to license the IPR was not 
justified by any specific need, and that the exercise of the IPR went “beyond what 
[was] necessary to fulfill the essential function of the IPRs”. The ECJ concluded that 
the aim of the refusal to license was clearly incompatible with competition law,209 and 
thus amounted to an abuse of a dominant position.  
                                                 
202 Case C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co., I-05039, at 50 (2004). 
203 This included the evaluation of whether there are substitutes to the input protected by the IPR, and 
whether there are technical, legal or economic obstacles capable of making it impossible (or 
unreasonably difficult) for any undertaking to reproduce such input.  
204 Case T-69/89 Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission of the European Communities, ECR II-485, at 
52-56 (1995).  
205 The ECJ clarified in the Magill case that the refusal to license can be abusive only it prevents the 
offer of a new type of product that the dominant undertakings does not offer and for which there is 
potential consumer demand. The criteria were however arguably relaxed in the Microsoft case, when 
the ECJ maintained that such element is met also when the refusal impedes technical development. T-
201/04 Microsoft v. Commission, ECR II-4463, ¶ 647 (2004).  
206 The court has recognized that the IP owner might a valid business justification for the refusal to 
grant a license. The Commission made clear that it will consider claims that a refusal is necessary to 
allow the dominant undertaking to realize an adequate return on the investments. As showed by the 
Microsoft case, however, just a general statement that the refusal is justified by the need to protect 
innovation might not be sufficient.  
207 Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television 
Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission of the European Communities, ECR II-00485(1991). 
208 Id. at 73. 
209 Id. at 75. 
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The ECJ refused to apply the doctrine in few cases after Magill.210 It nevertheless 
confirmed the exceptional circumstances test in two important occasions. First, the 
doctrine was applied in the much criticized IMS Health case.211 IMS developed a 
format to present data on the sale of pharmaceutical products called a “brick” 
structure, which became a de facto industry standard. Given that customers refused to 
adopt alternatives, IMS’ competitors tried to obtain the right to use the copyrighted 
brick structure from IMS. However, IMS refused to grant a license and its competitors 
filed a complaint with the European Commission maintaining that IMS’ refusal to 
license constituted an abuse of a dominant position.212 The Commission imposed an 
interim measure (later withdrawn) on IMS, forcing the undertaking to license its brick 
structure. The Commission maintained that IMS’ brick structure had become the 
national standard, and that consumers were locked in its use. It added that the brick 
structure was indispensable to carry on business, given that there was no actual or 
potential substitute. The Commission reasoned that IMS’ refusal to license was not 
objectively justified, and it was likely to foreclose the market to potential new entrants 
and eliminate all prospect of competition. It thus concluded that IMS’ refusal to 
license constitutes a prima facie abuse of a dominant position.213  
A parallel patent infringement case was discussed in Germany, where the 
Frankfurt court made a reference for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ. Also the ECJ 
confirmed that the IMS’ refusal to license might constitute an abuse of a dominant 
position.214 The ECJ did however not determine whether given the circumstances of 
the case, the IMS’ refusal amounted to an abuse, but left the ultimate decision to the 
national court. Several commentators criticized the ECJ’s ruling. They pointed out 
that it did not provide any reference to the national court with respect to the elements 
that need to be taken in evaluating the presence of a “new product” element.215 In 
                                                 
210 See, e.g., Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs und 
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, ECR I-07791 (1998).  
211 Case C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co., I-05039 (2004).  
212 Press Release, Commission Starts Procedure Against IMS Health in Germany, seeks interim 
measures (Mar. 14, 2001), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-01-365_en.htm?locale=en 
213 Press Release, Commission Imposes Interim Measures on IMS Health in Germany, IP/01/941 (Jul 
3, 2001). 
214 Case C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co., I-05039, 48 (2004). 
215 J. Killick (White & Case), IMS and Microsoft Judged in the Cold Light of IMS (Dec 4, 2001), at 4, 
available at http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/52195d09-658c-45e7-a0d9-
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particular, they emphasized that there was no secondary market for the IMS product, 
and that such market was merely hypothetical. Those commentators stressed that 
imposing a duty to license in such circumstances is not justified and it would have a 
negative impact of the incentives to invest in innovation. 216  
Next, the Commission considered a refusal to license abusive in the Microsoft 
case, where Microsoft refused to license certain interface information of its working 
group server operating systems to its competitors.217 In reviewing the case, the Court 
of First Instance (CFI) arguably relaxed even further the “new product” element of the 
exceptional circumstances test. It maintained that a refusal to license might constitute 
an abuse of a dominant position not only if it prevents the development of a new 
product, but also if it gives rise to a “limitation . . . of technical development”.218 Also in 
this case, many scholars criticized this test as being too loose and elusive, and 
departing from the Magill judgment.219 
Although controversial, the three cases confirm that a refusal to license an IPR 
might in exceptional circumstances constitute an abuse of a dominant position. The 
cases imposing such duty relied very much on the doctrine developed earlier in 
Commercial Solvents, which, in the view of several authors, introduced the 
“essentially facilities doctrine” in EU competition law (although the ECJ did not use 
                                                                                                                                                                  
6b9d480e2fbc/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/d49ad7c5-3a2a-4324-aa65-
74df0ecc39fc/00688ny_killick_article_byline_02.pdf. 
216 Drexl maintains that the underlying idea of the intervention in the Magill case was that IPRs 
should protect their owners from competition by imitation, but not from competition by substitution. (J. 
Drexl, Abuse of Dominance in Licensing and Refusal to License: A "More Economic Approach" to 
Competition by Imitation and to Competition by Substitution (European University Institute, Robert 
Schuman Conter for Advance Studies 2005). The requirement of the secondary market had thus the 
purpose to distinguish between competition by imitation and competition by substitution. As noted by 
Gitter, undertakings would “decline to enter a particular market if they had to share their essential 
facility with rivals competing in exactly the same market. [T]he very essence of that right is the ability 
to exclude others from using it, and the inability to do so will destroy incentives to invest in the creation 
of intellectual property”. (D. M. Gitter, Strong Medicine For Competition Ills: The Judgment Of The 
European Court Of Justice In The IMS Health Action And Its Implications For Microsoft Corporation 
15 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW 152 (2004)). As pointed out by several 
authors, however, the IMS Health case did not concern competition by substitution, but rather 
competition by imitation. Competitors tried to offer substitutes, but, without success. The secondary 
market was mainly hypothetical.  
217 T-201/04 Microsoft v. Commission, ECR II-4463, (2004). In its appeal, Microsoft contended that the 
elements determined in Magill and IMS Health were not met. The ECJ did not however agree, finding 
that the copyrighted information was indispensable, there was a risk that the refusal would eliminate 
competition, and it would prevent the emergence of a new good.  
218 Id. at 647. 
219 Id. at. 561 – 563.  
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this wording).220 Under this doctrine, competition law can force a dominant 
undertaking to grant access to an essential input on reasonable and nondiscriminatory 
terms, if such access is needed to provide service in a secondary market. The discussed 
cases suggest that the Commission intends to apply the principles of the essential 
facilities doctrine also to the context of IPRs. When the access to the IPR is essential, a 
refusal to license might constitute an abuse of a dominant position. 
It is worth noting that none of the discussed cases concerned a refusal to license a 
patent, but only other forms of IPRs. One could consequently question whether the 
reasoning adopted in the Magill and IMS cases can be directly transposed to cases 
concerning a refusal to license a patent right.221 In the United Kingdom, for instance, 
the Patent Court held that “it does not follow inevitably that Magill can be applied by 
analogy to a patent case.”222 The court noted that different IPRs last for different 
periods, they are infringed by different types of activity, and they are subject to 
different types of defenses or exceptions. For example, in contrast to other IPRs, 
patents provide the compulsory license exception. One could consequently argue that 
the exceptional circumstances doctrines should not be applied to cases concerning 
patent rights. 
The absence of precedents clearly leaves some uncertainty with respect to the 
company’s liability for refusing to license a patent. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely 
that the ECJ and the Commission would adopt a different approach in evaluating a 
refusal to license a patent than in cases concerning a refusal to license other IPRs. 
Neither the ECJ nor the Commission have differentiated between different IPRs when 
discussing cases of a refusal to license.223 Further, in Parke, Davis & Co v. Probel, the 
                                                 
220 J. Drex, Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law IMS Health and Trinko - Antitrust Placebo for 
Consumers Instead of Sound Economics in Refusal-to-Deal Cases, 35(7) INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW 788 (2004). J. Turney, Defining the Limits of the EU 
Essential Facilities Doctrine on Intellectual Property Rights: The Primacy of Securing Optimal 
Innovation, 3 NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 179 (2005). 
221 LIONEL BENTLY AND BRAND SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, 2nd ed. (Oxford University 
Press 2004). 
222 Philips Electronics N.V. v Ingman Limited and the Video Duplicating Company Limited, F.S.R. 
112, 134 – 135 (Patents Court). 
223 See, e.g., The ECJ has implicitly recognized such approach, by stating that “the central issue to be 
resolved […] is whether […] the conditions on which an undertaking in a dominant position may be 
required to grant a licence are satisfied”, and not further discussing the difference between copyrights 
and patents. (T-201/04 Microsoft v. Commission, ECR II-4463, ¶ 290 (2004). See also: Guidance on the 
Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary 
Conducts by Dominant Undertakings, C 45/7, ¶ 80 (2009). 
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ECJ explicitly acknowledged that patent rights are not immune from competition law 
and their use might degenerate into a violation of Article 102 TFEU.224 Similarly, the 
Commission has implicitly also recognized that competition law does not differentiate 
among different IPRs. In Microsoft, for instance, it acknowledged that Microsoft’s 
interoperability information could be covered by a patent or by a copyright. It 
nonetheless maintained that there was no need to decide that issue since, in any 
event, the conditions for finding an abuse of a dominant position were satisfied 
irrespective of whether the information was protected by a patent or a copyright.225 
The position expressed by the ECJ and the Commission thus suggested that the 
exceptional circumstances doctrine applies also to a refusal to license a patent right. 
Other arguments support the conclusion that a refusal to license a patent right 
should not be treated differently from a refusal to license other IPRs. It is true that 
the patent system provides the remedy of compulsory licensing. It is however 
important to notice that the argument for granting a compulsory license under patent 
law is often based on the idea of morality, public health, such as for instance, where 
there is a need to ensure a access to a drug for life-threatening diseases.226 The 
purpose of the remedy therefore is different from an antitrust intervention, which 
aims at stopping an anticompetitive practice. The existence of a remedy of a 
compulsory license under the patent system does not seem to justify a less 
interventionist approach under competition law. Also the argument that a compulsory 
license has to be imposed only in cases of weak IPRs does not seem persuasive.227 
Some commentators have argued that a refusal to license has been found 
anticompetitive only in cases of weak IPRs. Although such argument might apply in 
Magill (where, as pointed out by some authors, the copyright could be considered 
weak), it seems less well founded in cases like IMS and Microsoft where the grant of 
copyright was not controversial, but the Commission and the ECJ nonetheless found 
                                                 
224 Case 24-67 Parke, Davis and Co. v Probel, Reese, Beintema-Interpharm and Centrafarm, ECR 
000555, ¶ 72 (1968). 
225 T-201/04 Microsoft v. Commission, ECR II-4463, ¶¶ 288-289 (2004).  
226 WORD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, SURVEY ON COMPULSORY LICENSES GRANTED BY 
WIPO MEMBER STATES TO ADDRESS ANTI-COMPETITIVE USES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Oct. 
4, 2011), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_4/cdip_4_4_rev_study_inf_5.pdf. 
See also S. M. Ford, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPS Agreement: Balancing Pills 
And Patents, 15 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW (2000).  
227 W. CORNISH & D. LLEWELLYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS AND 
ALLIED RIGHTS, 6th ed., at 755 (Sweet & Maxwell 2003). 
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the imposition of a duty to license appropriate.228 It is therefore possible to conclude 
that, when the elements of the exceptional circumstances test are met, a refusal to 
license a patent right can constitute an abuse of a dominant position in violation of 
Article 102 TFEU. 
2.2.A.2. Limited liability under U.S. antitrust law 
U.S. courts have been much more reluctant to find a refusal to license 
anticompetitive than their EU counterparts. There are cases in which U.S. courts 
considered a refusal to license in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Ninth 
Circuit, for example, considered anticompetitive Kodak’s refusal to license 
replacement parts for its photocopiers and micrographic (or microfilm) equipment to 
independent service organizations (ISOs), which competed with Kodak in the market 
for replacement parts.229 Replacement parts were protected by both patents and 
copyrights. The court ruled that the right to refuse to grant a license had a 
presumably valid business justification, which was nevertheless rebuttable. The Ninth 
Circuit found that Kodak’s justification concerning the IPRs protection was just a 
pretext and did not provide a valid business justification for a refusal to license.230  
Several commentators criticized the approach adopted by the Ninth Circuit, 
maintaining that it gave too much weight to the IPR owner’s subjective intent, a 
criterion that is not only often difficult to evaluate, but also not in line with the 
antirust trend of relying on effects-based approaches.231 The criticism was reflected in 
the Federal Circuit’s judgment in Independent Service Organizations Antitrust 
Litigation v Xerox (hereinafter Xerox).232 The case concerned very similar 
circumstances as the one presented in the Kodak case.233 The Federal Circuit 
nonetheless refused to apply the Kodak approach, emphasizing that “antitrust laws do 
                                                 
228 M. Delrahim, Forcing Firms to Share the Sandbox: Compulsory Licensing Of Intellectual Property 
Rights And Antitrust, British Institute of International and Comparative Law (May 10, 2004), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/203627.pdf. 
229 Image Technical Services v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1212-1213 (9th Cir. 1997). 
230 Id. at. 1219.  
231 See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP; PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, Vol. III, at 222 (Aspen Publ. 2002).  
232 In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation v Xerox Corp., 203 F. 3d 1322 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000). 
233 Xerox manufactured, sold, and serviced high-volume copiers. In 1984, it established a policy of not 
selling parts unique to its series 10 copiers to independent service organizations (“ISOs”), unless they 
were also end-users of the copiers. ISOs brought suit claiming that copier manufacturer's refusal to sell 
its patented parts and copyrighted manuals and to license copyrighted software violated antitrust laws. 
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not negate the patentee’s right to exclude others from patent property.”234 The Federal 
Circuit recognized that the right to exclude is not absolute, and that it might in 
certain circumstances constitute an anticompetitive conduct, particularly when it 
concerns illegal tying, fraud against the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham 
litigation.235 The Federal Circuit nonetheless noted that it is for the defendant to prove 
that one of these exceptions applies in the concrete case. In the absence of such 
allegation, the court refused to evaluate the patent owner’s subjective motivation for a 
refusal to license.236 It explained that by establishing the system of IPRs, Congress 
relied on the assumption that  
 
[the right to] exclude others from using their works creates a system of incentives 
that promotes consumer welfare in the long term by encouraging investment in 
the creation of [such work]. We cannot require antitrust defendants to prove and 
reprove the merits of this legislative assumption in every case where a refusal to 
license . . . comes under attack.237 
 
The Federal Circuit thus adopted a presumption of legality for cases concerning a 
refusal to license. 
The divergent decisions adopted by the two courts leave some uncertainty 
regarding antitrust liability for a refusal to license a patent. It seems, however, that 
particularly after the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Trinko case, a unilateral and 
unconditional refusal to license is unlikely to constitute an act of monopolization 
under the Sherman Act. The Trinko case did not concern a refusal to license. Rather, 
the court evaluated Verizon’s failure to provide to its competitor access to the 
operations support systems on just, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, as 
provided in the Telecommunication Act.238 The plaintiffs alleged that Verizon’s refusal 
to provide its services aimed to limit entry in the market.239 The Supreme Court 
refused to find the conduct anticompetitive, maintaining that antitrust law does not 
                                                 
234 Id. at 1325. 
235 Id. at 1327. 
236 Id. at 1326. 
237 Id. at 1329. 
238 Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
239 Id. at. 407. 
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impose on an undertaking a duty to deal with its competitors. The Supreme Court 
reasoned that firms may acquire a strong market position by developing a unique 
infrastructure. “Compelling such firms to share the source of their advantage is in 
some tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the 
incentive . . . to invest in [the development of those] facilities.”240 By forcing to the 
Court to grant access to the facility, antitrust law would force the undertaking to 
share the fruits of its investments with its competitors. This might in turn decrease 
the violator’s incentives to invest in research and innovation in the first place. The 
Supreme Court thus concluded that antitrust law “does not restrict the long 
recognized right [of an undertaking] . . . to exercise his own independent discretion as 
to parties with whom he will deal.”241  
The Supreme Court also noted that the judgment would not have been different 
even if the parties had pleaded the essential facilities doctrine.242 The Supreme Court 
distanced itself from the doctrine, by emphasizing that it has “never recognized such 
doctrine.”243 As a result, several commentators see the Trinko judgment as the 
ultimate rejection of the “essential facility doctrine” under U.S. antitrust law.244 The 
Trinko case thus established a strong presumption of legality for cases concerning a 
refusal to deal.  
The application of the principles developed in the Trinko case to the context of 
patent rights suggest that a unilateral and unconditional refusal to license a patent is 
presumed to be a legitimate business practice, and it is unlikely to trigger antitrust 
liability under U.S. antitrust law. This position was confirmed also by the two U.S. 
antitrust agencies—the DOJ and the FTC—which maintained that the “antitrust 
liability for the unilateral, unconditional refusals to license patents will not play a 
                                                 
240 Id. at 408. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. at 411. In order to sustain a claim under the essential facility doctrine, the plaintiff must prove 
that: (1) the monopolist controls an essential facility, (2) the inability to duplicate the facility, (3) the 
denial of the use of the facility to a competitors, and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility. When 
these elements are met, the monopolist will be forced to grant access to its facility, unless there is valid 
business justification for a refusal. (See, e.g., MCI Comm’ Corp. v AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-1133 (7th 
Cir. 1983); Aldridge v Microsoft Corp, 995 F. Supp. 728, 752 (S.D. Tex 1998).  
243 Id. 
244 See, e.g. H. J. Hovenkamp, Standards Ownership and Competition Policy, 48 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW 
REVIEW 87, 101 (2007) (suggesting that the Trinko case “leaves few opportunities for use the essential 
facility doctrine). 
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meaningful part in the interface between patent rights and antitrust protections.245 
Under U.S. antitrust law, there is hence a strong presumption that a refusal to license 
a patent does not constitute an anticompetitive conduct, even if the patent owner has 
strong market power.  
It is worth noting, that the Trinko ruling departs, to a certain extent, from the 
Supreme Court’s earlier decision in the Aspen Skiing case, which determined that a 
termination of a voluntary business relationship with a competitor may constitute an 
anticompetitive conduct actionable under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. When 
reasoning the departure from Aspen Skiing ruling, the Supreme Court first noted that 
“Aspen Skiing is at or near the outer boundary of Section 2 liability,”246 emphasizing 
in this way the need for a narrow reading of that judgment. Next, the Supreme Court 
recalled that Aspen Skiing concerned the termination of a voluntary collaboration with 
competitors. In the Supreme Court’s view, the termination of the relationship clearly 
indicated the willingness to forsake short-term profit to achieve an anticompetitive 
end. The Supreme court concluded that the Trinko case did not fit in the “limited 
exceptions” recognized in Aspen Skiing, given that Verizon would not have enter in a 
business relationship with its competitors, unless such obligation was provided in a 
statute. 247 Nonetheless, Aspen Skiing suggests that despite the strong presumption of 
legality, a refusal to license a patent could still trigger an antitrust liability if it falls 
within the exception recognized in that case. 
There might be several other qualifications to the general rule that a refusal to 
license does not constitute an anticompetitive conduct. Although a unilateral and 
unconditional refusal to license is not likely to be anticompetitive, an antitrust 
liability might arise in cases of a conditional refusal to license, in a form of tying, 
exclusive dealing, or reciprocity.248 In such cases, the legal evaluation will focus on the 
imposed conditions, rather than on the refusal itself.  
Section 5 of the FTCA has not played a relevant role in challenging the patent 
owner’s refusal to license. In fact, courts have been reluctant to extend the domain of 
                                                 
245 U.S. D.O.J. & F.T.C., ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 32 (Apr. 2007). 
246 Verizon Comm’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004). 
247 Id. at 409. 
248 P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 709c, at 232-34, 2nd ed. (2002) (identifying price 
fixing, market division, exclusive dealing, and reciprocity as categories of suspect conditional refusals). 
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Section 5 of the FTCA beyond the limits of the Sherman Act in a context where there 
is a well-developed court practice determining the elements of an antitrust 
violation.249 It would be consequently difficult to argue that a refusal to license that 
falls outside the Sherman Act liability could constitutes a standalone violation of the 
FTCA. In other words, the scope of Section 5 of the FTCA in the context of a refusal to 
license seems to correspond with the scope of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
2.2.B. Excessive royalties 
The EU and U.S. approaches differ considerably when addressing the patent 
owner’s imposition of excessive royalties.250 In the EU, the imposition of excessive 
prices, including excessive royalties, can constitute an anticompetitive conduct. Article 
102 TFEU explicitly prohibits dominant firms from imposing “unfair purchase or 
selling prices or other unfair trading conditions.” The ECJ clarified that the word 
“unfair” also encompasses excessive prices.251 It explicitly stated (although referring to 
copyrights) that an IPR does not guarantee the owner the opportunity to demand the 
highest possible remuneration, but only the appropriate remuneration.252 The case law 
has thus clearly determined that the patent holder’s imposition of excessive royalties 
can constitute an abuse of a dominant position in violation of Article 102 TFEU. 
Excessive prices are, on the contrary, not an antitrust offence under U.S. 
antitrust law. U.S. antitrust law is only concerned with the illegitimate obtainment or 
maintenance of monopoly power, but it does not determine how a legitimate 
monopolist should uses its market power.253 The Supreme Court clarified that  
 
                                                 
249 Boise Cascade Cor. v F.T.C., 637 F. 2d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 1980). 
250 Excessive prices are generally defined as prices that are set significantly above competitive levels. 
(See OECD, Glossary of Statistical Terms, available at http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3211 
(last visited on July 2012)). 
251 See, e.g. Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207, at 235; Case 110/99 Lucazeau v 
SACEM [1989] ECR 2811, at 33.  
252 Joined cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others and Karen Murphy v 
Media Protection Services Ltd, Football Association Premier League ECR 0000, at 108 (2011). 
253 See, e.g. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F. 
2d 1374, 1383 (Court of Claims 1971); Berkey Photo, Inc. v Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 297 (2d 
Cir. 1979); Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wisconsin v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1413 
(7th Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945); Ball Memorial 
Hospital, Inc. v. Mutual Hospital Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d at 1325, 1339 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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[c]harging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful, but it is an important 
element of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices, at 
least for a short period of time, is what attracts business acumen in the first 
place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth[.]254  
 
A successful competitor “having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when 
he wins.”255 The patent owner’s imposition of excessive royalties is thus not considered 
an anticompetitive behavior under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.  
 Likewise, the imposition of excessive royalties is also unlikely to constitute a 
standalone offence of Section 5 of the FTCA. Given the strong reluctance to condemn 
excessive prices under the Sherman Act, the FTC did generally not challenge the 
unilateral imposition of excessive royalties as unfair methods of competition. As in the 
case of a refusal to license, in the case of excessive royalties as well, the limits that 
Section 5 of the FTCA poses on the patent owner’s conduct seem to correspond to the 
ones determined by the Sherman Act. 
The different approaches EU competition law and U.S. antitrust law adopt 
toward exploitative conducts (and excessive royalties, more specifically) reflect the 
divergence between the underlining ideologies on which the two competition laws 
systems rely. U.S. antitrust law is based on the strong assumption that the free 
market leads to the best allocation of economic resources. It also believes that the 
government and courts should not become itself an obstacle to the free market. At the 
same time, there is a strong skepticism towards the efficiency of antitrust intervention 
in cases of excessive prices, given the practical difficulty in identifying the violation 
and defining the appropriate remedy.256 
The EU approach, on the contrary, has a stronger emphasis on distributive 
justice.257 The concept reflects the influence of the Ordoliberal school of law, which 
regarded excessive prices as an inequitable distribution of the benefits of the 
                                                 
254 Verizon Comm’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004). 
255 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945). 
256 M. S. Gal, Monopoly Pricing as an Antitrust Offense in the U.S. and the EC: Two Systems of Belief 
About Monopoly?, 49 ANTITRUST BULLETIN (2004). 
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market.258 At the same time, the prohibition of excessive prices must also be evaluated 
in light of the basic principles on which the European Union was established. The 
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community259, which set out the basic 
principles of EU competition law, did not aim at economic efficiency itself, but had a 
broader political goal: the establishment of a common market among the member 
states.260 As explained by Bellamy, “the basic idea behind articles 85 and 86 [now 
Article 101 and 102] was that if you are to dismantle barriers between states within a 
common market . . . you cannot risk having those barriers re-erected by private 
agreements or abuses of monopoly by private [parties]”.261 The prohibition of excessive 
prices aimed at addressing potential barriers to the development of an internal EU 
market that could be raised by private parties.  
Nevertheless, the difference between the approach EU competition law and U.S. 
antitrust law adopt toward exploitative abuses is less prominent in practice. Despite 
the legal basis for an antitrust intervention, the European Commission has in fact 
rarely condemned dominant undertakings for imposing excessive prices.262 The 
intervention has been often seen as unnecessary, given the ability of the market to 
self-correct.263 High prices should attract new entrants in the market, and 
consequently drive prices down to competitive levels.  
                                                 
258 The Ordoliberal school of thought, often referred also as the Friedburg school, was founded in the 
1930s at the University of Freiburg in Germany. The school promoted economic freedom and 
competition as the sources of prosperity, but also of political freedom. They saw competition as a central 
element to economic progress but placed it in a wider, socio-political perspective. The central belief was 
that an economy based on the free market would provide the basis for the society they envisioned. They 
however emphasized that competition should be protected from two main sources where power can be 
accumulated: governmental power and private power. In relation to the former, they argued for 
representative democracy. In relation to the latter, ordoliberals focused on competition law, which 
protected the conditions of competition, rather than focus on competition’s direct results. It required 
dominant firms to act in a manner consistent with a competitive economic model, and stressed the role 
of fairness, which protected the individual’s economic freedom of action .In this respect, they supported 
a strong role of competition law as the guarantor of free competition. (For discussion see L Lovdahl 
Gormsen, Article 82 EC: Where are we coming from and where are we going to?, 2 THE COMPETITION 
LAW REVIEW 5(2006)). 
259 Also known as the Rome Treaty. 
260 Honorable C. Bellamy, Some Reflections on Competition Law in the Global Market, 34 NEW 
ENGLAND LAW REVIEW 15 (2000). 
261 Id.  
262 To the contrary, national competition authorities of the member states of the EU have been much 
more aggressive in addressing cases of excessive prices.  
263 V. KORAH, EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE, 6th ed., at 113 (Hart Publishing 1997); G. MONTI, 
EC COMPETITION LAW, chapter 7 (Cambridge University Press 2007). 
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The intervention towards excessive prices has been often also considered 
controversial. One reason is the absence of a clear test that would allow the 
competition authority to differentiate between high, but legitimate prices, and those 
that are excessive and thus abusive. The ECJ defined excessive prices as prices which 
have “no reasonable relation to the economic value of the products supplied.”264 
“Reasonable” and “economic value” are however vague terms that provide little 
guidance for a practical evaluation.265 The identification of an excessive royalty might 
be particularly difficult in the context of IPRs where, what might be considered a 
monopoly profit in other sectors only represents a fair compensation for an innovative 
technology.266 The absence of a well-defined test to identify excessive royalties might 
open the door for costly erroneous decisions. When a company is illegitimately forced 
to decrease its prices, the intervention will not only affect its ability to recoup the past 
investments, but will also affect its willingness to further invest in innovation. 
Erroneous decisions might thus harm innovation and consumer welfare.  
Given the controversies related to the intervention in cases of excessive prices, it 
should come as no surprise that in the EU as well the antitrust enforcement has 
rarely focused on exploitative abuses. The Commission expressed its concerns with the 
intervention in cases of excessive royalties already in the 1994 Report on Competition 
policy, when it stated that  
 
[c]onsumers can suffer from a dominant company exploiting this position . . . 
through prices higher than would be found in the market subject to effective 
competition. However, the Commission in its decision-making practice does not 
                                                 
264 See, e.g., Case 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission 
of the European Communities, ECR 207, ¶ 250 (1978); Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission, 
ECR 00207, ¶ 250-252 (1978).  
265 In the context of tangible goods, the ECJ adopted a two-step approach which was designed to 
facilitate such evaluation. It determined that it is (i) first, necessary to analyze whether the difference 
between the costs and the charged price is excessive; and (ii) second, determine whether the price is 
either unfair in itself or when compared to competing products. The European Commission has however 
recognized that the test has a limited applicability in the context of IPRs. (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to 
Horizontal Cooperation Agreements § C(2010) 9274/2, ¶ 289 (2010)) Geradin however criticized the 
application of the two step-approach emphasizing several drawbacks (D. Geradin, Pricing Abuses by 
Essential Patent Holders in a Standard-Setting Context: a View from Europe, 76 ANTITRUST LAW 
JOURNAL 329 (2009)).  
266 M. GLADER, INNOVATION MARKETS AND COMPETITION ANALYSIS: EU COMPETITION LAW AND US 
ANTITRUST LAW (New Horizons in Competition Law and Economics) (Edward Elgar Publishing 2006). 
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normally control or condemn the high level of prices as such. Rather it examines 
the behavior of the dominant company designed to preserve dominance, usually 
directed against competitors or new entrants who would normally bring about 
effective competition and the price level associated with it.267  
 
As a result, as in the United States, also in the EU, companies have been rarely 
condemned for the imposition of exploitative licensing conditions. 
The few cases in which the Commission challenged the imposition of excessive 
prices concerned situations where the market was not be able self-correct the 
excessive level of price, because of the presence of significant barriers to entry. This 
was, for example, the case of natural or legal monopolies, such as ports and postal 
services.268 A similar approach was adopted in the context of IPRs. The Commission 
condemned the pricing strategy of the French performing rights society SACEM in 
licensing French discotheques.269 The Commission maintained customers had no 
possibility to switch to an alternative licensor, in response to the exploitative licensing 
conditions, given that SACEM had a legally granted monopoly. The Commission 
confirmed its intention to intervene similar cases in the Guidance on its enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings (Guidance on exclusionary practices).270 The document states 
that “the Commission may decide to intervene in relation to [excessive prices], in 
particular where the protection of consumers and the proper functioning of the 
internal market cannot otherwise be adequately ensured.” 271 Therefore, although 
Article 102 TFEU provides the legal basis for an intervention, there are only a few 
cases where the imposition of an excessive royalty was considered anticompetitive, 
mainly related to markets with strong barrier to enter. 
The antitrust analysis follows a different path in cases where the imposition of 
excessive royalties has an exclusionary effect. It is possible that a patent owner is not 
                                                 
267 XXIV Report on Competition Policy, at 207 (1994).  
268 See, e.g., Case 26/75 General Motors Continental v Commission [1975] ECR 1367; COMP/C-
1/36.915 British Post Office v. Deutsche Post AG., OJ L331/40 [2001].  
269 Case 110/99 Lucazeau v SACEM [1989] ECR 2811. 
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interested in licensing its technology, and makes a fictitious offer to the licensee, by 
imposing licensing conditions that will be ultimately rejected. The literature often 
refers to such practices as a “constructive refusal to license”.272 In such circumstances, 
an antitrust liability could arise under both EU competition law and U.S. antitrust 
law. However, the focus of the analysis will not be on the excessive price itself, but 
rather on the exclusionary effects it imposes on the market. The patent owner’s 
conduct is thus evaluated in light of other doctrines, such as the refusal to license, or 
the conditional refusal to license.273 
2.2.C. Conditional licensing 
Courts and competition authorities confirmed that the imposition of grant-back 
clauses,274 non-assertion clauses,275 royalty free clauses, or other forms of conditional 
licensing might also trigger anticompetitive concerns. Competition law does not 
prohibit such practices. Rather, it recognizes that these types of licensing constraints 
often have a genuine purpose and serve procompetitive effects.276 A grant-back, for 
example, can facilitate licensing, given that it provides an efficient way to value the 
licensed IPR, and it can represent an alternative to higher royalty rates. A non-
assertion clause permits the parties to avoid costly litigation over the use of an IPR, 
and thus allow them to focus on their core business, rather than on patent 
enforcement. There might be nonetheless situations where the imposition of specific 
licensing conditions have anticompetitive effects.277 A broad grant-back clause might 
                                                 
272 J. Drexl, Refusal to Deal: Answers to the Questionnaire of the ICN Unilateral Conduct Working 
Group, available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/questionnaires/uc%20refusals/drexl.pdf. See 
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276 See, e.g. U.S. D.O.J. AND F.T.C., Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property 
Rights, §3.4 (Apr 1995).  
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deter innovation, if it completely prevents the licensee from receiving the benefits from 
its innovative improvements. A non-assertion clause that is too broad in its scope and 
duration might help maintain an illegitimate duopoly or monopoly. Further, invalid 
patents impair competition, and challenging their validity is generally desirable.278  
There are cases where the imposition of specific licensing conditions has been 
considered an abuse of a dominant position. In Tetra Pak, for example, the 
Commission found that the undertaking abused its dominant position by imposing, 
inter alia, compulsory grant-back clauses on its customers. The Commission 
considered that given the strong position Tetra Pak had in the market, the imposition 
of such requirement, together with other contractual clauses, was part of an overall 
strategy to make customers totally dependent on Tetra Pak for the entire life of the 
machine, excluding any possibility for competition.279  
Similarly, U.S. courts confirmed that the legality of the imposed licensing 
conditions should be evaluated under the rule of reason. The analysis focuses on 
whether the contractual restrains are likely to diminish competition in the concerned 
market.280 The analysis normally focuses on the following factors: the market power of 
the parties, whether the practice inhibits entry of other firms, and whether the 
practice reduces the incentive to innovate. Courts will normally assess whether the 
restraint is likely to diminish competition “among entities that would have been actual 
or likely potential competitors” in the absence of that restraint.281  
In sum, both jurisdictions emphasize the need to evaluate the imposed licensing 
conditions on a case-by-case basis. They both recognize that conditional licensing is 
generally legitimate, but that, in some circumstances, the imposition of specific 
licensing conditions might constitute an anticompetitive behavior. 
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3. A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION 
The chapter has provided a basic picture of the limits competition laws poses on 
the exercise of patent rights. The analysis shows that although the exercise of patent 
rights does not necessarily give rise to competition concerns, there are situations 
where conflicts do arise. In such circumstances, both EU competition law and US 
antitrust law recognize that patent owners are in no way immune from competition 
law, and competition law might limit the exercise of a legitimately obtained patent 
right.  
The approach adopted by courts and competition authorities towards patent 
rights reflects the approach adopted in the context of tangible goods. As in the context 
of tangible goods, EU competition law and US antitrust law differ importantly in their 
relation towards exploitative practices, such as the imposition of excessive royalties. 
Whereas Section 2 of the Sherman Act does not condemn the imposition of excessive 
royalties, the situation is different in the EU. Article 102 TFEU provides the legal 
basis for the intervention in cases where the patent owner imposes excessive royalties. 
Although there are only few cases where the Commission has condemned such 
practices, the patent owner’s imposition of exploitative licensing conditions might be 
considered anticompetitive. 
Further, the two systems differ also in their relation towards exclusionary 
practices. A review of the past cases indicates that US courts have in general adopted 
a less interventionist approach, in comparison to their EU counterpart. Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act, and Section 5 of the FTCA (which enforcement seems to largely 
correspond with that of Section 2 of the Sherman Act) impose fewer limitations to the 
patent owner’s conduct than Article 102 TFEU. A clear example is a case concerning a 
refusal to license patents. Whereas the Commission and the ECJ confirmed that in 
exceptional circumstances a refusal to license an IPR may constitute anticompetitive 
conduct, such outcome is much less likely under U.S. antitrust law.  
Several reasons might explain the differences between the approaches adopted in 
the two jurisdictions. Kovacic suggests that the differences between the EU 
competition law and U.S. antitrust law should be at least partially attributed to the 
difference between the antitrust enforcement mechanisms in place in the two 
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jurisdictions.282 He suggests that characteristics of the U.S. antitrust enforcement, 
such as private rights of action with mandatory treble damages, asymmetric shifting 
of costs, broad rights of discovery, class actions, and jury trials, stimulated courts to 
adopt a more lenient treatment toward firms’ unilateral conducts. Plaintiffs may be 
interested in using antitrust law to secure a commercial advantage, rather than 
pursuing the public interest. As a result, U.S. courts have adopted a more cautious 
approach before condemning business conduct, and have established relatively 
demanding standards that private plaintiffs must satisfy to demonstrate that a 
specific conduct constitutes an antitrust violation. In the EU, on the contrary, where 
the enforcement is predominantly in the hands of a public authority, there was less 
need for strict legal standards, assuming that the authorities would select cases to 
pursue the public interest.  
The two jurisdictions seem to also have different beliefs regarding the market 
structure that provides better incentive for innovation. Both systems recognize that 
competition law and IPRs stimulate innovation. They nonetheless seem to favor 
different policies to achieve this goal. In the EU, the Commission considers that the 
maintenance of competitive market conditions is the primary tool to foster innovation, 
even though it requires granting access to a proprietary input. The EU approach thus 
seems to reflect the position of Arrow and other economists, who believe that 
competition provides more incentives to innovate.283 U.S. courts, on the contrary, seem 
to rely more on the protection of private property, including IPRs, as a tool to foster 
innovation. As emphasized by the Supreme Court, forcing undertaking to share the 
fruits of their investment might harm their incentive to make further investments.284 
The approach adopted in the United States, reflects very much the position of 
Schumpeter and other economists, who maintain that monopolies are necessary to 
stimulate firms to invest in research and development. They can generate more 
innovation through the “creative destruction”, where monopolies of different firm 
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Divergence?, Bates White Fifth Annual Antitrust Conference (June 2, 2008), available at 
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succeed each other. In their view, monopolies are the main drivers of technological and 
innovative progress in society.285  
Having analyzed the basic doctrines that govern the relationship between 
competition law and patent rights, we can now turn our discussion on the SEP owners’ 
antitrust liability. The next chapters will analyze the SEP owner’s liability for the 
various licensing practices. The analysis will assess whether the divergences between 
EU competition law and U.S. antitrust law identified in this chapter hold also in cases 
addressing the SEP holder’s conduct.  
                                                 
285 J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (Kessinger Publishing 1943). 
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Chapter IV 
THE SEP OWNER’S MARKET POWER  
Competition authorities and courts have scrutinized the SEP owner’s conduct 
through provisions addressing unilateral practices. Despite the large number of cases, 
the scope competition law has in addressing the SEP owner’s conduct remains 
nonetheless unsettled. The second part of this book aims to bring some clarity to this 
picture, by identifying the types of conduct that might lead to an antitrust liability 
under EU competition law and U.S. antitrust law. 
The present chapter focuses primarily on the evaluation of the SEP owners’ 
market power—an essential element of the unilateral conduct offence under both EU 
competition law and U.S. antitrust law. This chapter analyzes which circumstances 
should be taken into account when assessing the SEP owner’s market power.  
 
1. THE CURRENT APPROACH TOWARDS THE SEP OWNER’S MARKET 
POWER 
The evaluation of the SEP owner’s market power is an essential element of the 
violation of Article 102 TFEU, Section 2 of the Sherman Act, as well as the Section 5 of 
the FTCA offence.286  
As explained in the previous chapter, none of the jurisdictions provides a 
presumption of market power for patent owners. A similar principle applies in the 
context of SEPs. In the EU, the Commission explicitly stated that “even if the 
establishment of a standard can create or increase the market power of IPR holders . . 
. there is no presumption that holding or exercising IPR essential to a standard 
equates to the possession . . . of market power.”287 Similarly, in the United States, 
none of the Supreme Court decisions state that there is a presumption of monopoly 
power for a SEP owner. In Townshend v. Rochwell, the District Court of the Northern 
District of California even maintained that “[t]he adoption of an industry standard 
                                                 
286 See discussion in Chapter III, 2.1. Patent owner’s market power. 
287 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
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incorporating [a] proprietary technology does not confer any power to exclude that 
exceeds the exclusionary power to which a patent holder is otherwise legally 
entitled.”288 It concluded that the ownership of a SEP was not sufficient to prove the 
existence of monopoly power.  
The approach adopted in practice is however not always consistent. On some 
occasions, courts and competition authorities have been more willing to conclude that 
a SEP owner holds strong market power. For example, in Broadcom v Qualcomm, the 
Third Circuit held that the “the incorporation of a patent into a standard . . . makes 
the scope of the relevant market congruent with that of the patent.”289 The District 
Court of San Jose also adopted a narrow market definition in dispute between Apple 
and Samsung, accepting Apple’s argument that Samsung’s SEPs formed its own 
relevant market, in which Samsung had a monopoly.290 The European Commission 
adopted a similar approach in the approval of the merger between Google and 
Motorola Mobility. The European Commission acknowledged that once a patented 
technology becomes standard essential, the existence of competing standards might 
mitigate the concerns with opportunistic practices.291 It however also stated that  
 
[t]he specificity of SEPs is that they have to be implemented in order to comply 
with a standard and thus cannot be designed around, i.e. there is by definition no 
alternative or substitute for each such patent. Therefore, each SEP constitutes a 
separate relevant technology market on its own.292 
 
Defining the market so narrowly, around the individual technology protected by a 
SEP, necessarily leads to finding each SEP owner dominant in the market of its 
technology. It basically results in a presumption of dominance of monopoly power for 
every SEP owner. 
The different approaches adopted by courts and competition agencies leave some 
uncertainty regarding the evaluation of the SEP owner’s market power. Does the 
                                                 
288 See, e.g., Townshend v. Rockwell Intl. Corp., 2000 WL 433505, at 35 (N.D. Cal. 2000).  
289 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F. 3d 297, 315 (3rd Cir. 2007). 
290 Apple Inc.. v. Samsung Elecs, Case No. 11-CV-01846, 99 (N.D. California). 
291 Case No COMP/M.6381 -Google/Motorola Mobility - Merger procedure, EUR-Lex, at 53 (Dec. 17, 
2008). 
292 Id. at 54. 
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implementation of a technology in an industry standard confer market power? Is the 
narrow market definition around the individual SEP, which considers the SEP owner 
per se dominant, in line with the economic theory? Is a SEP owner necessarily 
dominant or a monopolist? 
In order to answer these questions, the next paragraphs analyze the effects that 
the inclusion of a patented technology in the industry standard has on the SEP 
owner’s market power. As it will be explained, the ownership of a SEP might confer 
market power, but this is not necessarily the case. There is consequently no valid 
justification to introduce a presumption of dominance or monopoly power for SEP 
owners. 
 
 
2. THE ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
2.1. Intra-standard and inter-standards competition 
The inclusion of a patented technology in an industry standard can certainly 
confer market power to the SEP owner. When selecting the technologies to be 
implemented in the standard, there might be several available alternatives, some of 
which are available in the public domain, whereas others (generally the majority) are 
protected by patent rights. At this stage, the technology owner’s market power 
depends largely on the quality of its technology, and on the available alternatives. 
When there are several alternatives available, it is unlikely that the technology owner 
will be able to charge high royalties. Potential licensees can shift to the use of 
alternatives in response to an increase in price. 
The standardization process nonetheless eliminates the intra-standard 
competition, that is, the competition among technologies that compete for the 
implementation in the standard.293 Once the standard is set, the available alternatives 
are eliminated, and the chosen technology becomes essential for the standard. At this 
point, potential licensees are not able to react to an eventual increase in royalties, 
given that switching to alternatives would require a revision of the standard—a 
                                                 
293 P. Chappatte, FRAND Commitments–The Case For Antitrust Intervention, 5 EUROPEAN 
COMPETITION JOURNAL 319, 324 (2009). 
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process that is generally lengthy and extremely expensive. The inclusion of a patented 
technology in an industry standard might thus confer some degree of market power.  
The implementation of a technology in a standard does however not necessarily 
confer the level of market power leading to dominance or a monopoly. Although there 
is no doubt that the implementation of the standard can confer incremental market 
power to the SEP owner, the actual level of obtained market power is an empirical, 
rather than a theoretical question. Incremental market power is defined as difference 
between the SEP owner’s market power after the implementation of its technology in 
the standard and the market power it had before the implementation. Its magnitude is 
contingent on several factors, such as the success of the standard and the competition 
that the standard faces from alternative standards and non-standardized products.  
There are several situations where the implementation in the standard does not 
confer any significant level of market power. First, not every standard succeeds. Some 
standards are not accepted by the market, and are never implemented by a 
substantial number of manufacturers. In this case, the implementation of a technology 
in a standard does not confer any significant level of market power to the SEP 
owner.294 An example of an unsuccessful standard is the first SDRAM standard 
adopted by JEDEC, which later adopted the standard including the much-discussed 
patents held by Rambus. The first SDRAM standard was not implemented as quickly 
or as widely as anticipated, and consequently JEDEC decided to begin to work on a 
next-generation standard. Although the standard included two Rambus’ patents, the 
inclusion did clearly not confer any substantial level of market power to the 
company.295  
 Second, even after the implementation in the standard, the SEP owner might 
still face constraints from other standards (inter-standard competition), or from non-
standardized products. There are several industries where competing standards 
coexist and compete among each other. One example is the market for high-speed, 
                                                 
294 A. Fuchs, Patent Ambush Strategies and Article 102 TFEU, in MORE COMMON GROUND FOR 
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW (Warren S. Grimes Josef Drexl, Clifford A. Jones, Rudolph J. R. 
Peritz, Edward T. Swaine ed. 2011) (“There is, however, no guarantee that a standard announced by an 
SSO will really govern an economic market or a whole industry.”). The FTC made a similar observation 
in the Dell investigation, maintaining that only “[o]nce [the] standard had become widely accepted, the 
standard effectively conferred market power upon Dell as the patent holder.” Dell Computer Corp., N. 
3658, F.T.C. (May 20, 1996). 
295 Rambus, Inc. v. F.T.C., 522 F.3d 456, 460 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  
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high-quality computer games, where Sega, Nintendo, and Sony compete by relying on 
different standards.296 When manufacturers can choose among competing standards, 
or standardized and non-standardized products, the SEP’s owners might not be able to 
behave independently from its consumers, or control prices and thus exclude 
competition. Also in this case, the implementation of a patented technology in a 
standard does not necessarily confer to the SEP owner a considerable level of 
incremental market power.297 
There are nevertheless standards that are very successful and become the 
predominant solution adopted in the market. A clear example is a case where the 
compliance with the standard becomes a de facto market requirement. A de facto 
standard faces little or no competition from alternative standards. In such 
circumstances, it will be difficult—if not impossible—for the potential licensees to 
react to the SEP owners’ opportunistic conduct. At the same time, a collective reaction 
to the SEP owners’ opportunism might be difficult to implement, given that it would 
require all the manufacturers to collectively switch to a new standard: a change that is 
often difficult to implement in practice. 298 As a result, the SEP owner might be able to 
behave independently from its competitors, consumers, and customers (using the EU 
                                                 
296 See, e.g., D. L. Rubinfeld, Competition, Innovation, And Antitrust Enforcement In Dynamic 
Network Industries (Mar. 4, 1998), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/1611.htm 
(noting that where network effects are sufficiently limited, or offsetting factors sufficiently strong to 
permit multiple networks to survive in the marketplace, there is a strong competition among coexisting 
networks (“multiple standards”)). 
297 See, e.g., Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman F.T.C., Recognizing the Procompetitive Potential of 
Royalty Discussions in Standard Setting, Remarks at Standardization and the Law: Developing the 
Golden Mean for Global Trade 10, at 3 (Sept. 23, 2005), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050923stanford.pdf (“if the chosen standard has to compete with 
rival standards, the owner of the SSO’s chosen technology may end up with little market power.”). 
Commissioner Azcuenaga made a similar observation in the dissent concerning the FTC action against 
Dell, pointing out that the inclusion of Dell’s patented technologies in the standard did not necessary 
confer market power. If computer producers could switch to bus designs that did not incorporate Dell's 
technology, no monopoly was possible (Dissent, Dell Computer Corporation, Consent Order, etc., Docket 
No. C-3658 (1996)). Also the European Commission recognized that “restrictive effects are most unlikely 
in a situation where there is effective competition between a number of voluntary standards.” It 
emphasized that where there are “several competing standards or in the case of effective competition 
between the standardised solution and non-standardised solution, a limitation of access (to the 
standard) may not produce restrictive effects on competition.” (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Guidelines on 
the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal 
Cooperation Agreements § C(2010) 9274/2, ¶¶ 269, 277, 294 (2010)).  
298 E. Ramirez, Oversight of the Impact on Competition of Exclusion Orders to Enforce Standards-
Essential Patents (Jul. 11, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/ramirez/120711sep-
stmtofftc.pdf (noting that it may not be feasible to deviate from the standard unless all or most other 
participants in the industry agree to do so in compatible ways.). 
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definition of dominant position), and will be able to control prices or exclude 
competition (using the U.S. definition of monopoly power). In those circumstances, the 
implementation of the patented technology in the standard confers to the SEP owner 
considerable level of incremental market power, leading to dominance and/or 
monopoly.299  
Courts and competition authorities were thus correct in noting that SEPs differ 
from regular patents.300 The inclusion of a patented technology in an industry 
standard might confer market power to its owner and lead to dominance and 
monopoly.301 However, the market power does not arise directly from the 
implementation in the standard, but rather from the success of the standard. Only the 
implementation in a successful industry standard that is widely adopted by the 
market is able to confer considerable market power leading to dominance or monopoly.  
In sum, the economic theory does not support the presumption of market power 
for SEP owners. As in the case of other patents, the ownership of a SEP does not 
necessarily confer a dominant position or monopoly power, but there is a need to 
evaluate the SEP owner’s market power on a case-to-case basis.  
 
2.2. The relevance of sunk costs and the lock-in effect  
The discussion of the SEP owner’s market power has often focused on the 
presence of sunk costs and the lock-in effect.302 The argument can be summarized as 
                                                 
299 For a detailed discussion on de facto standards see: Chapter II, 1.3. 
300 For EU see: EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty con 
the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements § C(2010) 9274/2, ¶ 269 
(2010) (“(B)y virtue of its IPR, a participant holding IPR essential for implementing the standard, could, 
in the specific context of standard-setting, also acquire control over the use of a standard.”) For the 
United States see: Research in Motion Limited v. Motorola Inc., 644 F.Supp.2d 788, 791 (N.D. Tex. 
2008) (“Once a patent becomes an essential patent, it gains undue significance as a result”); Broadcom 
Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F 3d. 297, 314 (3rd Cir. 2007) (“Essential patents are very different from 
normal patents.”). 
301 See, e.g. H. J. Hovenkamp, Standards Ownership and Competition Policy, 48 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW 
REVIEW 87, 89 (2007) (“Some, but certainly not all, standards are capable of conferring significant 
market power.”). 
302 See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F 3d. 297, 310 (3rd Cir. 2007) (“Industry 
participants who have invested significant resources developing products and technologies that conform 
to the standard will find it prohibitively expensive to abandon their investment and switch to another 
standard. They will have become "locked in" to the standard.”); U.S. D.O.J. & F.T.C., ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION at 35 
(2007); S. Michel, Bargaining for RAND Royalties in the Shadow of Patent Remedies Law, 77 
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 889, 892 (2011). 
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follows. Manufacturers have generally made specific investments to design their 
product to comply with the standard. The manufacturer’s investment is specific to the 
transaction and has a lower value, or no value, for other purposes. It is lost if the 
manufacturer switches to the use an alternative standard, or produces a non-
standardized product. Because of its sunk investment, the manufacturer might not be 
able to react to the SEP owner’s opportunistic conduct, and it might find itself locked 
in the use of the standard, and consequently of the SEP. In the view of some 
commentators, the presence of sunk costs can thus confer to the SEP owner the ability 
to hold up manufacturers and extract from them unfair licensing conditions.  
However, the ability to hold up a specific manufacturer only shows the SEP 
owner’s bargaining (circumstantial) power, and does not necessarily indicate the 
existence of market power. Bargaining power created by a consumer’s investment is 
not uncommon, even in perfectly functioning, competitive markets. Consider for 
example a case where A purchases an apartment from B, without clarifying the exact 
price for the parking place next to the apartment. Once A buys the apartment, B can 
act opportunistically, and ask an exorbitant price for the parking place. Because of the 
investment in the apartment, A will agree to pay a higher price than it would agree ex 
ante. Although opportunistic, most would agree that B’s behavior is not an action that 
could be challenged under competition law. B might be an individual owner of the 
apartment, without any market power and ability to affect the prices in the market. In 
the same vein, the SEP owner’s ability to hold up specific manufacturers does not 
necessarily indicate the presence of market power. The presence of sunk costs and the 
consequent lock-in effect does not necessarily indicate the existence of market power 
with the meaning of competition law. 
The distinction between bargaining and market power is not always clear in the 
courts’ practice. In Kodak, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on sunk costs to infer the 
existence of monopoly power.303 Eastman Kodak was a supplier of high-volume 
photocopiers and micrographic equipment, and also sold and installed replacement 
parts for its machines. Independent service organizations (ISOs) were servicing Kodak 
equipment. Kodak adopted a policy which limited ISOs’ ability to compete: it refused 
to sell its photocopier and micrographic parts to ISOs, and sold its replacement parts 
                                                 
303 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
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only to equipment owners that bought repair services from Kodak, or provided their 
own service. ISOs brought an action against Kodak, claiming that the conduct was 
anticompetitive. In evaluating the presence of market power, the Supreme Court 
found that Kodak had a monopoly power in its own aftermarket. It maintained that 
customers that had purchased Kodak photocopiers were “locked-in” the use of the 
machines, given their initial investments in the primary market (i.e. Kodak’s 
machines), and the consequent high “switching costs”. In the Supreme Court’s view, 
this conferred upon Kodak the ability to charge monopoly aftermarket prices for 
replacement parts.  
The Supreme Court’s decision was nonetheless criticized in the dissenting 
opinion. Justice Scalia emphasized the need to distinguish between bargaining power 
and monopoly power. Justice Scalia maintained that  
 
[t]he leverage held by a swimming pool contractor when he discovers a 5-ton 
boulder in his customer’s backyard and demands an additional sum of money to 
remove it; or the leverage held by an airplane manufacturer over an airline that 
has ‘standardized’ its fleet around the manufacturer's models; or the leverage 
held by a drill press manufacturer whose customers have built their production 
lines around the manufacturer’s particular style of drill press. Leverage, in the 
form of circumstantial power, plays a role in each of these relationships; but in 
none of them is the leverage attributable to the dominant party's market power 
in any relevant sense.304  
 
Justice Scalia added that “[t]hough that power can plainly work to the injury of 
certain consumers, it produces only a brief perturbation in competitive conditions—not 
the sort of thing the antitrust laws do or should worry about.”305 Through these 
statements, Justice Scalia explained that the bargaining power the incumbent enjoys 
over its customers because of the presence of sunk costs does not necessarily indicate 
the incumbent’s market power, and its ability to affect competition in the market.  
                                                 
304 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451, 497-498 (1992). 
305 Id. at 498. 
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The legal literature has similarly criticized the Kodak decision for confusing the 
undertaking’s bargaining power and the undertaking’s market power.306 Also courts 
have generally limited the application of the Kodak judgment to very narrow 
circumstances.307 It is possible to state that the current legal practice recognizes that 
the specific investments of individual manufacturers and the consequent lock-in effect 
are not sufficient to prove market power.308  
The same economic reasoning should apply in the SEP context. The mere fact 
that some manufacturers have invested in the implementation of the standard and 
face sunk costs should not be sufficient to prove the existence of market power. “The 
mere existence of sunk costs in any particular industry . . . does not necessarily mean 
that entry barriers are high or that competition within the market is not effective.”309  
There are nevertheless situations where the presence of a lock-in effect will 
confer on the SEP holder significant market power. This might be the case when an 
entire industry is locked in the use of a specific standard. In such circumstances, the 
                                                 
306 Several academics criticized the judgment of the Supreme Court, suggesting that it should be 
overruled. (See e.g., H. Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2 COLUMBIA 
BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 257 (2001) (“The central conclusion is that the Supreme Court's controversial 
Kodak decision has done more harm than good and should be overruled”); B. H. Kobayashi & J. D. 
Wright, Federalism, Substantive Preemption, and Limits on Antitrust: An Application to Patent 
Holdup, 5 JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 469 (2009) (“The Court’s opinion in Kodak 
has been widely criticized for confusing the issue of a single ﬁrm’s power over its own price, and the 
proper concept of antitrust market power that requires the ﬁrm to have the power to control market 
prices.”); D. A. J. Goldfine & K. M. Vorrasi, The Fall of the Kodak Aftermarket Doctrine: Dying a Slow 
Death in the Lower Courts, 72 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 209, 213 (2004). 
307 Goldfine and Vorassi conducted an analysis evaluating the application of the Kodak judgment by 
lower courts. They found that courts have applied the ruling in very limited circumstances. Court 
considered defendants dominant in their aftermarket only when the following circumstances are met: (i) 
consumers face high switching costs, (ii) there needs to be information asymmetry on the side of 
consumer, which are typically not well informed when initially purchasing in the primary market, and 
thus not able to fully assess the life-cycle cost of owning the primary good, (iii) the defendant abuses the 
locked-in consumers by employing some type of opportunistic conduct. Even if the listed circumstances 
were met, courts could still reject to find the defendant monopolist, based on some additional 
consideration such as non-interchangeability of aftermarket products, or independence of primary and 
aftermarket decisions. In the Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc. (Domino’s Pizza), for 
instance, the court rejected the application of the Kodak ruling to a franchise agreement that required a 
franchisee to purchase pizza dough from Domino's. As clarified by the court, franchisees had to acquire 
the products from Domino's Pizza not because of Domino's strong market power, but because of 
contractual requirements. See: D. A. J. Goldfine & K. M. Vorrasi, The Fall of the Kodak Aftermarket 
Doctrine: Dying a Slow Death in the Lower Courts, 72 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 209 (2004). 
308 See, e.g., Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc, 124 F.3d 430 (3rd Cir. 1997) (“[O]ne cannot 
equate power over a ﬁrm’s own product’s price, which occurs frequently within competitive industries, 
with the ability to affect the market price, which is the proper concern of antitrust policy.”).  
309 OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, Assessment of Market Power: Understanding Competition Law, § 5.11 
(2004), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/ca98_guidelines/oft415.pdf. 
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lock-in effect represents a barrier to entry, and it might consequently affect the ability 
of potential competitors to challenge the SEP owner’s conduct.  
In sum, relying solely on evidence of sunk investment and lock-in effect might be 
misleading. It might lead to find the SEP holder dominant or a monopolist even when 
it does not have significant market power. The presence of a sunk investment alone 
will generally not be sufficient to prove the existence of the SEP owner’s market 
power. It might however indicate the existence of market power if the sunk costs and 
customers’ lock affects a significant part of the market, and thus represent a 
significant entry barrier.  
 
2.3. The risks of a narrow market definition 
The criticisms presented in the previous section do not aim to state that courts 
and competition authorities were wrong in finding SEP owners dominant or 
monopolists. Most cases addressed in the EU and in the United States did, in fact, 
concern SEPs implemented in standards widely adopted by the market. In the Unocal 
case, the SEP owner owed patents which were essential for a standard, the compliance 
with which was directed by the California Clean Air Act.310 Companies had no other 
option that comply with the standard. In the Rambus case, the SEPs were 
implemented in a voluntary standard, which nonetheless enjoyed great market 
success. The Commission pointed out that “virtually all market participants confirmed 
that it is commercially indispensable to comply with JEDEC standards in order to be 
able to sell DRAM chips on the Community or worldwide market.”311 Also in the cases 
concerning the conduct of companies such as Qualcomm, Motorola, and Samsung, 
their SEPs were implemented in the UMTS standard (the so-called third generation 
(3G) standard for GSM-path networks), a fundamental requirement for the 
participation in the mobile wireless telephony market.312 Given that manufacturers 
                                                 
310 Complaint, Union Oil Company Of California, Docket No. 9305 (F.T.C. 2003) 
311 COMP/C-3/ 38 636 Rambus (Rejection Decision). 
312 As explained in the Qualcomm judgment, a mobile device contains computer “chipsets”—the core 
electronics that allow it to transmit and receive information from the wireless network. In order to 
allow the transmission of information, manufactures need to produce their product in compliance with 
specific standards that allow the interoperability of product. Two standards are in widespread use 
today: the code division multiple access (CDMA), and the global system for mobility (GSM) standard. 
Cellular telephone service providers operate under one or the other path. For example, Verizon Wireless 
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operating in the market had no alternative (that is, no option to compete by adhering 
to alternative standards or produce non-standardized goods), the SEP did most 
probably represent its own relevant market, in which the SEP owner was dominant. 
Thea finding of dominance was thus justified. 
The legal reasoning provided by the courts and competition authorities was 
nonetheless often imprecise. It was not the implementation in the standard, and the 
presence of sunk costs that conferred significant market power to the SEP owner, but 
rather the implementation in a successful, widely adopted industry standard. 
Similarly, it seems incorrect to state that the implementation of a technology in the 
standard makes the scope of the relevant market congruent with that of the SEP.313 
Although in some cases the SEP might represent its own market, this is not 
necessarily the case. Such a market definition is not appropriate for cases where there 
is substantive inter-standard competition. Potential licensees can switch to the use of 
alternative standards or non-standardized products in response to an increase in 
price—or more precisely an increase in a licensing fee—for the use of the SEPs. 
Defining the market too narrowly and illegitimately considering a SEP owner 
dominant, although it is not, might have important negative consequences for the 
antitrust intervention. Most importantly, there is a risk that private disputes will 
illegitimately be turned into antitrust cases, despite having little potential of imposing 
anticompetitive effects.314 This represents a waste of public resources,315 particularly 
when the enforcement is carried by a public authority. At the same time, competition 
                                                                                                                                                                  
and Sprint Communications operate under the CDMA-path networks, and AT&T and T-Mobile under 
the GSM-path networks. The two paths are not interoperable: the equipment and technologies used in 
one cannot be used in the other. The standard used in current generation GSM-path networks is the 
third generation ("3G"), and is known as the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System ("UMTS") 
standard. All manufacturers producing devices operating on the GSM-path network have to comply 
with the UMTS standard. (Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F 3d. 297, 303-304 (3rd Cir. 2007)). 
313 Id. at 351.  
314 U.S. DOJ, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN 
ACT REPORT, Chapter 2 (2008) (report withdrawn in May 2009) (“The costs that firms, courts, and 
competition authorities would incur in identifying and litigating liability, as well as devising and 
policing remedies for any and all conduct with the potential to have a minor negative impact on 
competition for short periods, would almost certainly far outweigh the benefits, particularly if the 
calculus includes, as it should, the loss of pro-competitive activity that would inevitably be discouraged 
in such a system.”). 
315 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork & Gregory J. Sidak, The Misuse of Profit Margins To Infer Market Power, 
9 JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 511, 511 (2013); B. H. Kobayashi & J. D. Wright, 
Federalism, Substantive Preemption, and Limits on Antitrust: An Application to Patent Holdup, 5 
JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 469(2009) (“Application of the antitrust laws in the 
absence of antitrust market power will result in frequent type I error”). 
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law is an inappropriate means of resolving private disputes: it provides strong 
remedies which are properly reserved for conducts that affect market competition in a 
significant way.  
Therefore, the market power of each SEP owner needs to be evaluated by taking 
into account the circumstances of the specific case. In doing so, courts and competition 
authorities should apply the traditional mechanisms used when defining the relevant 
market and assessing market power. In particular, courts and competition authorities 
should evaluate whether the SEP owner faces significant competitive constraints from 
alternative standards and not standardized products available in the market.316 Only 
when the SEP owner faces insignificant constrains, should the SEP owner be 
considered dominant and/or a monopolist.  
In our further discussion, we will for simplicity assume that the implementation 
of the patented technology confers to the SEP owner a dominant position, i.e. 
monopoly power. It should be nevertheless borne in mind that this assumption does 
not always hold. 317  
                                                 
316 H. J. Hovenkamp, Standards Ownership and Competition Policy, 48 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 
87, 89 (2007). (“[w]hen compatibility with the standard is technologically essential, or if a government 
rule requires that a specific standard be followed, standards can have significant exclusionary power 
provided that they are difficult to appropriate.”). 
317 This approach has been suggested by the Commission in the 2010 Guidelines, where it states that 
in the “absence of market power, a standardization agreement is not capable of producing restrictive 
effects on competition.” (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements § C(2010) 
9274/2, ¶ 277 (2010)). 
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Chapter V 
DECEPTIVE CONDUCT DURING THE STANDARDIZATION 
PROCESS 
  
The present chapter focuses on the first of the two identified groups of 
opportunistic practices: the SEP owner’s deceptive behavior during the 
standardization procedure. The analysis shows that both in the EU and in the United 
States the SEP owner might face antitrust liability for acting deceptively during the 
standardization process. However, contrary to the general intuition, the analysis 
shows that the SEP owner is more likely to face liability under U.S. antitrust law. The 
chapter is structured as follows. The first section discusses the different types of 
deceptive practices, and evaluates the negatives effects that they may impose on the 
market. Second, the chapter analyzes the applicability of Article 102 TFEU, Section 2 
of the Sherman Act, and Section 5 of the FTCA, and evaluates the circumstances in 
which an antitrust liability could arise. The chapter also discusses the possibility of a 
more expansive reading of competition law, in a way to capture conducts that fall 
outside the traditional antitrust doctrines. Finally, the chapter compares the 
approaches of the two jurisdictions and outlines the limitations competition law faces 
in addressing the SEP owner’s deceptive conduct. 
 
 
1. TYPES OF DECEPTION  
Participants of the standardization process might have an interest in their 
technology being implemented in a standard. The ownership of a SEP may provide 
several benefits to the owner, such as generating licensing revenue, facilitating cross 
licensing, and signaling technological competence.318 Each participant (including 
NPEs and practicing entities) may consequently aim to demonstrate the superiority of 
                                                 
318 Knut Blind et al., Study on the Interplay between Standards and Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPRs), at 12 (Tender No ENTR/09/015 2011). 
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its technology and in this way obtain its implementation in the standard. As a result, 
there is generally competition among participants of the standardization process for 
the implementation of their technology in the standard.  
A strong competition in the technology market is indeed desirable. The problem 
arises, however, if participants of the standardization process do not compete based on 
merit, but engage in deceptive practices. For example, the SEP owner can make an 
affirmative false statement to the SSO, by maintaining that it holds no patent 
covering the technology relevant for the standard under discussion. Only once the 
patented technology is implemented in the standard, and its use becomes essential for 
all manufacturers of standard-compliant goods, the SEP owner reveals the existence of 
its patent, and starts with the legal enforcement. Alternatively, the SEP owner might 
not make an affirmative false statement, but only stay silent and hide the existence of 
its patent interest, until the technology has been implemented in the standard. It is 
also possible that the SEP owner discloses the existence of its patents, but falsely 
commits to license them on FRAND terms. Once the technology is implemented in the 
standard, the owner reneges its commitment, and offers its SEPs only on non-FRAND 
licensing terms.  
These three types of deceptive practices might have several undesirable effects. 
Most importantly, the SEP owner’s deceptive conduct during the standardization 
process might affect competition in the technology market, where technologies 
compete for the implementation in the standard. By hiding the existence of its patent 
rights, or making a false FRAND commitment, the SEP owner confers to the 
participants of the standardization procedure the wrong impression that its 
technology is available at no cost, or in the case of a false FRAND commitment, 
available on FRAND terms. This might induce the SSO to implement the SEP owner’s 
technology in the standard, although if full information were available, alternative 
technologies would be selected. By engaging in a deceptive practice, the SEP owner 
can thus exclude competitors from the technology market.  
The SEP owner’s deceptive behavior might have also other negative 
consequences. It may lead to the adoption of a suboptimal standard, if, as result of the 
deception, suboptimal technologies are implemented in the standard. The SEP owner’s 
deception might also facilitate patent holdup. In the Rambus case, for example, the 
patent ambush allowed Rambus to avoid FRAND commitments, and consequently 
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charge allegedly excessive royalties. Some commentators suggested that the SEP 
owner’s deceptive conducts might also hinder the success of the standardization 
process, by diminishing the manufacturers’ incentives to produce goods in compliance 
with the standard, but also decrease the undertakings’ interest in participating in 
further standardization activities. By undermining the success of standards and of the 
standardization process, the SEP owner’s deceptive conduct in turn deprive consumers 
from the benefits brought by standardization.  
Competition authorities on both sides of the Atlantic have expressed their strong 
concerns with the SEP owner’s deceptive practices during the standardization 
process.319 In parallel to this, companies have challenged the SEP owners’ deceptive 
practices through the antitrust provisions in private legal actions.320 The next section 
will analyze the applicability of the antitrust provision to SEP owner’s deceptive 
behavior and identify the circumstances in which the SEP owner’s deceptive conduct 
might lead to an antitrust liability. 
 
2. ANTITRUST LIABILITY  
2.1. Liability under EU competition law  
In the EU, there is so far no formal decision concerning the SEP owner’s liability 
for patent ambush, false FRAND commitments or other deceptive practices that might 
arise during the standardization process. The Commission’s approach adopted in the 
Rambus cases suggests that such practices could constitute an abusive behavior in 
                                                 
319 For the EU see: Press Release, N. Kroes, European Commissioner for Competition Policy, 
Commission Accepts Commitments from Rambus Lowering Memory Chip Royalty Rates, 
SPEECH/09/575 (Dec. 9, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-09-
575_en.htm (“An effective standard-setting process should take place in a non-discriminatory, open and 
transparent way to ensure competition on the merits and to allow consumers to benefit from technical 
progress and innovation”); For US see: Complaint, Rambus Inc., 9302, F.T.C. (Jun 18 2002) 
(maintaining that deceptive practice during the standardization process resulted in increased royalties, 
increased prices for memory products compliant with JEDEC standards, decreased incentives to 
produce memory using JEDEC-compliant memory technology, and decreased incentives to participate 
in standard-setting organizations.). 
320 See, e.g. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F 3d. 297 (3rd Cir. 2007); Research in Motion 
Limited v. Motorola Inc, 644 F.Supp.2d 788, (N.D. Texas, 2008).). 
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violation of Article 102 TFEU.321 A detailed analysis nonetheless unveils the opposite 
result: the SEP owners’ deceptive practices would lead to an antitrust liability only in 
very limited circumstances.  
The legal analysis requires the distinction between two groups of participants of 
the standardization process: (1) SEP owners that have a dominant position since the 
beginning of the standardization procedure, and (2) owners that have low market 
power at the beginning of the standardization process, but acquire market power as 
result of the implementation of their technology in the standard. As it will be 
explained, Article 102 TFEU has different scopes in addressing the conducts of the 
SEP owners belonging to the two groups.  
2.1. A. SEP owners’ dominance at the time of the deception 
Article 102 TFEU clearly applies to a SEP owner that is dominant at the time of 
deception. Despite the absence of legal precedents in the context of SEPs, doctrines 
developed in other areas suggest that the SEP owner’s deceptive conduct during the 
standardization process can constitute an abuse of a dominant position in violation of 
Article 102 TFEU.  
The AstraZeneca judgment provides an important guidance for the evaluation of 
the SEP owner’s deceptive conduct.322 The Commission condemned under Article 102 
TFEU the deceptive behavior of AstraZeneca, a pharmaceutical group dominant in the 
market for proton pump inhibitors. In particular, AstraZeneca (1) made misleading 
representations before the patent offices and national courts of several Member States 
when applying for supplementary patent protection certificates,323 deregistered its 
drug marketing authorizations in some Member States. The Commission maintained 
that the first conduct allowed AstraZeneca to obtain (or maintain) supplementary 
protection certificates, for which AstraZeneca was not entitled or to which it was 
entitled for a shorter duration The deceptive behavior allowed AstraZeneca to keep 
                                                 
321 In the Rambus investigation, the Commission extensively discussed the effect of Rambus’ patent 
ambush on the JEDEC’s standardization process. European Commission, Rejection Decision, Case 
COMP/C-3/ 38 636 Rambus, European Commission (2010).  
322 Case C-457/10 P AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc v European Commission, ECR 00000 (2012). 
323 A supplementary protection certificate is a mechanisms adopted in the EU that allows the 
extension of the patent right after its expiration date. The supplementary protection aims to 
compensate the patent owner for the reduction in the period of the effective patent protection, resulting 
from the time needed to obtain the authorization to place the patented product on the market. 
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manufacturers of generic products away from the market. Similarly, the 
deregistration of the marketing authorization aimed to ensure that the registration 
would not be available to AstraZeneca’s competitors—producers of generic drugs— 
and it would thus keep them out of the market after patent expiration (at least for 
some time). The Commission found that the two deceptive practices constituted an 
abuse of a dominant position in violation of Article 102 TFEU, and the decision was 
later confirmed in the much criticized judgment of the General Court. The General 
Court emphasized that Article 102 prohibits “a dominant undertaking from 
eliminating a competitor and thereby strengthening its position by using methods 
other than those which come within the scope of competition on the merits.”324 The 
General Court maintained that AstraZeneca’s deceptive conduct did not represent 
competition on the merits, and did not comply with the special responsibility of a 
dominant undertaking to abstain from any conduct that impairs undistorted 
competition in the market. It thus concluded that AstraZeneca’s conduct amounted to 
an abusive behavior in violation of Article 102 TFEU.325  
AstraZeneca appealed the decision, arguing, inter alia, that the General Court 
adopted a legally flawed approach to the concept of competition on the merits. Several 
commentators similarly criticized the General Court’s decision, pointing out that the 
adopted standard suggests that any objectively misleading statement to the patent 
office would amount to abuse of a dominant position.326 Even a genuine and honest 
error made by a dominant company in the context of a patent application process, 
would amount to an abuse. The Court of Justice rejected AstraZeneca’s appeal, 
nonetheless adopting a narrower definition of competition on the merits, which 
corrected some of the criticisms of the General Court’s decision. The ECJ agreed that a 
misleading practice, even if undertaken by a dominant undertaking, does not per se 
constitute an abusive behavior. It emphasized that dominant undertakings do not 
need to be infallible. Not “each objectively wrong representation made by [a dominant] 
                                                 
324 T-321/05 Astra Zeneca v European Commission, E.C.L.R. 31(12) 00000, at 354 (2010).  
325 Id. at 354, 355, 361, 811-817. 
326 See, e.g., Blog, Gavin Bushell, Case C-457/10 P, AstraZeneca v Commission, Judgment of 6 
December 2012, available at http://kluwercompetitionlawblog.com/2012/12/07/case-c-45710-p-
astrazeneca-v-commission-judgment-of-6-december-2012/. 
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undertaking constitute[s] an abuse of that position.”327 The ECJ nevertheless 
emphasized that a deceptive conduct may amount to an abuse, if it leads to 
anticompetitive effects. The Court found that AstraZeneca’s deception had such 
effects. The misleading statements induced public authorities to grant an exclusive 
right to which AstraZeneca was not allowed. In this way, the AstraZeneca’s deceptive 
conduct raised regulatory obstacles to competition.328 The ECJ also noted that there 
was no legitimate justification for AstraZeneca’s deregistration, and the conduct only 
aimed at preventing, or making more difficult, the entrance of competing generic 
drugs into the market.329  
Although the circumstances of the AstraZeneca case differed considerably from 
the one in the SEP context, the judgment bears important implications for the SEP 
owners’ liability. A dominant SEP owner has, as any other dominant undertaking, a 
duty to abstain from any conduct that impairs undistorted competition in the market. 
The SEP owner’s deceptive conduct does not comply with such responsibility. The 
Astra Zeneca judgment nonetheless clarifies that a deception does, alone, not lead to 
an antitrust liability. A bad act is not considered abusive simply because undertaken 
by a dominant SEP owner. The SEP owner’s deceptive behavior would constitute an 
abusive behavior only if it imposes anticompetitive effects on the market, such as, the 
exclusion of rival technologies from the standard. The Astra Zeneca judgment thus 
suggests that in order to prove that the SEP owner’s deceptive behavior constituted a 
violation of Article 102 TFEU, the competition authority needs to prove both the 
existence of a bad act and the presence of anticompetitive effects. 
A separate question concerns the relevant standard of proof that the Commission 
would have to meet in order to show that the SEP owner’s deception amounts to a 
violation of Article 102 TFEU. Does the Commission have to prove that the SEP 
owner’s deceptive behavior actually excluded competing technologies form the 
standard? Would it be sufficient for the Commission to assert that the deceptive 
                                                 
327 Case C-457/10 P AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc v European Commission, ECR 00000, 99 
(2012).  
328 Id. at. 105-106. 
329 In particular, the de-registration prevented manufacturers to benefit from the exemption to have to 
carry out pharmacological and toxicological tests and clinical trials for the purposes of demonstrating 
the harmlessness and efficacy of the product in question. Id. at 117. 
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conduct could have had anticompetitive effects, without however showing that such 
effects have arisen in the specific case?  
The ECJ maintained in several occasions that in order to prove that a conduct is 
anticompetitive, the Commission does not need to shows that the anticompetitive 
effect is concrete, but it is sufficient to demonstrate that there is a potential for such 
anticompetitive effect.330 This might suggested, prima facie, that the Commission 
could condemn the SEP owner’s deceptive conduct, without having to show that the 
deception had an actual anticompetitive effect, but merely by asserting that such 
effect could arise in practice. In other words, the Commission could condemn under 
Article 102 TFEU the SEP owner’s deceptive practices without proving that the 
deception excluded alternative technologies form the standard.  
However, a deeper analysis suggests that this standard of proof is not 
appropriate. The ECJ has allowed the Commission to condemn conducts even in the 
absence of evidence of anticompetitive effects, because there was a risk that the 
challenged conduct would lead to an anticompetitive effect, unless aborted. If the 
Commission would have to wait for the anticompetitive effects to arise in practice, the 
antitrust intervention would be obsolete. This idea is particularly clear in the context 
of predatory prices, where the intervention may take place before the predatory 
pricing strategy excludes rivals. The situation is nonetheless different when 
addressing the SEP owner’s deceptive behavior. The SEP owner’s deception is likely to 
have exclusionary effects only at the time of the selection of the standard, hence, 
before the antitrust intervention. If the deception did not have an exclusionary effect 
at the time, it is highly unlikely that an anticompetitive effect will arise in the future. 
There is no risk that the deceptive conduct will lead to an anticompetitive effects, 
unless aborted. Consequently, on difference of cases such as predatory pricing, it 
seems that the appropriate standard of proof would require the Commission to show 
that the SEP owner’s deceptive behavior actually had an anticompetitive effect on the 
technology market, for example, by excluding competing technologies. In the absence 
of such evidence, the condemnation of the SEP owner’s conduct through the provisions 
of competition law seems not appropriate. It is also worth noting that under EU law, 
the SEP owner’s liability could arise also in absence of an anticompetitive intent. The 
                                                 
330 Id. at 112 (referring to TeliaSonera Sverige at 64).  
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concept of abuse is an objective concept and does not require evidences of intent.331 
Under this scenario, Article102 TFEU could condemn cases where the SEP owner’s 
unintentional failed to disclose a patent during the standardization procedure. The 
prosecution of such cases seems nonetheless not desirable from a policy perspective. 
Commissioner Azcuenaga noted that it is one thing to prohibit a knowing 
misrepresentation or an intentional manipulation, and another thing to prohibit an 
involuntary failure to disclose the patent interest.332 Standards are often complex and 
rely on several hundred patents. The failure to disclose a patent might be the result of 
pure oversight or a problem of patent’s interpretation.333 Imposing a competition law 
liability for the SEP owner’s involuntary failure to disclose a patent might have 
negative effects on the company’s incentives to participate in a voluntary 
standardization process. The prospect of facing strong antitrust remedies, including a 
monetary fine and antitrust damages, because of an involuntary oversight might deter 
companies for future contributing their technologies to the standard. The risk they 
would face might be simply too high. Under this scenario, the antitrust enforcement 
could deter participation in the standardization process and thus harm exactly the 
process that it aims to preserve. Policy considerations hence suggest that, although 
Article 102 TFEU could be applied also to cases of an unintentional failure to disclose 
relevant patents, it is appropriate to limit the intervention to cases where the SEP 
owner’s deceptive behavior is intentional.  
In sum, Article 102 TFEU provides a legal basis to address a large spectrum of 
deceptive practices undertaken by SEP owners that are dominant at the time of 
deception. It seems nonetheless desirable to limit the scope of the intervention to cases 
where the challenged behavior was intentional, and where the Commission can 
provide evidences that the SEP owner’s conduct had actual anticompetitive effects. 
When those conditions are met, the SEP holder’s deceptive behavior should be 
considered an abuse of a dominant position. 
                                                 
331 See, e.g., T-321/05 Astra Zeneca v European Commission, ECR. 31(12) 00000, at 356 (2010); 
Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission, 85/76, ¶ 91 (1979); Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v 
Commission of the European Communities, ECR I-03359, at 69 (1991)  
332 Dell Computer Corp., N. 3658, 630 (F.T.C. May 20, 1996) (Dissent). 
333 M. Dolmans, Standards for Standards, 26 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, 163, 185 (2002).  
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2.1.B. SEP owners that are not dominant at the time of deception  
The outcome of the legal analysis is very different in cases addressing the 
conduct of the second group of participants, that is, SEP owners that do not have 
substantive market power during the standardization process, but obtain it after the 
adoption of the standard. The absence of a dominant position at the time of deception 
prevents the application of Article 102 TFEU to the SEP owner’s deceptive conduct.334 
A non-dominant undertaking does not have the special responsibility under Article 
102 TFEU to abstain from a conduct that impairs undistorted competition in the 
market. As a result, Article 102 TFEU does not apply to the deceptive conduct of a 
SEP owner that was not dominant at the time of deception.  
An antitrust liability can only arise, if after the implementation in the standard, 
and the consequent obtainment of a dominant position, the SEP owner engages in an 
abusive practice. In the Rambus case, for example, the Commission maintained that 
Rambus abused its dominant position “by claiming unreasonable royalties . . . 
subsequent to a patent ambush.”335 It is nonetheless important to notice that the 
abusive conduct lays in the imposition of excessive royalties, and not in the patent 
ambush itself. Patent ambush only facilitated the abusive behavior, which occurred 
later on, when Rambus already had a dominant position.336 The potential liability for 
such conduct, that is, the impositions of excessive royalties, will be discussed in details 
in the next chapter. For now, it is important to notice that the mere deceptive practice 
                                                 
334 See, e.g., Id. at 187 ( “This means that at the moment of the concealment, the IPR owner may not be 
dominant and may not be caught by Article 82 EC”); D. Geradin & M. Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead 
to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of 
FRAND, 2 EUR. COMPETITION JOURNAL 101, 153 (2007)(“If the IPR owner only obtained its dominant 
position in the market for the standardised technology ex post the deceptive behaviour, it would be 
difficult to make a case for the applicability of Article 82 EC.”) A. Fuchs, Patent ambush strategies and 
Article 102 TFEU, in MORE COMMON GROUND FOR INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW (Warren S. 
Grimes Josef Drexl, Clifford A. Jones, Rudolph J. R. Peritz, Edward T. Swaine ed. 2011) (“[T]he market 
dominance must already have existed at the time of the alleged abuse”). 
335 Press Release, Antitrust: Commission confirms sending a Statement of Objections to Rambus, 
MEMO/07/330 (Aug. 23, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-07-330_en.htm 
(emphasis added). 
336 The Statement of Objections, the Commission provisionally concluded that claiming such royalties 
was incompatible with Article 102 TFUE, in light of the specific circumstances of this case. (Id.) This 
position was repeated also in the discussion of the appropriateness of remedies, where the Commission 
states that “As the competition concerns arise from the fact that Rambus may be claiming abusive 
royalties for the use of its patents at a level which it would not have been able to charge absent its 
conduct, the Commission considers that the Commitments (imposing a cup on the royalties) are 
sufficient [.]” (Rejection Decision in Case COMP/C-3/ 38 636 Rambus, at 83 (2010)).  
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of a non-dominant SEP owner, without a subsequent abuse, falls outside the domain of 
Article 102 TFEU.  
Given that the majority of the participants of the standardization process are not 
dominant at the time of deception, it is evident that Article 102 TFEU faces an 
important limitation in addressing the deceptive conducts that arise during the 
standardization process. Deceptive practices would remain largely unpunished under 
EU competition law. 
In light of such limitations, one could argue that the Commission and the ECJ 
should opt for a more extensive reading of Article 102 TFEU that would allow the 
Commission to prosecute also the deceptive conduct of a SEP owner that is not 
dominant at the time of deception. One of the principal goals of Article 102 TFEU is to 
prohibit conducts that impedes effective competition by excluding competitors on some 
basis other than merit.337 A deceptive practice during the standardization process 
might have exactly such effect, given that it might allow the SEP owners (including a 
non-dominant one) to illegitimately exclude competing technologies from the standard. 
It might thus represent aptly the type of conducts that the competition law aims to 
prevent. The Commission could thus adopt an approach which recognizes that when a 
deceptive act of a non-dominant SEP owner allows the company to obtain a dominant 
position through an anticompetitive practice, the conduct would still fall under the 
prohibition of Article 102 TFEU. In other words, the Commission could interpret 
Article 102 TFEU in a way to include acts of successful monopolization. 
Although tempting, an extensive reading of Article 102 TFEU is not desirable for 
several reasons. First, there is a legal argument against the extension of Article 102 
TFEU to the conduct of a SEP owner that was not dominant at the time of deception. 
None of the established legal doctrines would in fact allow the application of Article 
102 TFEU to a non-dominant company. It is true, for instance, that the ECJ 
maintained that Article 102 TFEU does not require the company to be dominant in the 
                                                 
337 Both schools of thought that affected the development of EU competition law (the Harvard School 
and the Ordoliberal school) argued that competition law should protect the competitive process. This is 
clearly reflected in the ideas of the ordoliberal school, which promoted the concept of economic freedom, 
which required the protection of the competitive process. The Commission confirmed this objective also 
in the Guidelines, by stating that “what really matters is protecting an effective competitive process and 
not simply protecting competitors”. (Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, C 45/7, ¶ 6 
(2009)).  
 113 
 
market where the challenged conduct imposes anticompetitive effect. In Tetra Pack, 
the ECJ maintained that the dominated market and the market where the abuse 
takes place do not need to coincide.338 However, in Tetra Pak, the company did hold a 
dominant position at the time when it engaged in the anticompetitive conduct, 
although the anticompetitive effects arose in a market where the company was non 
dominant. The situation is different in the context of SEPs, where, at the time of the 
deception, the SEP owner does not have a dominant position in any of the markets. 
The Tetra Pak ruling can hence not apply. Further, in Continental Can, the ECJ 
maintained that “[t]he very wording of . . . Article [102] shows that it is not concerned 
with the creation . . . of dominant positions.”339 Therefore, no matter how creative one 
can be with the application of Article 102 TFEU, case of monopolization undertaken by 
a non-dominant SEP owner simply fall outside the prohibition of Article 102 TFEU.  
Second, the extension of Article 102 TFEU to non-dominant SEP owners is not 
desirable from a policy perspective. It is true that the application of Article 102 TFEU 
to non-dominant SEP owners would allow the Commission to address practices that 
would otherwise remain unpunished under EU competition law. It is however also 
true that an extensive reading of Article 102 TFEU does not come without costs. First, 
tailor made solutions might undermine the consistency in the application of 
competition law, and legal predictability.340 Second, introducing an exception to the 
rule that Article 102 TFEU applies only to dominant undertakings might open a 
Pandora’s box for a wider application of Article 102 TFEU outside the context of SEPs. 
The Commission could try to extend the reach of Article 102 TFEU to non-dominant 
undertakings also outside the standardization context. This might be a dangerous tool, 
if not administered with sufficient safeguards. The broad scope of Article 102 TFEU, 
coupled with the generally low standard of proof, would in fact confer to the 
Commission a broad discretion in addressing the business decisions of undertakings. 
Although this does not necessarily imply that an extension of Article 102 TFEU to 
non-dominant SEP owner is undesirable, it indicates that there are some important 
risks associated with the extension of the provisions to non-dominant SEP owners. 
                                                 
338 See, e.g., Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission, ECR I-05951, at.30, 31 (1996). 
339 Case 6/72 Europemballage Corp. v Continental Can Company Inc., ECR 1973, 215 at 224 (1973). 
340 For a general discussion on “ad-hocisms”, although in the context of international human right law 
see: Andrea Bianchi, Ad-hocism and the Rule of Law, 13 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
263 (2002). 
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Extending the reach of Article 102 TFEU to non-dominant undertaking is a serious 
step that should be taken with great caution. 
Third, the market had showed the ability to adopt mechanisms to mitigate the 
risk that SSO’s participants (including non-dominant one) will engage in deceptive 
practices. Both SSOs and their participants have strong incentives to prevent 
individual’s misconduct.341 After cases of patent ambush, several SSOs have revised 
their internal in the way to avoid the possible deceptive practices of its participants. 
Those rules, which will be discussed in greater details in chapter VIII, seem to be 
effective in mitigating deceptive practices of both dominant and non-dominant SEP 
owners. The existence of mechanisms that can mitigate the SEP owner’s deceptive 
practices suggest, therefore, that an extensive reading of Article 102 TFEU might 
provide little incremental benefits if extended to the conduct of non-dominant SEP 
owners. 
  
 
2.2. Liability under U.S. antitrust law 
2.2.A. Section 2 liability 
The SEP owner’s deceptive conduct is more likely to lead to antitrust liability 
under U.S. antitrust law. In contrast to Article 102 TFEU, Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act applies to all participants of the standardization process, irrespective from their 
initial level of market power. The language of Section 2 makes clear that it is unlawful 
for any person to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize the market.342 As noted by 
Areeda, “[n]o matter how small may be the defendant’s power at the time of the 
anticompetitive conduct, it violates Section 2 if monopoly power actually results from 
the conduct or would . . . probably result from it [unless aborted].”343  
                                                 
341 See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice, Sherman Act Section 2 Joint 
Hearing / Understanding single-firm behavior: Misleading and deceptive conduct Session, Statement of 
Gil Ohana, at 54 (2006), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/sectiontwohearings/docs/transcripts/061206.pdf (“The deceptive practices in 
standards development . . . runs contrary to our interests. They reduce our incentives to participate in 
standards development, and they reduce our confidence that the products we ship will not infringe.”). 
342 Sherman Antitrust act, Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C., § 2 §1-7, § 2 (1890).  
343 P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR 
APPLICATION, Vol. 3, 331-332 (Apsen Publ. 2002).  
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U.S. antitrust law thus recognizes that certain type of conducts might impose 
anticompetitive effects even if employed by an undertaking with little market 
power.344 Although an undertaking with little market power often lacks the ability to 
render the monopolizing strategy successful, there are circumstances in which its 
conduct might result in a successful monopolization. A clear example is the 
enforcement of a patent obtained by fraud. Even a company with no market power 
might obtain a patent through a misleading statement to the Patent Office, and in this 
way it might be able to unlawfully obtain market power.345 The situation is similar in 
a market that has strong network effects, where the deceptive conduct of an 
undertaking with little or no market power might still be a successful monopolization 
strategy. What matters for antitrust evaluation is therefore not the SEP owner’s level 
of market power at the time of the deception, but rather the evaluation whether the 
deceptive conduct, coupled with the position of the SEP owner, leads (or would lead) to 
the acquisition of monopoly power.346 
U.S. courts have recognized that the SEP owner’s deceptive conduct during the 
standardization process can constitute an anticompetitive behavior actionable under 
the Sherman Act.347 Anticompetitive behavior comprises any conduct which aims to 
obtain or maintain monopoly power as a result of competition on some basis other 
                                                 
344 Id. at 651 (nothing that some conducts “challenged as exclusionary could be profitable for either a 
monopolist or a non-monopolist."). Even more, Section 2 might condemn an undertaking even if that 
conduct does not result in monopoly power, but meets the elements of the “attempt to monopolize” 
offence. The undertaking must have a dangerous probability of monopolizing the market.  
345 Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v Food Machinery & Chemical Corp. for instance concerned a 
dispute between Food Machinery & Chemical Corp, (hereafter Food Machinery) and Walker Process 
Equipment (hereinafter Walker Process). Food Machinery filed a patent infringement suit against 
Walker Process, which denied the infringement and counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the 
patent was invalid. Food Machinery subsequently dismissed its complaint because the patent had 
expired. Walker Process however amended its counterclaim, arguing that Food Machinery had illegally 
monopolized the market by fraudulently obtaining and maintaining its patent, while knowing that it 
had no basis for the patent right. The counterclaim alleged that Food Machinery used the patent to 
exclude Walker Process from the market through "threats of suit" and prosecution of this infringement 
suit. The Supreme Court confirmed that the enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent 
Office may be violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act provided the other elements necessary to a § 2 case 
are present. (Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 US 172 (1965). 
346 P. E. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR 
APPLICATION, 332 (Aspen Pub 2001) (“The relevant question is whether the challenged conduct, coupled 
with the market position of the undertaking, at that time lead or would have lead to the acquisition of 
monopoly power.”). 
347 See, e.g., Rambus Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission., 522 F. 3d 456, 463 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“We 
assume […] that if Rambus’ more complete disclosure would have caused JEDEC to adopt a different 
(open, non-proprietary) standard, than its failure to disclose harmed competition and would support a 
monopolization claim.”);, Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inco., 501 F. 3d 297, 313-314 (3rd Cir. 2007). 
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than merit.348 If the deception allows the SEP owner to obtain or maintain monopoly 
power through unlawful means, it constitutes a basis for a Section 2 liability.349  
The FTC addressed the SEP owner’s deceptive conduct first in Union Oil 
Company of California.350 In the 1980s, the California Air Resources Board (CARB), a 
department of the California Environmental Protection Agency, started rulemaking 
proceedings to determine regulations and standards governing the composition of low 
emission, reformulated gasoline. Unocal participated in the proceedings. It however 
did not reveal its patent interest, but allegedly created the “false and misleading 
impression” that it did not possess (or that at least it would not enforce) patents that 
could be relevant for the discussed standard. After the adoption of the standard, when 
the refining industry modified its products in a way to comply with the adopted 
regulation (and the standard), Unocal announced that it held patents that were 
covered by the standard, and made clear its intention to collect royalties from the 
manufacturers.  
The FTC started a legal action against Unocal, maintaining that Unocal’s 
deceptive behavior during the standardization process constituted an anticompetitive 
behavior. In the FTC’s view, CARB would not have adopted regulations that 
substantially overlapped with Unocal’s patents, but for Unocal’s deception. The 
misleading declarations allowed Unocal to obtain the implementation in the standard 
and illegally acquire monopoly power in the technology market for producing CARB 
gasoline. The FTC concluded that the deception amounted to a violation of Section 5 of 
the FTCA (equivalent to a Section 2 violation). The complaint was nevertheless not 
litigated, but solved with a consent order where Unocal agreed to stop enforcing the 
relevant reformulated gasoline patents.351  
The antitrust liability for the SEP owner’s deceptive conduct was discussed again 
in Broadcom v Qualcomm.352 Qualcomm was the owner of several patents essential for 
the UMTS standard adopted by ETSI. The company took part in the standardization 
                                                 
348 See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 US 563, 570-71 (1996); Verizon Communications, Inc. 
v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP. 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004).  
349 HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP, Patent Continuations, Patent Deception, and Standard Setting: the 
Rambus and Broadcom decisions, UNIVERSITY OF IOWA LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH, 9 (2008).  
350 Complaint, Union Oil Company of California, N. 9305, F.T.C. (Mar. 4, 2003). 
351 Decision and Order, Union Oil Company of California, N. 9305, F.T.C. (Aug. 2, 2005).  
352 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc. 501 F. 3d 297, (3rd Cir. 2007). 
 117 
 
procedure, disclosed its patent, and offered to license them on FRAND terms, if its 
technology was implemented in the standard. However, after the implementation in 
the standard, Qualcomm allegedly ignored its commitments, and offered non-FRAND 
licensing conditions. Broadcom brought an action against Qualcomm, maintaining 
that Qualcomm’s false commitments constituted an act of monopolization, in violation 
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The District court initially dismissed the complaint: 
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit however reversed the decision, finding 
Qualcomm’s behavior anticompetitive.  
The Court of Appeal held that a FRAND commitment is a key indicator of the 
cost of implementing a potential technology, and a misrepresentations of the cost may 
confer an unfair advantage to the patent owner when competing for the 
implementation in the standard.353 Qualcomm’s deceptive promise induced the SSO to 
underestimate the cost of the technology, and implement the technology in the 
standard. The implementation significantly expanded Qualcomm's market power, 
given that the UMTS standard was largely adopted by the market. Qualcomm did not 
obtain market power as a consequence of the superiority of its product, business 
acumen, or historical accident, but because of the false commitment. The Court of 
Appeals thus concluded that the deceptive conduct enabled Qualcomm to unlawfully 
obtain market power and constituted an act of monopolization in violation of Section 2 
of the Sherman Act.354  
In a later case brought against Rambus, the D.C. Circuit narrowed the scope of 
the potential liability for a deceptive conduct.355 Rambus was accused on intentionally 
concealing its patent interest during its participation in JEDEC standardization 
process, and revealing it only once its technology has been included in the standard.356 
The FTC brought an action, alleging that Rambus’ conduct constituted an 
anticompetitive conduct. The FTC suggested that had Rambus disclosed its patents 
two scenarios could arise: (1) alternative technologies would be implemented in the 
                                                 
353 Id. at 313. 
354 Id. at. 314 – 317. (“(1) in a consensus-oriented private standard-setting environment, (2) a patent 
holder's intentionally false promise to license essential proprietary technology on FRAND terms, (3) 
coupled with an SDO's reliance on that promise when including the technology in a standard, and (4) 
the patent holder's subsequent breach of that promise, is actionable anticompetitive conduct.”). 
355 Rambus Inc. v. F.T.C., 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
356 For a detailed description of the Rambus case see: INTRODUCTION: 1. SETTING THE CONTEXT 
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JEDEC’s standard; or (2) if alternatives were not available, JEDEC still would have 
implemented Rambus’ technology, but demanding Rambus to commit to license its 
patents on FRAND terms.  
The D.C. Circuit confirmed that the first scenario represented an anticompetitive 
acquisition of market power in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. It however 
emphasized that the FTC did not provide sufficient evidence that the first scenario 
occurred in practice. Rather the contrary: the FTC explicitly stated that there was 
insufficient evidence that JEDEC would have utilized other technologies had it known 
the full scope of Rambus' patent rights.357  
The second scenario was also plausible. The D.C. Circuit rules, however, that the 
second scenario did not constitute an anticompetitive act. It explained that, in order to 
be considered anticompetitive, a conduct must harm the competitive process.358 
However, Rambus’ conduct did not harm the competitive process, if JEDEC would 
have selected Rambus’ technology even in absence of deception.359 Rambus’ deceptive 
conduct had “no particular tendency to exclude rivals and thus to diminish 
competition.”360 There was in fact no evidence that competing technologies existed at 
all. Given that the second scenario did not constitute anticompetitive conduct, the D.C. 
Circuit concluded that the FTC failed to prove that Rambus’ deception harmed 
competition and thus constituted an anticompetitive conduct. The D.C. Circuit also 
emphasized that deceptive conduct that merely allows the company to charge higher 
prices falls outside the domain of the Sherman Act. In analyzing the Rambus case, it 
recognized that Rambus’ conduct might result in higher prices. It however emphasized 
that the higher prices are not the result of a less competitive market, but arise from 
the exercise of legitimate market power.361  
Part of the legal literature has heavily criticized the Rambus judgment.362 Some 
commentators maintained that a deception that allows the SEP owner to avoid a 
                                                 
357 Rambus Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission. 522, F. 3.d. 456, 464, 466 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
358 Id. at 463. 
359 Id. at 467.  
360 Id. at 466.  
361 Id. at 465. 
362 See, e.g., M. W. Nelson G. S. Cary, S. J. Kaiser, & A. R. Sistla, The Case For Antitrust Law To 
Police The Patent Holdup Problem In Standard Setting, 77 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 913, 919 (2011). R. 
Dagen, Rambus, Innovation Efficiency, and Section 5 of the FTC Act, 90 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW 
REVIEW 1479, 1484 (2010). 
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FRAND commitment should constitute an anticompetitive acquisition of market 
power.363 They pointed out that market power is defined as the ability to exclude rivals 
from the market place and the ability to control prices. A FRAND commitment 
constrains the SEP owner’s ability to control the price of its SEPs: the illegitimate 
avoidance of a FRAND commitment should thus constitute an anticompetitive 
acquisition of market power. Some commentators also argued that the failure to 
punish conduct like that of Rambus could have detrimental effect for the 
standardization process, for example, by discouraging industry members from 
participating in standardization activities.364  
It is however now clear that the Rambus case identified a failure of proof, rather 
than a failure of pleading. Courts have recognized that the SEP owner’s deceptive 
conduct during the standardization process can provide the basis for a Section 2 
liability. Nevertheless, proving only a deceptive act is not sufficient. A bad, malicious 
conduct does not constitute a violation of Section 2 if it does not harm competition in 
the market.365 It is not sufficient to prove that the deception allowed the SPE owner to 
avoid a FRAND commitment or charge higher prices. In order to bring a successful 
Section 2 claim, the plaintiff needs to prove that the deception allowed the SEP owner 
to acquire market power in an anticompetitive way.  
Showing that the SEP owner’s deceptive behavior lead to the anticompetitive 
acquisition of monopoly power requires proof of several facts. First, the plaintiff needs 
to prove that the technology in question would not be included in the standard (and no 
market power would be acquired), but for deception.366 If alternative technologies 
existed, the plaintiff needs to show that in absence of the deceptive practice, 
alternatives would be implemented in the standard. On the contrary, if there were no 
alternatives to the technology, the plaintiff needs to prove that the SSO would not 
                                                 
363 See, e.g., Statement of George Cary, Joint Hearing / Understanding single-firm behavior, at 69-70 
(2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/sectiontwohearings/docs/transcripts/061206.pdf. 
364 See, e.g., D. A. Dorth, The Rambus Shell Game: A Lack of Integrity in the Standards Setting 
Process, 3 JOHN MARSHALL RIPL 138 (2003).  
365 Brooke Group Ltd. V Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993). See also: H. J. 
Hovenkamp, Patent Continuations, Patent Deception, and Standard Setting: the Rambus and 
Broadcom decisions, UNIVERSITY OF IOWA LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER (2008) (“Deception is 
ordinarily a business tort that only rarely raises serious 2 issues.”).  
366 Townshend v. Rockwell Intl. Corp., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5070, 2000 WL 433505 (N.D.Cal.2000). (“In 
order to establish anticompetitive conduct, the plaintiff must show that the patent holder's failure to 
disclose its intellectual property rights induced the SSO to set the standard incorporating the essential 
patent”).  
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include the technology in the standard, absent the deception.367 Second, the plaintiff 
needs to show that the SEP owner has monopoly power. As explained in the chapter 
on market power, the implementation of a technology in a standard does not necessary 
confer the degree of market power leading to dominance or monopoly.368 Third, a 
successful Section 2 claim requires evidences of the SEP owner’s anticompetitive 
intent. Although there is no need to prove the SEP owner’s subjective intent, it would 
be nonetheless difficult to bring a successful action where the SEP owner shows that 
the failure to disclose a patent was unintentional.369  
Past cases show, nonetheless, that it might be often difficult for the plaintiff to 
meet the required standard of proof and show that the SEP holder’s deceptive 
behavior was anticompetitive. Courts were often reluctant to find patent ambush 
anticompetitive.370 Courts often saw the causal link between the SEP owner’s 
deceptive behavior and the implementation in the standard (and the consequent 
acquisition of market power) as too weak.371 Courts have noted that the SSO could 
have selected the very same technology even in absence of a deception, if the 
technology in question provided the only possible mean to realize a functional 
requirement, or if its price/quality ration was superior to those of the available 
alternatives. Even if alternatives existed, they were not necessarily available for free, 
or at lower costs. In other words, the SEP owner’s technology could have been 
implemented in the standard (and market power acquired) also in absence of the 
ambush.  
                                                 
367 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F. 3d 297, 316 (3rd Cir. 2007).  
368 See discussion in Chapter IV. 
369 H. J. Hovenkamp, Patent Continuations, Patent Deception, and Standard Setting: the Rambus and 
Broadcom decisions, UNIVERSITY OF IOWA LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER (2008) (“Under Section 2 […] 
the defendant must act "willfully" in acquiring or maintaining monopoly power. Thus, for Rambus's 
allegedly deceptive course of conduct to be actionable under the Sherman Act, Rambus must have acted 
willfully [.]”).  
370 See, e.g., Rambus Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission. 522 F. 3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Townshend v. 
Rockwell Intl. Corp. U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5070, 2000 WL 433505 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Apple v. Samsung, WL 
4948567, at 4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2011). 
371 Lemley noticed that the link between the deceptive conduct and the market power is not 
immediate, but relies on “a long chain of interference”. “[T]he competitive risk is that the 
misrepresentation will cause an SSO to adopt a standard it otherwise would have rejected, and that the 
adoption of that standard will in turn confer on the defendant market power it would not otherwise 
have obtained. This is a rather long chain of inferences […].”M. A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights 
and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 1889, 1931 (2002).  
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Courts were, on the other hand, less reluctant to condemn cases addressing the 
SEP owner’s false FRAND commitment. Courts generally saw the link between the 
false commitment and the acquisition of market power more easily.372 In the 
Qualcomm case, for example, the court maintained “[a] FRAND commitment . . . is a 
factor—and an important factor—that the [SSO] will consider in evaluating the 
suitability of a given proprietary technology vis-a-vis competing technologies.”373 It 
further added that by making a false FRAND commitment, and thus misrepresenting 
the costs, the SEP owner “may confer an unfair advantage and bias the competitive 
process in favor of that technology's inclusion in the standard.”374 The court thus saw a 
clearer the link between the SEP owner’s deceptive behavior and the anticompetitive 
acquisition of monopoly power. 
The approach adopted by courts was not uncontroversial. Some commentator 
argued that courts should apply a more lenient causation requirement between the 
SEP owner’s deceptive conduct and the acquisition of market power. Dagen suggests 
that it should be sufficient to show that the conduct “reasonably appear[s] capable of 
creating or maintaining a monopoly,” without however the need to prove that the 
deception actually has such effect in practice.375 He points out that unlike other 
practices such as predatory pricing, or tying, SEP owner’s deceptive conduct have no 
pro-competitive potential, and there is consequently a lower risk that a strict 
application of Section 2 will unduly chill pro-competitive conduct.376 In his view, courts 
should be hence adopt a lower standard of proof when scrutinizing the SEP owner’s 
deceptive behavior. 
Dagen’s criticism is however not well founded. Several arguments support the 
maintenance of a strict causation requirement. A strict causation requirement is in 
line with the principle that, when addressing the conduct of undertakings with little 
level of market power at the time of the deception, there is a stronger need to prove 
                                                 
372 See, e,g., Research in Motion Limited v. Motorola Inc. 644 F. Supp. 2d 788 (ND Texas 2008); 
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F. 3d 297 (3rd Cir. 2007). 
373 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F. 3d 297, 313 (3rd Cir. 2007). 
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375 R. Dagen, Rambus, Innovation Efficiency, and Section 5 of the FTC Act, 90 BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW 1479, 1491 (2010). 
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causation between the challenged act and the acquisition of market power.377 Second, 
the approach is also in line with the principle that fraudulent or misleading practices 
should be considered a Section 2 Sherman Act violation only when there is clear 
evidence of anticompetitive effects.378 If the deception excluded alternative 
technologies from the standard, or allowed the SEP owner to obtain the 
implementation in the standard, the anticompetitive effects are clear and Section 2 
should apply. However, if it is not possible to prove any of these outcomes, the 
deception did perhaps not have relevant antitrust consequences. Competition law is 
not an instrument to prosecute bad acts in general, but only those that impose a 
substantial harm to competition.379  
Finally, introducing a lower standard of proof might also impose important costs. 
As pointed out by Kobayashi and Wright  
 
[w]hile it is true that deceptive conduct lacks pro-competitive virtue and 
therefore mitigates some of the concerns about error costs and favors 
enforcement all else being equal, it goes too far to argue that the presence of such 
conduct eliminates those concerns or demonstrates that the beneﬁts of 
enforcement outweighs its associated administrative and error costs.380  
 
As will be explained in chapter VIII, antitrust remedies have a severe impact on the 
violator, and it is seems reasonable to limit their use to conducts that have clear, and 
                                                 
377 P. E. Areeda and H. J. Hovenkamp emphasize that evidence of causation is crucial when dealing 
with defendant who lack monopoly power at the time of their anticompetitive behavior. “Even for a 
conduct that would be clearly called exclusionary for a firm with substantial market power, it should be 
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substantial doubts whether conduct would have sufficiently significant anticompetitive effect to be 
called exclusionary for a firm possessing substantive market power, that conduct should not be deemed 
exclusionary for a firm lacking power at the time when it acted.” P. E. AREEDA & H. J. HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 332 (Aspen Publ. 
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to anticompetitive consequences.”). 
380 B. H. Kobayashi & J. D. Wright, Federalism, Substantive Preemption, and Limits on Antitrust: An 
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identifiable anticompetitive effects. This does not imply that deceptive practices that 
do not meet such requirement should remain unpunished. It is nonetheless more 
desirable to address those cases through other rules, as for instance, the SSO’s 
internal regulation, than through antitrust law. 
In sum, the SEP owner’s deceptive conduct can constitute an act of 
monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. To bring a successful 
Section 2 claim, the plaintiff needs to nonetheless prove that the deception allowed the 
SEP owner to obtain the implementation in the standard, and through this, acquire 
monopoly power. In absence of such evidence, the conduct will fall outside the domain 
of Section 3 of the Sherman Act. 
2.2.B. Section 5 liability 
As explained, Section 5 of the FTCA covers all the prohibitions embodied in the 
Sherman Act, but it might capture also practices that are not explicitly prohibited by 
the act, but are nonetheless against its spirit. 381 In the view of some commentators, 
the provision could address SEP owner’s deceptive practices that fall outside the 
domain of the Sherman Act.382 For example, the FTC could address through Section 5 
cases as Rambus, where there is no evidence that the SEP owner’s deception excluded 
competing technologies in the technology market, but it nonetheless (allegedly) 
allowed the SEP owner to charge excessive prices.  
The FTC addressed the SEP owners’ deceptive conduct through Section 5 of the 
FTCA already in the action brought against Dell Computers in 1996.383 Dell took part 
in the standardization process of the Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA), 
however its representative falsely certified that the proposed standard did not infringe 
any of Dell’s patents. Only after VESA adopted the standard, and an important part of 
industry members started producing their goods in compliance with it, Dell informed 
manufacturers about the existence of its SEPs and invited manufacturers to enter into 
licensing agreements. The FTC maintained that Dell’s threat to exercise undisclosed 
patent rights unreasonably restrained competition contrary to Section 5. The conduct 
                                                 
381 For a discussion of Section 5 of the FTCA as a standalone offence see: Chapter III:1.3.C.
 Section 5 of the FTCA. 
382 See, e.g., Concurring Opinion Of Commissioner Jon Leibowitz, Rambus, Inc., Docket No. 9302. (Aug 
2, 2006).  
383 Complaint, Dell Computer Corp., N. 3658, F.T.C. (May 20, 1996). 
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hindered the industry’s acceptance of the VESA standard, it increased the costs of the 
standard implementation, and chilled the undertakings’ willingness to engage in the 
standard-setting process.384 The FTC also argued that in light of VESA’s strong 
preference for standards that do not include proprietary technology, there was clear 
evidence that the SSO would have implemented a different non-proprietary standard 
in absence of Dell’ deception.385 The FTC stated that enforcement action against this 
kind of behavior under Section 5 was particularly appropriate, given that Section 5 
provides only for prospective relief, a remedy the FTC considered appropriate in cases 
where the legal and economic theories are (or more precisely “were” at the time) 
somewhat novel. 386 
The FTC’s complaint brought against Dell was not uncontroversial. The dissent 
of Commissioner Azcuenaga pointed out that the complaint did “not articulate a 
violation of Section 5 of the FTCA under any established theory of law.”387 In the 
Commissioner’s view, the majority opinion did not provide a detailed determination of 
the elements of Section 5 standalone offence, nor did it assess whether they were 
present in Dell’s case.388 In other words, while the FTC presented theories of harm, it 
did not explain which facts triggered the standalone application of Section 5. The case 
was finally concluded with a consent agreement, in which Dell agreed to desist from 
asserting its SEPs against the users of the standard. Thus, it remained unclear 
whether, and under which conditions, the SEP owner’s deceptive during the 
standardization process constitutes a standalone violation of Section 5 of the FTCA.  
Several years later, in 2002, the FTC brought another action challenging the SEP 
owner’s deceptive conduct as a Section 5 standalone offence.389 In Rambus, the FTC 
determined more precisely the elements of the offence, by emphasizing that such 
offence requires evidence of: (1) the defendant’s market (but not monopoly) power, (2) 
an anticompetitive or exclusionary practice (unfair practice), (3) and adverse effects on 
competition, although not necessarily rising to the level of monopolization.390 The FTC 
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390 Rambus Inc, N. 9302, 249, F.T.C. (Feb 23, 2004) (Administrative Law Judge Decision).- 
 125 
 
maintained that Rambus’ conduct met the elements of the Section 5 stand-alone 
offence. In the FTC’s view, Rambus engaged in an unfair practice, by making 
affirmative misleading statements to JEDEC, and concealed its patent interests, in 
violation the JEDEC’s disclosure policy. At the same time, the FTC maintained that 
Rambus’ conduct violated a duty of good faith Rambus owed to the SSO by 
participating in the standardization procedure. Such conduct was in the FTC’s view 
clearly anticompetitive, had the effect to unreasonably restraining trade in the 
relevant markets, and allowed Rambus to obtain market power.391 It thus concluded 
that Rambus’ conduct amounted to a standalone violation of Section 5 of the FTCA. 
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the FTC complaint based on the 
Section 5 standalone offence. The ALJ confirmed that Section 5 allows the FTC to 
proscribe a conduct which, although not violation of the letter of the antitrust laws, is 
close to a violation or is contrary to their spirit.392 It nevertheless noted that, while 
Congress intentionally left open the term “unfair”, the determination that a conduct 
constitutes an unfair method of competition must have "a reasonable basis in law.” It 
further explained that, given that the FTC did not assert that Rambus’ conduct was 
collusive, coercive, predatory, and it failed to prove it was exclusionary, it had to prove 
that Rambus’ failure to disclose its patent interest was unfair on some other basis of 
law. However, the ALJ found that the FTC did not establish a valid legal basis on 
which Rambus’ conduct could be considered unfair. First, the ALJ refused the FTC’s 
suggestion that the decree adopted in the Dell case established that SEP owners 
participating in the standardization process have a duty to act in good faith. The ALJ 
emphasized that decrees provide no precedential value, and could thus not be 
considered as imposing a duty on participants of the standardization process.393 Next, 
the ALJ determined that Rambus did not violate a disclosure duty, given that the 
JEDEC’s policy only encouraged, but did not mandate, the disclosure of relevant 
patents.394 Further, the invitation to disclose included only patents, and not patent 
                                                 
391 Id. at 253-255. 
392 Id. at 254 (referring to E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 729 F.2d 128, 136-137 (2nd Cir.1984)). 
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applications, or intention to file patent applications. During the standardization 
process, Rambus however did not have any valid patent, but only pending patent 
applications. Finally, the ALJ emphasized that in the absence of a duty to disclose, 
Rambus’ had a legitimate business justification for not disclosing its patent interest 
before the patent were granted, given that applications are generally kept confidential 
as long as possible.395 It thus concluded that FTC failed to prove evidences that the 
Rambus conduct should be considered unfair on any basis of law.  
The FTC case against Rambus was later brought to the Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit. However, the FTC relied solely on the monopolization claim, dropping 
the allegation of Section 5 standalone offence.396 The D.C. Circuit nonetheless 
presented its opinion on the eventual liability under Section 5 and it expressed 
concerns with the FTC’s finding that Rambus’ conduct was deceptive or misleading. 
The D.C. Circuit maintained that the FTC reading of the SSO’ written policies 
stretched the policies’ language, which provided an invitation to disclose only existing 
and pending patents, but did not address the duty to disclose future patent 
applications. It further noted that  
 
[o]ne would expect that disclosure expectations . . . requiring competitors to share 
information that they would otherwise vigorously protect as trade secrets would 
provide “clear guidance” and “define clearly what, when, how, and to whom the 
members must disclose.397  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
standard to discover which patents apply”, and there were no evidence that JEDEC took any action 
against such participants. 
395 Id. at 288 (“The protection of trade secrets is a valid business justification for not disclosing 
information regarding pending patent applications and intentions to file applications or to amend 
pending claims in the future. F. 1076. Disclosure of trade secrets, including pending patent applications 
or intentions to file or amend future applications, even after a parent patent application becomes public, 
may: (1) jeopardize the issuance of pending claims by enabling competitors to file patent interferences 
or to race to be first-to-file in certain foreign jurisdictions; and (2) result in a loss of competitive 
advantage by informing competitors of the firm s research and development focus or by inducing 
competitors to begin work around efforts earlier.”). 
396 Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 462 (D. C. Cir. 2008) (maintaining that the SEP owner’s 
deceptive behavior during the standardization process constitutes a violation Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act only if it has an exclusionary effect on other technologies that were competing for the 
implementation in the standard. For detailed discussion see: Chapter V: 2.2.A. Section 2 liability. 
397 Id. at 468. 
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The Court of Appeals thus ruled that “[a]lthough antitrust can serve as a useful check 
on abuses of the standard-setting process, it cannot substitute for a general 
enforcement regime for disclosure rules.”398  
None of the past cases brought by the FTC have determined whether, and under 
which conditions, the SEP owners’ deceptive conduct could constitute a standalone 
violation of Section 5. It remains consequently unclear whether a SEP owner’s 
deceptive practice can trigger a liability under Section 5, despite not meeting the 
elements of the Section 2 violation.  
A speculative analysis nonetheless suggests that even when the SEP owner’s 
conduct should be clearly considered unfair, the FTC would have to prove an adverse 
effect on competition.399 Indeed, the deception might have several adverse effects. It is 
nevertheless necessary to evaluate whether those effects represent a harm to 
competition, with the meaning of antitrust law. The FTC suggested that the SEP 
owner’s deceptive conduct might have an adverse effect on competition if it results in 
increased royalties and consequently in higher price for standard compliant goods.400 
However, in the Rambus case, the D.C. Circuit refused to accept such effect as a harm 
to competition, and it is questionable whether courts would adopt a different position 
when evaluating the applicability of Section 5 of the FTC.401 It is therefore possible 
that evidence of an increase in royalties might be insufficient to prove that the SEP 
owner’s deceptive conduct has an adverse effect on competition and thus constitutes a 
Section 5 standalone offence. The FTC suggested that the SEP owner’s deceptive 
conduct also has other adverse effects, such as delay in the adoption of the standard, 
undermine the confidence in the standardization process, and consequently deprive 
consumers of the benefits brought by the standardization.402 This line of argument is 
more persuasive, and harm to the standardization process and ultimately consumer 
might provide a type of harm to competition recognized under the FTCA.  
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402 See, e.g., Administrative Complaint, Rambus Inc, N. 9302, 120, F.T.C. (June 18, 2002); Dell 
Computer Corp., N. 3658, 9, F.T.C., (May 20, 1996).  
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One could nonetheless question whether a mere statement that the SEP owner’s 
deception had an adverse effect on the success of the standard, or the standardization 
process would be sufficient to prove a violation of Section 5. In the Boise Cascade case, 
the Ninth Circuit maintained that the theoretical possibility of an anticompetitive 
effect could arise does not provide evidence that conduct actually harmed 
competition.403 It emphasized that a mere assertion of a possible–theoretical–
anticompetitive effects is not sufficient to prove a Section 5 violation. This suggests 
that in order to bring a successful action under Section 5, the FTC would have to prove 
SEP owner’s deception did actually delay the implementation of the standard or of the 
standardization process. This is likely to be impossible to show. 
It remains also unclear whether Section 5 could apply to cases of unintentional 
failure to disclose a patent interest. The FTC suggested that Section 5 does not require 
evidence of intent.404 However, as explained in the section on the European Union, it 
is questionable whether the condemnation of an involuntary failure to disclose a 
patent is desirable from a policy perspective. Imposing a liability for an involuntary 
failure to disclose a patent might in fact deter companies from participating in SSOs’ 
activities and contribute their technologies.405 As in the EU, it seems more desirable to 
focus the intervention of cases of intentional deception. 
In sum, Section 5 of the FTCA could—in theory—address some deceptive 
practices that fall outside the domain of the Sherman Act. The reach of the provision 
remains however yet to be determined. Even if applied beyond the scope of the 
Sherman Act, it is evident that the provision would face some limitation. Most 
importantly, the FTC would still need to prove that the conduct had an adverse effect 
on competition, and as determined by the case law, a mere theoretical possibility that 
such effects could arise it is not sufficient. It is therefore questionable how many cases 
                                                 
403 Boise Cascade Corp. v FTC., 637 F.2d 573, 579 (9th Cir. 1980). 
404 Rambus Inc, N. 9302, F.T.C., at 249 (Feb. 23, 2004) (Administrative Law Judge Decision) (“in order 
to establish liability for unfair methods of competition, specific intent need not be shown.”). 
405 Several SSOs have accentuate the possibility of such effects when discussion the FTC intervention 
in the Dell case. Also Commissioner Azcuenaga maintained that “Several of the nation's most 
significant standards-setting organizations have written to state their opposition to the broad 
implications of the order and its possible chilling effect on the participation of firms with broad patent 
portfolios in the standards-setting process. VESA and a few other groups, however, support this or an 
even stronger order.”(Id. at 634).  
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that fall outside the domain of the Sherman Act would meet the elements of the 
Section 5 offence, if any.  
 
 
3. LIMITATIONS IN ADDRESSING SEP OWNERS’ DECEPTIVE CONDUCT 
The SEP owner’s deceptive conduct has triggered anticompetitive concerns both 
in the EU and in the United States. The analysis has nonetheless shown that EU 
competition law and U.S. antitrust laws have very different scopes in addressing the 
SEP owner’s deceptive conduct. Surprisingly, the analysis unveils that the SEP owner 
is more likely to face antitrust liability under U.S. antitrust law. Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act in fact enables the plaintiff to capture the deceptive conduct of any 
participant of the standardization process, regardless of its initial level of market 
power, under the condition that the plaintiff shows an anticompetitive acquisition of 
monopoly power. However, the application of Article 102 TFEU is limited only to 
participants that have a dominant position at the time of deception, and does not 
reach the deceptive conduct of all those participants that are not dominant. Given that 
the majority of participants fall in the latter group, and are not dominant at the time 
of deception, Article 102 TFEU has a very limited scope in addressing deceptive 
practices that arise during the standardization process.  
The divergent outcomes EU competition law and U.S. antitrust law reach in 
addressing the SEP owner’s conduct do not reflect the application of different legal 
standards. Rather, they point out the basic differences between the two legal texts. 
Although the analyzed provisions address the undertaking’s unilateral conduct, they 
ultimately embody different prohibitions. Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits 
undertakings to obtain or maintain market power in an anticompetitive manner. 
Article 102 TFEU is, on the other hand, less concerned about the way in which 
companies obtain their market power, but it focuses on the way in which, once obtain, 
this market power is used. Although this difference did not traditionally play a major 
role, it becomes particularly relevant in the standardization context. Therefore, in the 
standardization context, the differences between the prohibitions on unilateral 
conduct seems to emerge to their largest extent.  
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Further, the analysis has shown that an antitrust liability will not arise 
automatically even when the antitrust provisions apply. Even though Section 2 of the 
Sharman Act reaches the conduct of all participants of the standardization process, 
irrespectively of their initial level of market power, a liability would arise only in cases 
where evidence shows that the deception allowed the SEP owner to obtain or maintain 
market power. In the absence of such evidence, the deceptive conduct cannot be 
condemned under the Sherman Act. Therefore, difficulties in showing the causal link 
between the deceptive behavior and the acquisition of market power weaken also the 
force of the U.S. rules in addressing deceptive practices. Further, the analysis has also 
shown that Section 5 of the FTCA could perhaps apply to some conducts that remain 
outside of the scope of the Sherman Act, but the exact reach of the provision remains 
yet to be clarified. For now, the scope of Section 5 of the FTCA has in addressing SEP 
owner’s deceptive conduct seems to coincide with the scope of Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act.  
In light of such limitations, several commentators have argued for a more 
extensive application of the competition law provisions. In the US, commentators 
suggested that courts should adopt a less strict causation requirement when 
scrutinizing the SEP owner’s behavior under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. In the EU, 
one could suggest to extend the application of Article 102 TFEU to non-dominant 
participants of the standardization process. Policy reasons nonetheless suggest that a 
more extensive reading of the antitrust provisions is not desirable. Although the 
departure from the existing legal doctrines is in some cases necessary and desirable, it 
represents a dangerous instrument that should be used with great caution. Extending 
the application of Article 102 TFEU to non-dominant undertakings might be a 
particularly risky step, given that it would confer to the Commission a great discretion 
when assessing the legality of the conduct of non-dominant undertakings. At the same 
time, an extensive reading of Article 102 TFEU would have a limited beneficial effect, 
given that other mechanisms, such as SSOs’ rules, can adequately address the SEP 
owner’s deceptive practices. Given the costs related to an extensive reading of Article 
102 TFEU, and market ability to address those practice, there do not seem to be 
sufficient justifications to introduce such an important change in the enforcement of 
Article 102 TFEU.  
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Also in the United States, policy arguments support the maintenance of a strong 
causation requirement adopted so far by courts in scrutinizing the SEP owner’s 
deceptive behavior. As it will be explained in the chapter on antitrust remedies, 
finding the SEP owner’s deceptive behavior anticompetitive results in the imposition 
of antitrust remedies, with far reaching effects. The imposition of such remedies is 
justified only when there is evidence of anticompetitive effects. In the absence of such 
effects, however, antitrust remedies might not be appropriate, and it seems more 
desirable to leave the intervention to other bodies of law. 
In sum, competition law has a role in addressing the SEP owner’s deceptive 
conduct during the standardization process. This role is nonetheless limited to cases 
where the challenged conduct falls within the established antitrust doctrines. As a 
result, in both jurisdictions there will be cases of deception that will fall outside the 
domain of antitrust liability. This, however, does not necessarily imply that SEP 
owner’s deceptive conducts will remain unpunished, since other mechanisms, such as 
the SSOs’ internal rules can provide adequate remedies for the SEP owner’s deceptive 
practices. Competition law is only one of the tools that stimulate the well-functioning 
of the standardization process. Antitrust enforcers should not aim to stretch the 
applicability of competition law to all deceptive conducts, but rather limit their 
antitrust intervention to cases where there is evidence of an anticompetitive effect. In 
the absence of such evidence other mechanisms, such as SSOs’ rules, provide a more 
adequate tool the address the SEP owner’s deceptive behavior. 
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Chapter VI 
 STRATEGIC LICENSING PRACTICES  
The present chapter focuses on the second group of opportunistic practices: the 
strategic use of SEPs after their implementation into a standard. The chapter 
analyzes the applicability of Article 102 TFEU, Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and 
Section 5 of the FTCA to such practices, and identifies the circumstances in which the 
SEP owner can face antitrust liability under EU competition law or US antitrust law.  
The analysis shows that also in this case, EU competition law and US antitrust 
law have different scopes in addressing the SEP owner’s conduct. However, in contrast 
to cases concerning deceptive practices during the standardization process, the 
analysis unveils a more predictable result. A SEP owner faces a stricter liability 
standard under EU competition law, where Article 102 TFEU enables the Commission 
to address a wide spectrum of licensing practices. The US antitrust law provisions 
have, on the other hand, only a limited ability to address the SEP owner’s strategic 
licensing practices. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section reviews the licensing 
practices that might trigger antitrust concerns. Next, the chapter analyzes the 
applicability of the antitrust provisions to these licensing practices, and determines 
the circumstances in which a SEP owner might face antitrust liability under the two 
legal systems. The third section summarizes the results of the analysis and points out 
the limitations of competition law faces in addressing the SEP owner’s imposition of 
strategic licensing conditions.  
 
 
1. TYPES OF STRATEGIC LICENSING PRACTICES 
Once a patented technology becomes essential for the standard, the SEP owner 
becomes an unavoidable trading party for all manufacturers of standard compliant 
goods. The SEP owner gains the role of a gatekeeper, controlling not only the access to 
the SEP, but also the access to the entire standard. The position the SEP owner 
obtains after the implementation of its patented technology in a standard might thus 
open the door for opportunistic licensing practices.  
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First, the SEP owner might refuse to license its SEP to a manufacturer. By doing 
so, the SEP owner may exclude the manufacturer from the market of standard 
compliant goods, and, when compliance with the standard is de facto or de jure 
mandatory, from the entire product market. The SEP owner might have the incentive 
to do so if it competes in the product market, and it is thus interested in foreclosing its 
competitors from the downstream market. 
Second, the SEP owner might use its strong position to hold up a manufacturer, 
by imposing on it exploitative licensing conditions.406 The SEP owner might impose 
the payment of licensing fees which are considered excessive to the value of the SEP, 
or impose others onerous licensing conditions, such as mandatory cross-license of non-
essential patents, non-assertion clauses, and compulsory grant back. Particularly 
when compliance with the standard is de facto or de jure mandatory, manufacturers 
might have no other option than accept the onerous licensing conditions demanded by 
the SEP owner.  
Third, the SEP owner might also impose licensing conditions that not only exploit 
the manufacturer, but also harm manufacturer’s ability to compete. For example, the 
SEP owner might impose licensing conditions that raise manufacturer’s production 
costs, and in this way harm its ability to compete in the product market. Alternatively, 
the SEP owner might impose other onerous licensing conditions that harm the 
manufacturer’s ability to compete. In Apple v Samsung, for example, Apple alleged 
that Samsung had used its SEPs as a tool to coerce Apple to cross-license, or at least 
tolerate, Samsung’s use of Apple’s design patents. 407 This would allow Samsung to 
free-ride on the Apple’s innovation, and thus deprive Apple from the competitive 
advantage it enjoys in the product market thanks to its design related IPRs.  
Therefore, the implementation of the patented technology in the standard might 
enable the SEP owner to engage in licensing practice that have exclusionary effects, 
exploitative effects, and/or might harm rivals’ ability to compete. Several 
commentators have emphasized that the SEP owner’s opportunistic licensing practices 
                                                 
406 C. Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties, 282 AMERICAN LAW AND ECONOMICS 
REVIEW 12 (2010). 
407 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Inc., WL 3205801 (July 21, 2011). 
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might have also broader negative implications.408 They suggested that cases of patent 
holdup might affect negatively consumers, if the high royalties are passed on them in 
the form of higher prices of standard compliant goods.409 An indirect harm may also 
arise if the SEP owner’s behavior affects the success of the standard, undermines 
confidence in the standardization process, decreases the incentives of undertaking to 
participate in the standardization activities, and thus deprives consumers form the 
benefit of standardization activities.410 In other words, SEP owners’ strategic licensing 
practices might not only have a detrimental effect on the manufacturer of standard 
compliant goods, but also on consumers more in general. 
The next section will review the applicability of the competition law provisions to 
the described licensing practices and evaluate under which circumstances the SEP 
owner might face antitrust liability under EU competition law or US antitrust law.  
 
 
2. THE ANTITRUST LIABILITY  
2.1. Refusal to license a SEP 
A refusal to license allows the SEP owner to exclude the manufacturer from the 
market of standard compliant goods, and in some circumstances, from the entire 
product market. A SEP owner that owns a patent essential for the 3G standard, and 
itself competes in the market for mobile devices, may refuse to license its SEPs to a 
rival manufacturer of mobile devices, and in this way foreclose a downstream 
                                                 
408 See, e.g., R. M. Davis, Failed Attempts to Dwarf the Patent Trolls: Permanent Injunctions in Patent 
Infringement Cases Under the Proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005 and eBay v. Mercexchange, 17 
CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 431, 438 (2008); U.S. Dept. of Justice & U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office, Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary 
F/RAND Commitments (2013). 
409 See, e.g., Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Consults on Commitments Offered by Samsung 
Electronics Regarding Use of Standard Essential Patents, IP/13/971 (Oct. 17, 2013) (“cause harm to 
consumers by increasing prices, reducing product choice and stifling differentiating innovation in the 
markets for smartphones and tablets.”). 
410 See, e.g., Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc., Complaint, File No. 121-0120, F.T.C. (2013); F. M. 
Scott-Morton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General For Economic Analysis, The Role of Standards in the 
Current Patent Wars (2012), Presented at Charles River Associates Annual Brussels Conference 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/289708.pdf; J. F. Wayland, Oversight of the 
Impact on Competition of Exclusion Orders to Enforce Standards-Essential Patents (2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/testimony/284982.pdf. 
. 
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competitor from the market. Cases concerning a refusal to license a SEP thus raise 
similar concerns as the ones arising in relation to “essential facilities”.  
There is so far no precedent determining whether a SEP owner’s refusal to 
license a SEP constitutes anticompetitive conduct under EU competition law. Cases 
where the SEP owner unilaterally and unconditionally refuses to license its SEPs are 
rare in practice. It is nonetheless possible to speculate that a SEP owner’s refusal to 
license could constitute an anticompetitive behavior under EU law. When evaluating 
the applicability of Article 102 TFEU, it is important to keep in mind that a refusal to 
license a SEP takes place at the time when the patented technology has been 
implemented in the standard, and the SEP owner has (presumably) obtained a 
dominant position.411 Therefore, the SEP owner needs to respect the prohibitions of 
Article 102 TFEU. As explained in chapter III, though patent owners, including 
dominant ones, are in principle free to select their licensees, such right is not 
unqualified, and in exceptional circumstances, a refusal to license can constitute an 
abuse of a dominant position. When the elements of the exceptional circumstances test 
are met (the access to the IPR is indispensable, a refusal to license excludes effectives 
competition, prevents the emergence of new products, and it is not objectively 
justified), a refusal to license a SEP can constitute an abuse of dominant position in 
violation of Article 102 TFEU.412  
Although the ECJ and the Commission did not discuss the presence of 
exceptional circumstances in any of the investigations against SEP owner, it is 
possible to foresee several instances where the SEP owner’s refusal would meet these 
elements. Consider the example of a SEP implemented in the GSM standard, back in 
the days, a de facto requirement for the participation in the EU market for mobile 
devices. First, the access to a SEP meets the requirement of indispensability. Given 
that compliance with the GSM standard was a de facto requirement for the 
participation in the EU market for mobile devices, the access to the standard, and 
                                                 
411 For discussion on SEP owner’s market power see Chapter V: THE SEP OWNER’S MARKET 
POWER. 
412 For the doctrine of exceptional circumstances see: Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P Radio 
Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission of the 
European Communities, ECR, Pag. I-00743 (1995); Case C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v 
NDC Health GmbH & Co., I-05039, 48 (2004); See also discussion in Chapter III: 2.2.A.1. The 
“exceptional circumstances” test under EU competition law. 
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consequently to the SEPs implemented the GSM, was indispensable for manufacturers 
of mobile devices entering the EU market. Second, by refusing to license its SEP, the 
SEP owner could exclude manufacturers from the EU market of mobile devices. 
Mobile devices that did not comply with the GSM standard could not interoperate with 
the large network of GSM devices, and were consequently not attractive for EU 
consumers. Third, a refusal to license the SEP could prevent manufacturers to offer 
new devices, for which there is potential demand. This element can be read narrowly, 
as requiring the manufacturer to offer a totally different product that does not exist in 
the market. The “new product” element can be read, however, also more broadly. In 
Microsoft, the ECJ maintained that the “new product” element should include all 
circumstances “where there is a limitation not only of production or markets, but also 
of technical development.”413 This could be interpreted as capturing any case where 
the refusal to license the SEP prevents the manufacturer from releasing a product, 
(including products having only minor difference form the one already existing in the 
market), and through this hindering technical development.  
The same analysis applies also to cases of a constructive refusal to license a SEP. 
A SEP owner that is not interested in licensing its SEP might make a fictitious offer to 
the manufacturers, but impose unreasonable licensing conditions that cannot be 
accepted by the manufacturer. Such practice has the same effect of a refusal to license 
and it is evaluated by applying the same legal doctrine.414 Therefore, also a 
constructive refusal to license a SEP can constitute an anticompetitive conduct in 
violation of Article 102 TFEU. 
It is worth noting that in principle, the SEP owner’s refusal to license its SEP 
might constitute an abusive behavior even if the SEP owner did not make a FRAND 
commitment. Outside the SEPs context, there are several cases in which the ECJ and 
the Commission considered abusive a refusal to license an IPR, although the owner 
never expressed its intention to license its IPR to other companies. In Magill, for 
example, the three broadcasting companies had previously not offered their respective 
                                                 
413 T-201/04 Microsoft v. Commission, ECR II-4463, ¶ 647 (2004). 
414 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, C 45/7, ¶ 79 (2009).  
 137 
 
copyrighted materials to other entities.415 Likewise, in the IMS case, the copyright 
owner did not express the intention to license its brick structure to competitors.416 
Although the decisions in these two cases were highly controversial, they clearly 
indicate that a refusal to license might constitute an abuse of a dominant position, 
even in absence of a previous agreement to license the IPR to other companies. Indeed, 
the fact that the SEP owner has voluntary agreed to license its SEPs to other 
companies on FRAND terms might be taken into account by the competition authority 
when determining whether a refusal to license constitutes an abuse of a dominant 
position. A liability is more likely to arise when the SEP owner has committed to 
license its SEP on FRAND terms. However, the absence of a FRAND commitment 
does not preclude the application of Article 102 TFEU to the SEP owner’s refusal to 
license.  
The example of a technology essential for the GSM standard might be again 
helpful in explaining this point. Let us assume that X, the SEP owner, did not 
participate in the standardization process, and did not commit to license its SEP on 
FRAND terms, but its technology was nonetheless implemented in the GSM standard. 
Due to the wide adoption of the GSM standard, X obtained a dominant position. If X 
decides to license its SEPs to the majority of licensees, but refuses to do so to a specific 
licensee, the Commission could challenge X’s conduct under Article 102 TFEU. If the 
elements of the exceptional circumstance test are met, X’s refusal to license its SEP 
could be still considered abusive, although X is not bound by a FRAND commitment. 
Although such situations might be rare in practice, it is evident that the absence of a 
FRAND commitment does not preclude the SEP owner’s antitrust liability under 
Article 102 TFEU. 
It is possible, on the other hand, that, despite the existence of a FRAND 
commitment, the SEP owner’s refusal to license does not meet the criteria of the 
exceptional circumstances test. The access to the SEP might not be indispensable, 
because of the availability of alternative, although less attractive, standards. As 
emphasized by the ECJ in the Oscar Bronner case, if alternatives exist, although less 
attractive, the access to the input cannot be considered indispensable, and a refusal to 
                                                 
415 Case T-69/89 Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission of the European Communities, ECR II-485, at 
73-74 (1995).  
416 Case C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co., I-05039. 
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grant access is not abusive. 417 In such circumstances, the SEP owner’s refusal to 
license should not trigger a liability under Article 102 TFEU.  
In practice, however, it is unlikely that the Commission or the ECJ would find a 
SEP owner dominant, but nonetheless consider the input not indispensable. As 
pointed out by Rousseva, the evaluation of indispensability often focuses on the very 
same criteria as the one taken into account when evaluating the undertaking’s market 
power.418 It is consequently unlikely that once the SEP owner has been found 
dominant, the refusal to license will not meet the elements of the exceptional 
circumstances test.419  
In sum, the established principles of EU competition law clearly show that SEP 
owner’s refusal to license its SEPs might constitute an abuse of a dominant position 
                                                 
417 The case concerned a dispute between Oscar Bronner, the publisher and distributor of the daily 
newspaper Der Standard, and Mediaprint Zeitungs, the publisher of two daily newspapers. Mediaprint 
established a nationwide home-delivery scheme for the distribution of its newspapers. It however 
refused to grant access to the scheme to Oscar Bonner, who requested to include Der Standard in 
Mediaprint’s home-delivery service in exchange for a reasonable remuneration. Oscar Bronner brought 
an action against Mediaprint, maintaining that the refusal constituted an abuse of a dominant position. 
The ECJ however rejected Oscar Bronner complaint. It noted that other methods of distributing daily 
newspapers existed, although less advantageous: the access to Mediaprint’s scheme was thus not 
indispensable to compete in the market. It thus concluded that Mediaprint’s refusal was not in violation 
of Article 102 TFEU (Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs und 
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, ECR I-07791, at 145 (1998)). 
418 Rousseva points out that Commission and the ECJ have often inferred the indispensability of an 
input from the undertakings’ dominant position. They have generally take into account the same factors 
when evaluating the indispensability element, and the dominant position. In proving her statement, she 
points out several examples. In the Magill case, for instance, the ECJ determined that the TV program 
listening constituted a relevant market, and considered indispensable for competition in the market of 
televisions guides. When discussing the indispensability element the CFI maintained that there was 
“no actual or potential substitute for a weekly television guide offering information on the programs for 
the week ahead”. Rousseva maintains that through such statement the ECJ “de facto equated 
indispensability with the test for substitutability applied in defining the relevant market.” She further 
points out that in the Oscar Bonner case the ECJ addressed separately the issue of dominance and 
indispensability. When referring to the national court it nonetheless suggested to take into account the 
same factors when defining the relevant market, and when evaluating the indispensability of the input. 
The connection between the two evaluations is even more evident in the IMS case, where the ECJ 
determined that it is possible to identify a hypothetical market where “the products or services are 
indispensable in order to carry on a particular business, and where there is an actual demand for them 
on the part of undertakings which seek to carry on the business for which they are indispensable.” As 
maintained by Roussova, this clearly indicates that there is no distinction between the condition for 
indispensability and the demand-side substitutability used in defining relevant markets. See: 
EKATERINA R. ROUSSSEVA, THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 82 EC TO EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES: EVOLUTION 
OR REVOLUTION, European University Institute (2008). 
419 In theory, however, such outcome could be possible. The court clarified that the access to an input 
should be considered indispensable when there are no actual or potential substitutes for it. (Case C-
7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 
ECR I-07791, at 41 (1998)). Even if a company has a dominant position in the market, it does not 
necessarily imply that substitutes do not exist. 
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and lead to a liability under Article 102 TFEU. A relevant question is how the 
European Commission and the ECJ will apply the exceptional circumstances test. If 
the Commission and the ECJ adopt wide interpretation of the concepts of 
“essentiality” and “new product” criteria, SEP owners would face strict constraints 
under Article 102 TFEU. This could lead to a situation where every refusal to license a 
SEP is considered anticompetitive, even if the circumstances of the specific cases are 
not truly exceptional.  
The analysis of the antitrust liability follows a different path under US antitrust 
law. Also in this case there is no legal precedent evaluating the antitrust liability for 
the SEP owner’s refusal to license. As in the EU, US courts have recognized that the 
patent owners’ right to refuse to license is not absolute, and that in certain occasions a 
refusal to license can constitute an anticompetitive conduct in violation of Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act.420 However, US courts have been much more reluctant than their 
EU counterparts to find exceptions to the general rule. Particularly after Trinko, 
several scholars believe that it is highly unlikely that a US court will consider a 
unilateral refusal to license anticompetitive.421  
Nevertheless, the strong reluctance of US courts to find a refusal to license 
anticompetitive, does not necessarily preclude the SEP owner’s liability for refusing to 
license a FRAND-encumbered SEP. Hovenkamp points out that “[i]t is incorrect to 
conclude that antitrust does not apply because under the antitrust laws a firm is free 
to refuse to license its patents.”422 He emphasizes that the case law did not determine 
that a refusal to license can never be illegal under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
Rather the contrary. In Xerox, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit maintained 
that the patent owner cannot use the statutory right of a refusal to license to gain a 
                                                 
420 In re Independent Service Organization Antitrust Litigation, 203 F.3d. 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  
421 See, e.g., 3B P. E. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 770–74 (3d ed. 2007) (“(T)he simple 
refusal to license is virtually never an antitrust violation”); U.S. D.O.J. & F.T.C., ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 6 
(2007) (“Antitrust liability for mere unilateral, unconditional refusals to license patents will not play a 
meaningful part in the interface between patent rights and antitrust protections.”). For a detailed 
discussion of a liability for a refusal to license see: Chapter III, 2.2.A.2. Limited liability under U.S. 
antitrust law. 
422 H. J. Hovenkamp, Standards Ownership and Competition Policy, 48 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 
87, 105 (2007) (“One is the fact that a “mere” refusal to license is not an antitrust violation. The other is 
that compulsory licensing of patents is a common remedy for conduct that has been found to violate the 
antitrust laws.”). 
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monopoly in a market “beyond the scope of the patents.”423 Although it remains to be 
clarified when a refusal to license extends the monopoly power “beyond the one 
conferred by the patent”, it is evident that the SEP owner’s antitrust liability for a 
refusal to license cannot be completely excluded. Finding the SEP owner’s refusal to 
license a FRAND-encumbered patent anticompetitive also does not contradict the 
Supreme Court’s Trinko decision. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit pointed 
out that cases where the SEP owner has offered to license its SEPs on FRAND terms 
differ from Trinko, where the defendant would not cooperate with other undertakings 
absent a statutory duty to do so.424 By imposing a duty to license, antitrust law would 
not impose on the SEP owner any additional duty, but for the one the SEP owner 
voluntary agreed to access. The reasoning of the Third Circuit suggests that, although 
antitrust law generally does not impose on a SEP owner a duty to cooperate with its 
licensees, once a SEP owner voluntary enters in such collaboration (by making a 
FRAND commitment), a subsequent refusal to license could trigger the application of 
the Sherman Act.  
Such conclusion is nonetheless highly speculative. Given the absence of 
precedents, it remains unclear whether courts would be willing to find a refusal to 
license a SEP anticompetitive. US courts have been much more reluctant than their 
EU counterparts to use antitrust as a tool to impose on undertakings a duty to deal 
with competitors. They might be similarly reluctant to impose such an obligation on 
SEP owners.  
Further, even if one accepts that a refusal to license can amount to an act of 
monopolization (or attempted monopolization) in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman 
act, the legal standard for finding such practice anticompetitive is different from the 
standard applied under EU competition law. Whereas in the EU the evaluation 
focuses on the existence of exceptional circumstances, including the question whether 
the refusal to license prevents the emergence of a new product, the US analysis 
                                                 
423 In re Independent Service organizations Antitrust Litigation, 203 F. 3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
The Supreme Court adopted this approach already in Singer, by stating that “[t]he possession of a valid 
patent or patents does not give patentee any exemption from provisions of Sherman Act beyond limits of 
patent monopoly.” (United States v. Singer, 374 U.S. 174, 196 (1963). See also FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 
S. Ct. 2223, 2243 (2013) (“antitrust law has no business prying into a patent settlement so long as that 
settlement confers to the patent holder no monopoly power beyond what the patent itself conferred.”). 
424 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F. 3d 297, 316 (3rd policz  2007).  
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focuses on the extension of market power “beyond the scope of the patent”. The SEP 
owner’s refusal to license would be thus scrutinized under different legal standards in 
the two jurisdictions.  
The difference between the two legal systems is even more evident in cases where 
the SEP owner did not agree to license its SEP on FRAND terms. In absence of a 
FRAND commitment, US courts are unlikely to consider a refusal to license 
anticompetitive. This can be inferred by reference to the two leading cases. In Aspen 
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., the Supreme Court found that a company 
operating three of four mountain ski areas in Aspen violated Section 2 by refusing to 
continue its cooperation with the company that operated the fourth ski area.425 The 
Supreme Court maintained that the fact that Aspen Skiing was willing to unilaterally 
terminate a collaboration that lasted for several years suggested a willingness to 
forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end. In Trinko, on the 
contrary, there was no voluntary collaboration, but only a duty to deal imposed by a 
statute. The Supreme Court emphasized that in absence of previous voluntary 
cooperation, antitrust law does not impose on undertakings a duty to deal with their 
rivals. 426 This suggests that in absence of a voluntary agreement to license its SEP on 
FRAND terms, the SEP owner’s refusal to license does not constitute an 
anticompetitive conduct actionable under the Sherman Act.427 
In both jurisdictions it remains also questionable which reasons, if any, could 
justify the SEP owner’s refusal to license its SEP. Both EU competition law and US 
antitrust law recognize that a patent owner might provide an objective justification for 
its refusal.428 Outside the context of SEPs, US courts recognized that when a patent 
owner has been sued by the potential licensee, the existence of such suit might provide 
a valid justification for the patent owner’s refusal to licensee.429 It seems however that 
                                                 
425 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, (1985). 
426 Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004). 
427 A plaintiff could still try to bring an action against the SEP owner under the essential facility 
doctrine. As mentioned in Chapter III, however, the success of such action is highly unlikely, given that 
in the view of many authors, the Supreme Court decision in the Trinko case represents the ultimate 
rejection of the essential facility doctrine under US antitrust law. See chapter III: 2.2.A. Refusal to 
license.  
428 See chapter III: 2.2.A. Refusal to license. 
429 House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir.1962); see also Zoslaw 
v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 889-90 (9th Cir.1982) ("[T]he relationship between a manufacturer 
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this justification will not be accepted in the context of SEPs. Several SEP owners have 
been sued by their licensees for patent infringement; however, courts and competition 
authorities have not taken this aspect into account when evaluating SEP owner’s 
licensing practice.430 Perhaps, the SEP owner can justify its refusal to license a SEP if 
it proves that the parties requesting the use of the SEP have refused (or are unable to 
pay) what has been determined to be a FRAND royalty. However, outside of this 
scenario, it seems questionable whether courts and competition authorities would 
accept any other justification for refusing to license its SEPs. The argument that 
licensing damages its incentives to carry out research and development would be 
undermined by his own expression of willingness to license on FRAND terms. 
 
2.2. Patent holdup  
The second group of strategic licensing practices includes cases where the SEP 
owner licenses its SEP, but demands the manufacturer to accept exploitative licensing 
terms. The SEP owner might holdup the manufacturer and impose on it licensing 
conditions that the manufacturer would not accept in an ex ante negotiation. Such 
licensing strategy has no exclusionary, but only an exploitative effect. Competition 
authorities on both sides of the Atlantic have expressed their strong concerns with the 
SEP owner’s ability to impose exploitative licensing conditions and have often signaled 
their intention to address such practices through competition law.431 Despite the high 
number of investigations, however, the limits competition law poses on the SEP owner 
                                                                                                                                                                  
and its customer should be reasonably harmonious; and the bringing of a lawsuit by the customer may 
provide a sound business reason for the manufacturer to terminate their relations.")  
430 See, e.g., Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Motorola Mobility 
on Potential Misuse of Mobile Phone Standard-Essential Patents, IP/13/406 (May 6, 2013). 
431 For the EU see: Press Release, J. Almunia, Industrial policy and Competition policy: Quo vadis 
Europa? (SPEECH/12/83), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-83_en.htm (“I 
am notably thinking of the surge in the strategic use of patents that confer market power to their 
holders . . . We must also ensure that, once they hold standard essential patents, companies give 
effective access on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms . . . I am determined to use antitrust 
enforcement to prevent the misuse of patent rights to the detriment of a vigorous and accessible 
market.”); For the US see: Statement of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division on Its Decision 
to Close Its Investigation of Google Inc.’s Acquisition of Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc. and the 
Acquisition of Certain Patents by Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp. and Research in Motion Ltd., Depart. Of 
Justice (Feb. 13, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2012/280190.pdf 
(“[The division] continues to monitor the use of SEPs in the wireless device industry, particularly in the 
smartphone and computer tablet markets. The division will not hesitate to take appropriate 
enforcement action to stop any anticompetitive use of SEP rights”).  
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remain unsettled, given that most cases have been concluded without a formal 
determination of whether the challenged conduct constituted anticompetitive conduct.  
Commentators initially focused their attention on the SEP owner’s imposition of 
excessive royalties. Competition authorities were particularly concerned that by 
holding up manufacturers, a SEP owner would be able to impose licensing fees that 
are excessive to the value of the technology.432 Later on, however, the attention 
focused on the SEP owner’s use of the injunction as a tool to hold up manufacturers, 
and impose on them exploitative licensing conditions. Those licensing conditions did 
not necessary refer to excessive royalties, but could include other onerous licensing 
terms, such as non-assertion clauses, broad cross-licensing agreements, or other 
licensing conditions that the manufacturer would not accept in absence of the threat of 
an injunction.433 The liability for the two types of practices will be discussed in the 
following paragraphs.  
2.2.A. Excessive royalties 
i. The EU approach  
The European Commission has shown a clear intention to prosecute under 
Article 102 TFEU the SEP owner’s imposition of excessive royalties. In the Rambus 
case, the Commission challenged the imposition of royalties that were considered 
excessive to the value of the SEPs. According to the Commission’s preliminary view, 
Rambus had engaged in an intentional deceptive conduct during the standardization, 
by not disclosing the existence of patents essential for the standard (patent ambush), 
and subsequently abused its dominant position, by charging unreasonable royalties for 
the use of its SEPs434 The Commission’s preliminary view was that “without its ‘patent 
ambush’, Rambus would not have been able to charge the royalty rates it currently 
does.”435 The Commission has thus clearly indicated the intention to address the SEP 
                                                 
432 See, e.g., Press Release, Antitrust: Commission confirms sending a Statement of Objections to 
Rambus, MEMO/07/330 (Aug. 23, 2007). 
433 See, e.g., Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Motorola Mobility 
on Potential Misuse of Mobile Phone Standard-Essential Patents, IP/13/406 (May 6, 2013). 
434 Press Release, Antitrust: Commission confirms sending a Statement of Objections to Rambus, 
MEMO/07/330 (Aug. 23, 2007). 
435 Id. 
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owner’s exploitative licensing practices made possible by a deceptive behavior during 
the standardization process. 
The Commission addressed the imposition of exploitative licensing conditions 
also in the investigation initiated against Qualcomm. Qualcomm participated in the 
standardization process and committed to license its SEPs on FRAND terms. Later on, 
however, Qualcomm allegedly failed to comply with the FRAND commitment. When 
initiating the investigation, the European Commission maintained that it would 
evaluate whether Qualcomm’s breach of the FRAND commitment constituted an 
abuse of its dominant position.436 It argued that “a finding of exploitative practices […] 
contrary to Article [102] of the EC Treaty may depend on whether the licensing terms 
imposed by Qualcomm are in breach of its FRAND commitment.”437 The approach 
adopted in the Qualcomm investigation suggest that imposing exploitative licensing 
terms subsequent to a false FRAND commitment might constitute an abuse of a 
dominant position. 
In a later investigation the Commission signaled that a SEP owner’s imposition 
of exploitative licensing practices might constitute an anticompetitive behavior, even if 
the SEP owner did not act deceptively during the standardization process. The 
Commission made this position clear in the investigation it brought against IPCom.438 
Robert Bosch GmbH (Bosch) participated in the standardization procedure of ETSI, 
and committed to license its patents on FRAND terms. Bosch however later sold its 
patent portfolio (including its SEPs) to IPCom, an entity that did not participate in the 
standardization process and was consequently not bound by Bosch’s FRAND 
commitment. The Commission expressed a concern that the transfer of the patent 
portfolio could result in patent holdup and signaled the intention to start an 
investigation, would IPCom not comply with the FRAND commitment given by Bosch. 
The Commission emphasized that the unrestricted access to SEPs on FRAND terms 
safeguards the procompetitive economic effects of standard setting, and such effects 
could be eliminated if, as a result of a transfer of the SEP, the FRAND commitment 
                                                 
436 Press Release, Antitrust: Commission initiates formal proceedings against Qualcomm, 
MEMO/07/389 (2007). 
437 Id. (emphasis added). 
438 Press Release, Antitrust: Commission welcomes IPCom’s public FRAND declaration, 
MEMO/09/549, 2009. 
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would no longer apply.439 The Commission’s intervention implicitly suggested that the 
new SEP owner should inherit the FRAND commitment from the previous SEP owner. 
Although one could questioned whether competition law was the appropriate tool to 
force the “transfer” of the FRAND commitment, the invention against IPCom clearly 
indicated the Commission’s willingness to address SEP owners’ exploitative licensing 
practices, even if not deceptive conduct is involved. 
Despite the three initiated investigations, as of April 2014, the Commission has 
not adopted any infringement decision against a SEP owner for the imposition of 
exploitative licensing terms. The Rambus case was closed with a commitment decision, 
which imposed on Rambus a royalty cap, but did not determine whether the 
challenged conduct constituted an abuse of a dominant position.440 The IPCom case 
ended with the SEP owner’s assurance that it will license the SEPs on FRAND 
terms,441 whereas the Commission closed the proceeding against Qualcomm, after the 
complainants withdrew their claims.442  
A speculative analysis suggests, nonetheless, that the broad language of Article 
102 TFEU would allow the Commission to address the SEP owner’s exploitative 
licensing practices. Article 102 TFEU prohibits dominant undertakings to abuse their 
dominant position by engaging in both exclusionary and exploitative practices.443 
Further, the ECJ clarified that an IPR does not guarantee to the owner the 
opportunity to demand the highest possible remuneration, but only the appropriate 
remuneration.444 Although the Commission has rarely addressed exploitative 
practices, it is worth noting that it has never given up its ability to prosecute those 
practices. Rather the contrary: the Commission emphasized that although its 
enforcement will generally focus on exclusionary practices, it intends to address 
                                                 
439 Id. 
440 Press Release: Antitrust, Commission Accepts Commitments from Rambus Lowering Memory Chip 
Royalty Rates, MEMO/09/544 (2009). 
441 Press Release: Antitrust: Commission Welcomes IPCom’s Public FRAND Declaration, 
MEMO/09/549 (Dec. 10, 2009). 
442.Press Release: Antitrust: Commission Closes Formal Proceedings Against Qualcomm, 
MEMO/09/516 (Nov. 24, 2009).  
443 Case 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the 
European Communities, ECR 207, ¶ 235 (1978); Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission, ECR 
00207, ¶¶ 250-252 (1978); Case 26/75 General Motors Continental v Commission, ECR 1367, a12 
(1975).  
444 Joined cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC 
Leisure and Others and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd., at 108 (2011). 
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exploitative conducts in circumstances where the “proper functioning of the market 
cannot be otherwise adequately ensured”.445 As argued by some authors, such 
circumstances are aptly represented by cases concerning SEPs, where the presence of 
network effects and the length of the standardization process prevent the development 
of market mechanisms that would efficiently address the SEP owner’s exploitative 
practices.446  
A liability under Article 102 TFEU could arise even when the SEP owner is not 
bound by the FRAND commitment. Article 102 TFEU imposes a general prohibition 
on dominant undertaking not to abuse a dominant position, irrespectively from the 
duties that arise for the dominant undertaking from a contractual agreement, such as 
a FRAND commitment. The absence of a FRAND commitment does not preclude the 
Commission intervention in cases where the SEP owner imposes exploitative licensing 
terms. Article 102 TFEU provides the legal basis to address exploitative practices even 
in absence of a FRAND commitment.  
However, the fact that Article 102 TFEU provides the legal basis for an 
intervention does not necessarily imply that the antitrust intervention is desirable 
from a policy perspective. As in other areas, the intervention towards exploitative 
practices remains highly controversial.447 There are several reasons for it.  
First, it is often difficult to identify an exploitative licensing practice. For 
example, it is difficult to define the line between legitimate, but high royalty, and a 
royalty that is abusive. So far, neither the ECJ nor the Commission has designed a 
clear test that would allow to identify unfair, excessive royalties. The definition 
adopted so far by the ECJ determines that a price should be considered excessive if it 
bears no “reasonable relation with the economic value of the good.”448 The European 
Commission, on the other hand, did suggest some benchmarks that could be applied in 
evaluating whether the licensing fee determined by the SEP owner is fair. In the 
Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 TFEU to Horizontal Cooperation 
                                                 
445 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, C 45/7, ¶ 7 (2009). 
446 M. Dolmans, The Concept of Abuse under Article 82 EC: Profit Sacrifice or Proportionality Test? US 
law and EU law compared, College of Europe, Bruges / Global Competition Law Centre (2005). 
447 For a general discussion on the concern related to the antitrust intervention in exploitative 
practices see: Chapter III, 2.2.B. Excessive royalties. 
448 Case 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the 
European Communities, ECR 207, ¶ 250 (1978). 
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Agreements, a document dealing inter alia with standardization agreements, the 
Commission suggested that in case of a dispute, the fairness of a royalty could be 
evaluated by comparing the fees charged ex ante (before the industry has been locked 
into the standard) to those charged ex post (after the industry is locked in),449 or to a 
fee announced in an ex ante statement.450 The suggested benchmarks might provide 
some help. They however do not provide a general test that would allow to clearly 
identify the exploitative licensing fees. In particular, they do not determine how the 
Commission should evaluate cases where the licensing fee is set ex novo,451 and there 
is no valid benchmark that the Commission could use to evaluate the excessiveness of 
the royalty.  
Second, the absence of a clear legal test has several negative implications for the 
antitrust intervention. On one hand, it leaves a substantial level of legal uncertainty 
for SEP owners, who do not have any reference to evaluate whether the royalty fee 
they demand is within the borders of legality. At the same time, the absence of a clear 
legal test opens the door for incorrect decisions.452 The Commission might erroneously 
consider the royalties for the SEP excessive, although they are not. In this case, the 
Commission’s intervention would illegitimately limit the SEP owner’s compensation 
for its innovative effort, and consequently, it would affect in a negative way the SEP 
owner’s willingness to engage further in the innovative process, 453 and contribute its 
technologies to SSOs.454  
The absence of a clear legal test might also favor the strategic use of antitrust 
claims by the manufacturers.455 Hovenkamp notes that “[d]efendants in intellectual 
                                                 
449 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements § C(2010) 9274/2, ¶ 289 
(2010).  
450 Id. 
451 Latin expression meaning “from the beginning”, “new”. In contradiction with cases, where the SEP 
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452 For literature on false positives and false negatives see, e.g., F. H. Easterbrook, The Limits of 
Antitrust, 63 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1 (1984). 
453 See, e.g., D. Geradin, V. Denicolò, A. Layne-Farrar, and A. J. Padilla, Revisiting Injunctive Relief: 
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property cases cast about for some weapon with which to strike back at the plaintiff: 
an antitrust claim allows the intellectual property defendant to regain the offensive.” 
456 A manufacturer might use a claim of an anticompetitive conduct as a tool to obtain 
bargaining power in the negotiation of the licensing terms. A SEP owner that is facing 
a potential antitrust liability, including the possibility of a high fine and private 
damage claims, might be more willing to agree on a lower royalty.  
Third, even if the competition authority does not address the SEP owner’s 
imposition of excessive royalties, the manufacturer will generally have other legal 
mechanisms through which challenge the SEP owner’s exploitative licensing practices. 
If the manufacturer does not agree with the licensing conditions demanded by the SEP 
owner, it will be able to challenge them in court, by demanding the court to determine 
whether the demand licensing conditions comply with the FRAND commitment. The 
legal basis for brining those disputes is not antitrust, but rather contract law—more 
precisely, the FRAND agreement. Therefore, the fact that the SEP owner’s 
exploitative conduct will not be challenged under competition law does not necessarily 
imply that the conduct will not be challenged through other legal tools.  
One could argue that despite the existence of alternative mechanisms, the 
European Commission should address the SEP owner’s exploitative licensing 
practices, given that such practices are harmful for consumer. The SEP owner’s 
imposition of excessive royalties can impose a direct harm on consumer, if excessive 
royalties are passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices of standard 
compliant goods. Further, an indirect harm may arise, if the SEP owner’s imposition 
of exploitative licensing conditions undermines the success of the standard, diminishes 
the confidence in the standardization process, and thus deprives consumers from the 
benefits brought by the standardization. This theory of harm is certainly valid, and 
support the necessity for an antitrust intervention. However, part of the economic 
theory has criticized the patent holdup conjecture.457 They emphasized that not only 
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will patent holdup rarely arise in practice, but also that there is little evidence that it 
had any negative effect on the product market or on the standardization process. 
Given the divergent position of the economic theory, it seems desirable that, if the 
Commission decides to intervene in cases concerning the SEP owner’s imposition of 
excessive royalties, it limits the intervention to cases where evidence shows that the 
SEP owner’s conduct had an actual harmful effect on the product market, on the 
success of the standard, or on the standardization process.  
 In sum, although there is no doubt that Article 102 TFEU provides a legal basis 
for the European Commission’s intervention towards SEP owner’s exploitative 
licensing practices, it is less clear whether the intervention is desirable form a policy 
perspective. The risk of erroneous decisions, the consequent negative effects on 
innovation and the standardization process, coupled with the manufacturers’ ability to 
challenge the exploitative licensing practices through other legal means weight 
against intervention. Although this does not suggest that the imposition of unfair 
royalties could never be anticompetitive, it seems desirable to limit the antitrust 
intervention to cases where the SEP owner’s exploitative licensing conditions had a 
clear, and identifiable, harmful effect on consumers. In absence of evidences of such 
harm, it is desirable to solve the dispute over FRAND terms through other legal 
means, and forego the antitrust intervention. There is otherwise the risk that the 
Commission will become a body for the solution of disputes concerning the level of 
licensing fees (and the distribution of income between the SEP owner and the 
manufacturer), rather than a body for the protection of competition. 
ii. The US approach 
 The SEP owner’s imposition of excessive royalties triggers a different evaluation 
under US antitrust law. In contrast with Article 102 TFEU, the Sherman Act does not 
condemn exploitative licensing practices. Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits the 
undertaking to willfully acquire or maintain monopoly power on some basis other than 
merit.458 However, a SEP owner that has lawfully obtained its market power can 
                                                                                                                                                                  
University School of Law (Sep. 12, 2013), at 22; G. Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties, 9 
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charge any price the market can bear, without fearing antitrust liability under Section 
2 of the Sherman Act. 
 The SEP owner’s imposition of exploitative licensing conditions does not 
constitute anticompetitive conduct even if such exploitation was possible because of 
the SEP owner’s deceptive conduct. The D.C. Circuit made this point clear in Rambus, 
where it clarified that deceptive conduct during the standardization process may 
constitute a violation of Section 2 if it allows the SEP owner to unlawfully acquire 
market power. If it however only allows the SEP owner to charge higher prices, the 
conduct falls outside the domain of the Sherman Act.459 
 Liability could perhaps arise if the SEP owner imposes licensing conditions that 
allow it to monopolize the downstream market, or there is at least dangerous 
probability of such effect. In such case, the SEP owner’s licensing practice would 
require a different legal evaluation and could constitute an anticompetitive conduct 
actionable under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. However, actions brought against SEP 
owners generally do not include references to a possible exclusionary effect of the SEP 
owner’s licensing strategy.460  
Section 5 of the FTCA also has limited applicability in addressing the SEP 
owner’s imposition of exploitative licensing conditions. In the N-Data case, the FTC 
challenged the imposition of excessive prices as a Section 5 standalone violation.461 
The National Semiconductor Corporation (National) participated in the 
standardization procedure of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
(IEEE) and offered to license its technology for a one-time fee of $1,000. Later on, 
National sold its SEPs to Vertical Networks which sold them further to N-Data. At the 
time of the licensing stipulation, N-Data refused to license its SEPs for $1,000 offered 
by the original SEP owner and demanded manufacturers to pay a higher royalty. The 
FTC brought an action against N-Data, maintaining that its conduct constituted an 
act of unfair competition. The FTC acknowledged that N-Data’s conduct did not 
constitute an act of monopolization, it however maintained that the conduct fell 
squarely within the parameters of the DuPont case, often considered the case which 
                                                 
459 Rambus Incorporated v. F.T.C., 522 F. 3d 456, 464-466 (D.C. Circuit, 2008). 
460 See, e.g., id. (where the FTC challenged Rambus’ imposition of excessive royalties, but did not 
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established the principles of the Section 5 standalone violation.462 The FTC 
maintained that N-Data’s conduct was both oppressive and coercive, given that it 
attempted to exploit the manufacturers locked into the use of the standard.463 The 
FTC also maintained that there was little doubt that N-Data’s conduct was harmful to 
consumers, which could be harmed directly, if they had to pay higher prices, but also 
indirectly, if the manufacturers became less willing to participate in standardization 
activities.464 It thus suggested that the conduct was a standalone violation of Section 5 
of the FTCA. 
The decision to challenge the N-data’s conduct as a Section 5 standalone offence 
was not uncontroversial. The dissenting opinion of Commissioner Majoras emphasized 
that the FTC failed to clearly state the elements of the Section 5 standalone offence.465 
The FTC did not provide a clear test that would allow SEP owners to determine 
whether the imposed licensing conditions are within the border of legality, or they 
could constitute an act of unfair competition. Finally, the dissent also pointed out that 
the FTC did not prove that N-Data’s conduct had any anticompetitive purpose, nor 
that it lacked a valid business justification. Commissioner Majoras noted that the 
decision to increase the level of royalties could have been motivated by a legitimate 
business reason.466 She further explained that even if N-Data’s conduct was motivated 
by a desire to strike a better royalty compensation, this “alone should not be 
considered a competition-related offense.”467 
N-Data was concluded with a consent order, in which N-Data agreed not to 
enforce its SEPs unless it has first offered a license based on the terms offered by the 
original SEP owner.468 There was hence no determination as to whether the 
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challenged conduct violated Section 5 of the FTCA. As a result, it remains 
questionable whether the FTC’s action would be successful if challenged in court.  
It seems however unlikely that in the future the FTC would bring similar cases 
under Section 5 of the FTCA. In the N-Data case, the FTC’s concerns were very 
similar to the one expressed by the European Commission in the IPCom case: the FTC 
was particularly concerned that the N-Data-type conduct could allow participants of 
the standardization process to bypass the SSOs’ rules on FRAND commitments, by 
simply transferring their SEPs to a new entity.469 However, such conduct is unlikely to 
arise in future, given that most SSOs have implemented rules concerning the 
transferability of a FRAND commitment. In other words, the N-Data scenario is 
unlikely to arise in future cases. Secondly, it seems unlikely that the FTC would 
challenge under Section 5 of the FTCA the SEP owner’s imposition of excessive 
royalties. US courts and competition authorities have been traditionally reluctant to 
intervene in cases where the antitrust intervention would require them to determine 
the access terms, and thus act as price regulator.470 It is unlikely that a different 
approach would be adopted when dealing the SEP owner’s licensing practices.  
In sum, both Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 5 of the FTCA have a very 
limited applicability in addressing the SEP owner’s imposition of exploitative licensing 
conditions. As a result, cases of patent holdup will generally fall outside the domain of 
US antitrust law.  
2.2.B. The SEP owner’s request for an injunction  
One of the most controversial issues in the debate concerning SEPs is the SEP 
owner’s request for an injunction against infringers. Competition authorities on both 
sides of the Atlantic have expressed strong concerns with such practices, emphasizing 
that requesting an injunction against an infringer of FRAND-encumbered patents 
                                                 
469 Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, File No. 051-0094, 
F.T.C., at 1. 
470 The Supreme court emphasized this point in Trinko, where it suggested that “[a] problem should be 
deemed irremedia[ble] by antitrust law when [it] requires the court to assume the day-to-day controls 
characteristic of a regulatory agency” (Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, 
LLP, 540 US 398, 415 (2004). 
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could facilitate holdup.471 In the competition authorities’ view, the threat of being 
forced to pull the products out of the market−and suffer as a result a substantial 
financial loss—could force the infringer to accept onerous licensing conditions. The 
SEP owner’s request for an injunction could distort the licensing negotiation and 
enable the SEP owner to extract opportunistic licensing terms. 
i. The EU approach  
The European Commission has clearly shown the intention to address the SEP 
owner’s request for an injunction through Article 102 TFEU. The Commission 
addressed the SEP owner’s request for an injunction first in the investigation initiated 
against Motorola Mobility (Motorola), the owner of several SEPs for the 2G and 3G 
standards.472 The Commission explained that although seeking or enforcing an 
injunction is not in itself anticompetitive, it might in specific circumstances have 
anticompetitive effects and thus amount to an abuse of a dominant position. The 
Commission added that this would be the case when the SEP owner uses the threat of 
an injunction towards a willing licensee, that is, a licensee that is willing to accept 
FRAND licensing terms.  
The Commission was particularly concerned that Motorola used the threat of an 
injunction as a tool to force willing manufacturers of mobile devices—in particular 
Apple—to accept onerous licensing conditions for the use of SEPs. More specifically, 
the Commission was concerned that Motorola used the threat of an injunction as a tool 
to impose on Apple the agreement to not challenge the validity of Motorola’s SEPs.473 
The Commission maintained that Apple showed its willingness to accept FRAND 
licensing terms in particular by “accept[ing] to be bound by a German court’s 
determination of a FRAND royalty rate.”474 It added that “[t]he acceptance of binding 
third party determination for the terms of a FRAND licence . . . is a clear indication 
that a potential licensee is willing to enter into a FRAND licence.” The Commission 
                                                 
471 See, e.g., Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Opens Proceedings Against Motorola, IP/12/345 (Mar. 4, 2012); Complaint, 
Motorola Mobility LLC, and Google Inc., File No. 121 0120, F.T.C. (Jan 3, 2013); Complaint, Robert Bosch GmbH, Docket No. C-
4377, F.T.C. (Nov 26, 2012). 
472 Press Release, Antitrust: Commission opens proceedings against Motorola, IP/12/345 (Mar. 4, 
2012).  
473 Id. 
474 Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Motorola Mobility on 
Potential Misuse of Mobile Phone Standard-Essential Patents-Questions and Answers, MEMO/13/403 
(May 6, 2013).  
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explained that “the fact that the potential licensee challenges the validity, essentiality 
or infringement of the SEP does not make it unwilling where it otherwise agrees to be 
bound by the determination of FRAND terms by a third party.”475 Motorola allegedly 
tried to obtain licensing clauses that prohibited Apple to challenge the validity of 
Motorola’s SEPs, even after Apple had agreed to be bound by a third party 
determination of the FRAND terms. In the Commission’s preliminary view, such 
conduct constituted an abuse of a dominant position in violation of Article 102 
TFEU.476 
The Commission adopted a similar approach in the investigation it brought 
against Samsung, the owner of several 3G UMTS SEPs.477 Also in this case the 
Commission emphasized that seeking an injunction against a willing license amounts 
to an abuse of a dominant position in violation of Article 102 TFEU. The Commission 
was particularly concerned that Samsung was using the injunction as a tool to force 
manufacturers−in particular Apple−to agree on broad cross-licensing terms, which the 
manufacturer would not accept in absence of the threat of having its products 
excluded from the market.478 The Commission maintained that, based on its 
preliminary assessment, Apple was willing to enter into a licensing agreement on 
FRAND terms. Nevertheless, Samsung started judicial proceedings seeking 
injunctions against Apple. The Commission maintained that, based on its preliminary 
view, Samsung's behavior amounted to an abuse of a dominant market position.479 
In October 2013, Samsung offered to the Commission to abstain from seeking 
injunctions for a period of five years against any manufacturer that agrees to a 
particular licensing framework for Samsung’s SEPs.480 Joaquín Almunia, the Vice 
President of the European Commission Responsible for Competition Policy, 
nonetheless announced that the market test revealed that Samsung’s commitments 
were not sufficient to address the anticompetitive concerns and that the Commission 
“will take account of the feedback [received from markets participants] when we 
                                                 
475 Id. 
476 Id.  
477 Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Samsung on Potential 
Misuse of Mobile Phone Standard-Essential Patents, IP/12/1448 (Dec. 12, 2012). 
478 Id. 
479 Id.  
480 Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Consults on Commitments Offered by Samsung Electronics 
Regarding Use of Standard Essential Patents, IP/13/971 (Oct. 17, 2013) 
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discuss with Samsung possible improvements to their commitments.”481 As a result, 
the Commission did not accept the commitments initially offered by Samsung. The 
Commission nonetheless continued its talks with Samsung and it finally accepted 
Samsung’s commitments in April 2014.482 As part of the commitment decision, 
Samsung agreed to not seek injunctions for a period of five years against infringers 
“who sign up to a specified licensing framework”483 The framework provides that any 
dispute over what constitutes a FRAND royalty should be determined by a court, or if 
both parties agree, by an arbitrator.484 The licensing framework consists of (1) a 
negotiation of the licensing terms for a period of up to 12 months, and (2) if no 
agreement is reached, a third party determination of FRAND terms by a court if either 
party chooses, or by an arbitrator if both parties agree on this.485 
In April 2014, the Commission also adopted a decision against Motorola. 
Although as Samsung, Motorola was also negotiating with the Commission a possible 
commitment decision, the investigation ultimately resulted in an infringement 
decision. The Commission determined that by seeking and enforcing an injunction 
against Apple in front of a German court, Motorola abused its dominant position in 
violation of Article 102 TFEU.486 The Commission ordered Motorola to “eliminate the 
negative effects resulting from [its conduct].”487 It decided, however, to not to impose a 
fine on Motorola, since “there is no case-law by the European Union Courts dealing 
with the legality under Article 102 TFEU of SEP-based injunctions and that national 
courts have so far reached diverging conclusions on this question.”488  
The European Commission’s decision in Motorola represents the first case in 
which a competition authority found a SEP holder’s request (and enforcement) of an 
injunction anticompetitive. As of April 2014, it remains unclear whether Motorola will 
appeal the decision. Given the absence of a financial fine, it is possible that Motorola 
                                                 
481 Joaquín Almunia, Vice President of the European Commission Responsible for Competition Policy, 
Intellectual Property and Competition Policy, IP Summit 2013, Paris (Dec. 12, 2013).  
482 Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Accepts Legally Binding Commitments by Samsung 
Electronics on Standard Essential Patent Injunctions, IP/14/490 (Apr. 29, 2014). 
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486 Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Finds That Motorola Mobility Infringed EU Competition 
Rules by Misusing Standard Essential Patents, IP/14/489 (Apr. 29, 2104). 
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will not appeal the decision. One could nonetheless question, whether the Commission 
would be able to present valid case, if the decision was challenged in front of the ECJ.  
Antitrust doctrines developed in past cases suggest that SEP owner’s request for 
injunctive relief cannot automatically constitute an abuse of a dominant position. In 
ITT Promedia v. Commission, the ECJ noted that access to courts is a fundamental 
right and a general principle guaranteeing the rule of law. It explained that a legal 
proceeding, such as the request for injunctive relief, can constitute an abusive 
behavior “only in wholly exceptional circumstances.”489 The Commission added that 
such exceptional circumstance would arise if the initiation of the legal proceeding is 
not legally founded.490 However, not every SEP owner’s request for injunctive relief is 
legally unfounded. The Commission itself noted that there are circumstances in which 
the SEP owner can legitimately request the court to issue an injunction against an 
infringer of a FRAND-encumbered patent,491 for example, when the manufacturer 
refuses to pay a FRAND licensing fee. In order to prove that the SEP owner’s request 
for an injunction is anticompetitive, the Commission would thus have to show first 
that such request is not legally founded.  
While the Commission confirmed that only an injunction against a willing 
manufacturer triggers anticompetitive concerns, it did not provide a definition of 
“willingness.” Several questions remain open. Can the manufacturer refuse an offer 
made by the SEP owner and be still considered willing? Can the manufacturer refuse 
to negotiate the licensing terms? Does the manufacturer that is already using the 
SEPs have any duty towards the SEP owner?  
Those questions have not been answered by the ECJ or the European 
Commission. They have been nonetheless partially addressed by EU national courts, 
mainly in Germany and the Netherlands. Although the discussion of the approaches 
adopted by the national courts falls outside the domain of this book, it is worth noting 
that courts have adopted different positions in determining the steps that the licensee 
needs to take in order to be considered “willing,” and thus protected from the SEP 
                                                 
489 Case T-111/96, ITT Promedia NV v. Comm’n, E.C.R. II-02937, at 55 & 60 (1998). 
490 See, e.g., id at 55-56 (maintaining that in order to be considered anticompetitive the legal action 
must manifestly unfounded.).  
491 Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Motorola Mobility on 
Potential Misuse of Mobile Phone Standard-Essential Patents, IP/13/406 (May 6, 2013) (maintaining 
that the use of injunction might be justified against an unwilling licensee). 
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owner’s request of an injunction.492 German courts seems to have been more willing to 
grant SEP owners injunctions against implementers than courts in other jurisdiction. 
Although they recognized that the manufacturer might be able to avoid an injunction, 
they required the manufacturer to take some active steps during the negotiation 
process. The so called Orange book standard applied in Germany determines that that 
manufacturer can avoid an injunction only if (1) it makes an unconditional licensing 
offer that the SEP owner cannot reject, and (2) behaves as if the offer has been 
accepted. This requires the manufacturer that is already using the SEP to pay the 
corresponding licensing fee to the SEP owner. In other words, the manufacturer 
cannot avoid an injunction by simply stating that the offered licensing terms are not 
FRAND. 
In April 2013, the Düsseldorf court referred a question to the ECJ, asking the 
court to provide more guidance in evaluating the legitimacy of the SEP owner’s 
request for an injunction.493 When addressing the dispute between Huawei v. ZTE, the 
Düsseldorf court noted that there are contradicting standards applied at the national 
and EU level when allowing the SEP owner to request an injunction. In particular, the 
so called Orange book standard applied Germany, seems to be nonetheless in 
contradiction to the informal approach adopted by the European Commission when 
addressing the SEP owner’s request for injunction. In short, the referred questioned 
asked the ECJ to confirm the Orange book standard. As of April 2014, the ECJ has not 
addressed the question yet and none of the approaches has been (yet) recognized at 
the EU level.  
Further, even if the Commission finds that the SEP owner’s request for 
injunctive relief was not legally founded, this should not be sufficient to prove that the 
conduct is anticompetitive. A bad act cannot constitute an abusive behavior simply 
                                                 
492 See H. Ullrich, Patents and standards - a comment on the German Federal Supreme Court decision 
Orange Book Standard, International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law (2010) 
(discussing the approach adopted in Germany); G. Kuipers, D. Groenevelt and O. Lamme, A different 
perspective on Samsung v. Apple (De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek ed., 2011) (discussing the approach 
adopted in Netherlands). 
493 Vorabentscheidungsersuchen des Landgerichts Düsseldorf (Deutschland) eingereicht am 5. Apr. 
2013, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd gegen ZTE Corp., ZTE Deutschland GmbH, Rechtssache C-170/13, 
translated in Request for a Preliminary Ruling from the Landgericht Düsseldorf (Germany) lodged on 
Apr. 5, 2013, Huawei v. ZTE, Case C-170/13, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=139489&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&
mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=42242. 
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because undertaken by a dominant company. As the ECJ explained in AstraZeneca, 
the dominant undertaking’s misconduct must have an anticompetitive effect in order 
to constitute an abuse of a dominant position.494 Therefore, to show that the SEP 
holder’s request an enforcement of an injunction constitutes an abuse of a dominant 
position, the Commission would have to prove that such conduct imposes 
anticompetitive effects on the market. 
The Commission suggested that the SEP owner’s request for an injunction might 
have an anticompetitive effect, if it unduly distorts the licensing negotiation, and 
forces the manufacturer to accept exploitative licensing terms. This could have a 
negative effect on the manufacturer’s ability to compete in the downstream market, at 
the detriment of consumers. The Commission has thus adequately stated the potential 
anticompetitive effects that the SEP owner’s use of an injunction might have on the 
market. Also in this case, however, there is a considerable disagreement in the 
economic theory concerning the effects the SEP owner’s request for an injunction 
might have on the market. Although some commentators suggest that the use of 
injunctions fosters the risk of patent holdup, others have criticized this position. They 
suggested that courts are well equipped to reject to issue of an injunction if the 
circumstances of the case suggest that use of the remedy is not desirable.495 In their 
view, there is consequently little possibility that the mere threat of an injunction could 
allow the SEP owner to hold up a manufacturer. Further, one could question whether 
the Motorola’s requirement not challenge the validity of its SEPs could truly have 
anticompetitive effect. Although it is true that consumers should not have to pay for 
invalid or non-infringed patents, consumers might benefit from the companies 
agreements that avoid costly litigation. Antitrust has traditionally not prohibited 
calculates, and there seems be no valid reason to adopt a different approach in the 
context of SEPs.496  
                                                 
494 Compare: Case C-457/10 P AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc v European Commission, ECR Pag 
00000, 99 (2012) (maintaining that a mere deceptive behavior, even if undertaken by a dominant 
company, does not constitute an abuse of a dominant position if it has no anticompetitive effects).  
495 P. Camesasca, G. Langus, D. Neven & P. Treacy, Injunctions for Standard-Essential Patents: 
Justice Is Not Blind, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 285 (2013). 
496 See, e.g., Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to technology transfer agreements, C 89 57 (2014) ¶ 176 (“In sectors where large 
numbers of intellectual property rights exist and where individual products may infringe upon a 
number of existing and future property rights, license agreements whereby the parties agree not to 
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In sum, the SEP owner’s request for an injunction might constitute an abuse of a 
dominant position, however, such liability is far from automatic. To show that the SEP 
holder’s request for an injunction is anticompetitive, the Commission would have to 
shows that the request for an injunction was both legally unfounded and that such 
request had anticompetitive effects.  
ii. The U.S. approach 
The SEP owner’s use of injunctions was similarly scrutinized through the 
provisions of US antitrust law. The FTC first challenged the SEP owner’s use of an 
injunction in the Bosch case, concerning a merger between Robert Bosch GmbH 
(Bosch) and SPX Service Solutions (SPX).497 While evaluating the merger between the 
two companies, the FTC raised the issue regarding Bosch’s SEPs. More specifically, 
the FTC addressed the use of injunctions against infringers of Bosch’s SEPs. Both 
Bosch and SPX are active in the market for air-conditioning recovery, recycling, and 
recharging systems (“ACRRR”) for motor vehicles, generally produced in compliance 
with a specific industry standard. SPX, the owner of several SEPs relevant for this 
standard, sued several competing manufacturers for infringing its SEPs and sought 
against them injunctive relief. Following the commencement of the suits, the SSO 
demanded SPX to commit to grant its SEPs on FRAND terms. SPX agreed; it 
nevertheless did not stop its initiated prosecutions against some of the manufacturers. 
The FTC brought an action against Bosch, maintaining that by seeking an injunction, 
SPX breached its FRAND commitment. In the view of the FTC, the injunction would 
have exclude its willing competitors from the market, and it would have caused, or 
threatened to cause, harm to competition. The FTC also maintained the conduct, if left 
unchecked, would tend to undermine the vitality of the standard-setting process.498 It 
thus maintained that the SPX’s request for an injunction amounted to a violation of 
Section 5 of the FTCA.  
The FTC also challenged the SEP owner’s use of an injunction in the 
investigation initiated against Motorola Mobility/Google.499 As the Commission’s 
                                                                                                                                                                  
assert their property rights against each other are often pro-competitive because they allow the parties 
to develop their respective technologies without the risk of subsequent infringement claims.”). 
497 Robert Bosch GmbH, Docket No. C-4377, F.T.C. (Nov 26, 2012). 
498 Id. at ¶ 19-20.  
499 Complaint, Motorola Mobility LLC, and Google Inc., File No. 121 0120, F.T.C. (Jan 3, 2013). 
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investigation in the EU, the FTC challenged Motorola’s use of injunctions against 
manufacturers that violated Motorola’s SEPs. The FTC alleged that Motorola used the 
threat of the injunction as a tool to force some manufacturers to accept non-FRAND 
terms, and in this way, engaged in an unfair method of competition in violation of 
Section 5 of the FTCA.500  
The FTC’s decision to challenge the SEP owner’s request for an injunction as a 
Section 5 standalone offence was not uncontroversial. First, with respect to the Robert 
Bosch’s investigation, one could question whether it was appropriate to raise the 
question of the use of an injunction within a merger review. Next, the dissenting 
Commissioners, Ohlhausen and Rosch, emphasized that the FTC failed to state the 
elements of the Section 5 standalone offence.501 In other words, although the FTC 
recognized that the challenged conduct did not meet the elements of the 
monopolization or attempted monopolization offence, it did not clarify what elements 
were taken into account when concluding that the SEP owner’s use of an injunction 
amounted to a Section 5 standalone offence.  
The two complaints were finally concluded with consent orders, in which Bosch 
and Motorola agreed to withdraw their claims for injunctive relief for FRAND-
encumbered SEPs against willing licensees.502 The consent agreements might have 
helped to address the concerns raised by the FTC, but they did not clarify the scope of 
Section 5 of the FTCA. Therefore, also under US antitrust law none of the cases has 
determined whether, and under which conditions, the SEP owner’s request for an 
injunction could constitute an act of unfair competition under Section 5 of the FTCA. 
As the European Commission, the FTC also held that a SEP owner should be able to 
use an injunction against an unwilling licensee.503 The FTC (like the EU) failed to 
provide a definition of a willing licensee. Even if one accepts that the SEP owner’s 
                                                 
500 Id. at ¶ 3. 
501 Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Motorola Mobility LLC and Google 
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request for an injunction might constitute a Section 5 standalone offence, it remains 
far from clear when the use of an injunction is illegitimate.  
The FTC might face an additional constrains when challenging the SEP owner’s 
request for an injunction as a Section 5 violation, that is not present under EU 
competition law. Past cases suggest that it might be difficult for the FTC to prove that 
the SEP owner’s request for an injunction is unfair unless explicitly prohibited by the 
SSO’s rules.504 The Rambus case provides a clear explanation of this point. In bringing 
its action against Rambus, the FTC maintained that Rambus’ failure to disclose its 
patent interest during the standardization process was unfair, because—although not 
in violation of the exact words of the SSO’s rule—it was in violation of its “spirit”. The 
ALJ however refused to consider Rambus’ conduct unfair, maintaining that in absence 
of a duty to disclose its patent interest, Rambus had a legitimate business justification 
not to disclose its patent interest. In absence of a duty to disclose the relevant patent 
interest, the failure to disclose its patent interest could not be considered unfair.505 
This position was later confirmed also by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 
which criticized the FTC decision to consider Rambus’ conduct unfair, although not in 
violation of the SSO’s rules.506 Courts could adopt a similar approach in the SEP 
context. They could consider that the SEP owner has a legitimate reason to the use an 
injunction against infringers, unless such practice is explicitly prohibited by the SSO’s 
rules.  
Further, even when the FTC shows that the use of the injunction is not 
legitimate, proving a violation of the FTCA would require evidence of an 
anticompetitive effect.507 The FTC did list several anticompetitive effect. It suggested 
that, by keeping some of the goods out of the market, the injunction (if granted) might 
deprive consumers of the access to goods they are willing to buy, and diminishes the 
                                                 
504 Cases addressed outside the SEP context suggest that in order to prove a standalone violation of 
Section 5 of the FTCA, the FTC needs to first prove the existence of an unfair conduct (Sperry & 
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competition in the product market.508 The use of the injunction may allow the SEP 
owner to hold up manufacturers and force them to pay excessive licensing fees that go 
beyond the value of the SEPs.509 This might in turn harm consumers if higher prices 
are passed on to them.510 The FTC also suggested that the use of an injunction might 
impose an indirect harm on consumers if it hinders the manufacturers’ incentives to 
develop standard compliant products, and undermines the vitality of the standard-
setting process.511 However, a mere statement that the use of an injunction would have 
such effects will generally not be sufficient to prove a violation, but the FTC would 
have to prove that such effects have actually arisen in practice.512 
 In sum, Section 5 of the FTCA might allow the FTC to challenge the SEP owner’s 
use of injunction against infringers of FRAND encumbered patents. The FTC has also 
shown the intention to address those practices as a standalone violation. For now, 
however, the exact reach of the provisions remains yet to be defined. It seems, 
nevertheless, that even if applied outside the borders of the Sherman Act, Section 5 of 
the FTCA would still have a narrower scope that Article 102 TFEU. In particular, the 
FTC might have to meet a stricter burden of proof when showing the anticompetitive 
effects of the SEP owner’s request for an injunction, and might face stricter limitations 
when challenging the conduct of a SEP owner that does not compete in the 
downstream market. 
 
2.3. Licensing practices that harm rivals’ ability to compete  
2.3.A. The EU approach  
So far, I have discussed licensing practices that have either exclusionary or 
exploitative effects on the market. The SEP owner might impose, nonetheless, also 
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 163 
 
licensing conditions that not merely exploit the manufacturer, but also harm its ability 
to compete (without however excluding it from the market). I will call this licensing 
practice as practices that harm rivals’ ability to compete. For example, the SEP owner 
can harm rival’s ability to compete by imposing licensing condition that increase the 
manufacturer’s production costs. The risk of such practice has been pointed out in 
Research in Motion v. Motorola.513 Motorola, a manufacturer of mobile devices, but 
also the owner of several SEPs, allegedly licensed its SEPs under non-FRAND terms 
to other manufacturers of mobile devices, among which was Research in Motion (RIM). 
RIM brought an action against Motorola, maintaining that Motorola’s licensing 
practices would raise the prices for all mobile devices, except for its own. RIM argued 
that the increased cost would harm the rivals’ ability to compete in the market for 
mobile devices.514 
The SEP owner might also impose non-price related licensing conditions that 
harm the manufacturer’s ability to compete. Apple for example accused Samsung of 
having engaged in “a relentless campaign of illegal and abusive assertions of its 
declared-essential patents to try to coerce Apple into tolerating Samsung’s continuing 
imitation of the distinctive designs and patented features that are hallmarks of 
Apple’s iPhone and iPad products.”515 Such practice could deprive Apple of the 
competitive advantage it has in the market by virtue of its IPRs. 
The described licensing practices do not impose an imminent risk of exclusion. 
They might nonetheless harm the manufacturers’ ability to compete in that market. 
So far, competition authorities and courts have devoted relatively little attention to 
those type of practices. Perhaps, this can be partly attributed to the fact that past 
cases often concerned SEP owners that were not active in the downstream market, 
and had consequently no interest in harming the manufacturers’ ability to compete.516 
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However, these incentives might have changed in light of the recent patent 
acquisitions concerning SEPs, where the SEP owner often directly or indirectly 
competes in the downstream market. 
Despite the limited number of precedents, doctrines developed outside of the 
standardization context suggest some general guidelines in addressing licensing 
practice that harm rivals’ ability to compete. The SEP owner’s imposition of such 
licensing conditions could constitute an abuse of a dominant position in violation of 
Article 102 TFEU. As other dominant undertakings, a dominant SEP owner has a 
special responsibility to abstain from any conduct that “impairs undistorted 
competition in the market”.517 The imposition of licensing conditions that 
illegitimately hinders manufacturers’ ability to compete in the product market, and 
allows the SEP owner to obtain a competitive advantage, does not comply with the 
special responsibility and might constitute an abusive behavior. 
Cases of margin squeeze might provide valid guidelines. A margin squeeze can 
occur where a firm is dominant in an upstream market and supplies a key input to an 
undertaking that competes with it in a downstream market. The dominant 
undertaking can charge its input at a price that affects the competitor’s ability to 
compete in the downstream market, by squeezing its margins to insufficient levels.518 
The ECJ confirmed that the dominant undertaking’s margin squeeze can violate 
Article 102 TFEU.519 It explained that if “the spread does not allow a competitor which 
is as efficient as that undertaking to compete for the supply of those services to end 
users” the conduct constitutes an independent abuse of a dominant position.520 The 
ECJ also adopted a relatively low standard of proof. It explained that a margin 
squeeze might constitute an abuse of a dominant position even in the absence of 
evidence of exclusionary effects.521 It clarified that “the fact that the desired result, 
namely the exclusion of those competitors, is not ultimately achieved does not alter its 
                                                 
517 Case 322/81 NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin NV v. Commission, ECR 03461, ¶ 57 
(1983); Joined Cases C 395/96 P and C 396/96 P Compagnie maritime belge transports and Others v. 
Commission, ECR I-01365, at 37 (2000); Case C-280/08 Deutsche Telekom AG v. European Commission, 
ECR I-09555, ¶ 83 (2010); Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB, ECR I-00527, ¶ 
25 (2011). 
518 R. WHICH & D. BAILEY, COMPETITION LAW, 7th ed., at 754 (Oxford University Press 2012). 
519 See, e.g., Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission, ECR II-477 (2008); Case C-52/09, 
ECR I-000 (2001); Deutsche Telekom OJ [2003] L 263/9. 
520 Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige, ECR I-000 (2011), ¶¶ 30-32. 
521 Id. at 61 (citing Deutsche Telekom v. Commission, at 250 & 251). 
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categorization as abuse within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU.”522 The ECJ added 
that the anticompetitive effect does “not necessarily have to be concrete, and it is 
sufficient to demonstrate that there is an anti-competitive effect which may 
potentially exclude [as efficient] competitors.”523 It concluded that it is sufficient to 
prove that competition is strongly weakened because of the dominant undertaking’s 
anticompetitive conduct.524 
The doctrine developed in margin squeeze cases suggests that the SEP owner’s 
pricing strategy that harms rival’s ability to compete could constitute an abuse of a 
dominant position. This would be the case when the SEP owner charges a licensing fee 
for its SEPs that squeezes the profits of the “as efficient” manufacturer to insufficient 
level. Past cases also suggest that the Commission would have to meet a relatively low 
standard of proof. It would not have to show evidence of exclusion, but merely that the 
SEP owner’s licensing practice has “strongly weakened” competition in the market. 
Several questions remain nonetheless open. In particular, it remains unclear 
whether the Commission and the ECJ would be willing to extend the margins squeeze 
doctrine to the SEP context, given that so far it has been applied mainly in the 
telecommunication sector, a regulated industry.  
It is also questionable whether the Commission could condemn the SEP owner’s 
imposition on non-price based licensing conditions that harm rival’s ability to compete. 
For example, can the SEP owner face an antitrust liability for imposing an over-
inclusive cross-licensing requirement that harm the manufacturer’s ability to 
compete? The Commission has certainly expressed concerns with such licensing 
practices. In the case it brought against Samsung, for example, the Commission 
maintained that it is concerned that by using the threat of an injunction Samsung was 
able to impose “licensing terms, such as broad cross-licenses, which a licensee would 
not agree to, absent the threat.”525 However, those cases fall outside the margin 
squeeze doctrine which focuses on a cost analysis. It is hence questionable where the 
Commission could challenge such practices under any existent competition law 
doctrine. 
                                                 
522 Id. at 65. 
523 Id. at 64. 
524 Id. at 563. 
525 Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Consults on Commitments Offered by Samsung Electronics 
Regarding Use of Standard Essential Patents, IP/13/971 (Oct. 17, 2013). 
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In sum, although the SEP owner’s licensing practices that harm the 
manufacturer’s ability to compete might be considered abusive, a liability is likely to 
arise only in cases that would fall under the margin squeeze doctrine. Other cases, 
particularly those that do not focus on a cost analysis, are unlikely to be considered 
anticompetitive. 
2.3.B. The US approach  
The legal analysis is again different under US antitrust law, where a SEP owner 
is less likely to face antitrust liability for the imposition of licensing conditions that 
harm the manufacturer’s ability to compete. As maintained by the Supreme Court 
“even an act of pure malice by one business competitor against another does not, 
without more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws”, without proof of “a 
dangerous probability that [the defendant] would monopolize [the] market.”526 
Although the Supreme Court’s decisions are not always consistent,527 today’s approach 
suggests that in absence of a dangerous probability of market monopolization, the 
conduct will not be considered anticompetitive. Areeda and Hovenkamp noted that 
“when there is no realistic threat that the second market will become monopolized as a 
result of the defendant’s activity, the statutory language [of Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act] simply does not apply.” 528 Therefore, a licensing practice that harms rivals’ 
ability to compete, but has not prospect of monopolization, will be generally not 
considered anticompetitive under the Sherman Act. 
                                                 
526 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. 209 (1993). See also: Levine v. Central Fla. Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 
1538, 1555 (11th Cir.1996) (“To establish a violation of Section 2 for attempted monopolization, `a 
plaintiff must show (1) an intent to bring about a monopoly and (2) a dangerous probability of success.” 
(citing Norton Tire Co. v. Tire Kingdom Co., 858 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir.1988)). 
527 There are occasions in which the companies have been condemned for harming rivals’ ability to 
compete that had no prospect of monopolization. In United States v. Griffith, for instance, the Supreme 
Court maintained that the use of monopoly power to gain a competitive advantage in a secondary 
market, through practices such as raising their costs, or making the rivals’ offers less attractive, could 
violate Section 2, even if there is not dangerous probability to obtain a monopoly. United States v. 
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107-109 (1948). (“The use of monopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to 
foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitors, is unlawful”. See 
also: Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263. 276. For discussion see: P. AREEDA & H. 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, Vol. 3, at 
93, (2nd ed. Aspen Publ. 2002).  
528 Id. at 89. See also: H. Hovenkamp, The Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act, 62 
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW 1, 12 (2010) (maintaining that Section of the Sherman Act does not contemplate a 
monopoly leveraging claim).  
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US antitrust law has also adopted a very different approach towards margin 
squeeze cases than the one applied in the EU. In contrast to the ECJ, the Supreme 
Court held in Pacific Bell v linkLine that it does not recognize margin squeezes as a 
standalone form of anticompetitive conduct.529 The Supreme Court further emphasized 
that intervening in cases of margins squeeze might be particularly controversial 
because of the absence of clear antitrust rules.530 “[F]irms that seek to avoid price-
squeeze liability will have no safe harbor for their pricing practices.”531‘ 
Applying this reasoning to the context of SEPs suggests that the SEP owner’s 
licensing practice that increases rival’s cost, but does not allow an anticompetitive 
acquisition or maintenance of market power is not in violation of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.  
Areeda and Hovenkamp nevertheless suggested that there are some exceptions to 
the general rule that conduct that has no prospect of monopolization falls outside the 
domain of Section 2. In their view, courts could apply Section 2 to conduct that harms 
rivals’ ability to compete, but nonetheless does not allow monopolization of the 
market, if the following elements are met: (1) the undertaking does business in the 
secondary market, (2) the target market is properly defined (referring to the market 
where competition is harmed), and (3) the conduct puts competitors in the secondary 
market in a competitive disadvantage by raising their costs or making their offerings 
less attractive. The test suggested by Areeda and Hovenkamp could be easily applied 
to the SEPs context, suggesting that Section 2 might capture also some SEP owner’s 
imposition of licensing terms that do not allow the monopolization of the market, but 
nevertheless harm rivals’ ability to compete, by increasing their production costs.  
Given the lack of precedents, courts might be nevertheless reluctant to impose 
antitrust liability for a SEP owner’s licensing practices that do not have any prospect 
of monopolization. This was clearly shown in RIM v Motorola,532 where RIM 
maintained that Motorola used its SEPs to increase rivals’ costs. RIM maintained that 
“Even if Motorola’s conduct does not eliminate competition entirely, it has the power 
                                                 
529 Pacific Bell Telephone v linkline Comm’n., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1119 (2009). 
530 Id. at 1121. 
531 Id. at 1121. 
532 Research in Motion Limited v. Motorola Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788, (Dist. Court, ND Texas, 2008). 
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to harm it.”533 It added that if Motorola licenses only at exorbitant rates, it will force 
its competitors to increase prices in the downstream market in order to make a profit. 
This increases the prices for all products except for Motorola.534 The District court 
recognized that by increasing rivals’ cost, Motorola could affect the competition in the 
product market. However, it did not determine whether such conduct constitutes a 
violation of the Sherman Act. RIM ultimately won the case. The court nonetheless 
based its decision on a different theory of harm: it maintained that Motorola violated 
Section 2 by falsely committing to license its patents on FRAND terms, and thus 
monopolized the technology market.535 This supports the proposition that US courts 
might be reluctant to condemn under the Sherman Act licensing practices that merely 
harm rivals’ ability to compete, unless there is evidence that the conduct resulted in 
the monopolization of the market, or there is at least a dangerous probability of such 
effect. A similar conclusion can be drawn for cases where the SEP owner harms rival’s 
ability to compete by imposing non-price related licensing condition.  
                                                 
533 Id. at. 794. 
534 Id. 
535 Id. at. 796.  
536 The District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin adopted a similar approach in the dispute 
between SanDisk and Kingston Technology Co., Inc. and Kingston Technology Corp. (hereafter 
Kingston) competitors in the market for USB flash memory drives. SanDisk owned several SEPs for the 
productions of USB flash memory drives. Anyone selling flash memory systems in the United States 
needed to obtain a SanDisk’s license. SanDisk offered to its potential licensees only a worldwide and 
non-exclusive cross-licenses for its full portfolio, and it did not license its patents individually, or vary 
the royalty rate according to the number of patents the licensee used. Kingston argued that SanDisk’s 
licensing practices forced licensees to pay higher royalties, thus increasing their costs and ultimately 
driving them out of the market. Kingston brought an action under Section 1, the provision of antitrust 
law prohibiting conspiracies, i.e. agreements, in restraint of trade (perhaps the plaintiff choose to relay 
of Section 1 rather than Section 2, because of the lower threshold to prove an antitrust liability). 
Kingston claimed that SanDisk’s licensing conditions restrained trade beyond the legal monopoly that 
patents extend to their holders. Because Kingston did not allege that SanDisk’s licensing agreements 
was per se unreasonable restraints, the court analyzed the licensing agreements under the "rule of 
reason”, which requires "an inquiry into market power and market structure designed to assess a 
[restraint's] actual effect." The court however refused to find the practice anticompetitive. It recognized 
that the licensing practice can be anticompetitive. It however emphasized that the plaintiff needs to 
prove that (i) the licensing terms exceeded the scope of its patents and (ii) that the licenses have an 
anticompetitive effect. The Court however determined that Kingston failed to prove the anticompetitive 
effects of SankDisk practice. Kingston provided evidences that the number of aggregator and reseller 
firms operating in the USB flash memory drives market has fallen and several large firms have reduced 
their sales. The court found that it failed to prove that these changes would affect the competition in the 
market and increase prices or decrease output. Because the court found that the market actually 
remained competitive despite SanDisk’s conduct, it refused to find the conduct anticompetitive. 
(SanDisk Corp., v. Kingston Technology Co., Inc. and Kingston Technology Corp., No. 10-cv-243-bbc 
(Dist. Court, W.D. Wisconsin). 
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Finally, it remains unclear whether SEP owner’s licensing conditions that harm 
rivals’ ability to compete could trigger liability as a Section 5 standalone violation. So 
far, the FTC has not scrutinized such licensing practices under Section 5 of the FTCA. 
The provision might nonetheless provide a valid tool to addressing those practices. 
Hovenkamp suggested that Section 5 seems well suited to address a case where the 
undertaking uses the monopoly power in one market to harm competition in a 
secondary market. He noted the ability to address those kinds of conduct might be 
particularly important in dominated networks. This might be aptly the case in the 
standardization context, where the SEP owner might dominate the technology market, 
and use such position to affect competition in the product market. In the future, the 
FTC might thus consider addressing SEP owner’s licensing practices as a standalone 
violation of Section 5 of the FTCA. For now, however, the scope of the provision seems 
to coincide with that of the Sherman Act. 
However, the FTC might face particularly strong limitations in challenging the 
SEP owner’s practices that harm rivals’ ability to compete in cases where the SEP is 
in the hands of an NPE. In the past, courts have refused to find a violation of Section 5 
of the FTCA because the monopolist did not participate in the market where 
competition was affected, and therefore had no anticompetitive intent. In Official 
Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC,537 the court refused to find the monopolist’s conduct 
anticompetitive because the monopolist did not compete in the market where 
competition was allegedly affected. The case concerned the conduct of Official Airline 
Guides, Inc. (AOG), a monopolist in the publishing of flight schedules, which refused 
to provide information about commuter airlines’ connecting flights, while providing 
connecting flight information for major carriers in its guide. The FTC maintained that 
the AOG’s decision tended to lessen competition in the market for air transportation 
by harming the excluded carriers’ ability to compete, and thus constituted an act of 
unfair competition. The court agreed that the publisher’s conduct could be harmful. It 
nevertheless refused to find a violation of Section 5, given that the publisher did not 
compete in the air transport market and consequently did not have an interest in 
                                                 
537 Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. F.T.C., 630 F. 2d 920 (2nd Cir. 1980). 
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harming competition in it.538 This suggests that it might be difficult for the FTC to 
apply Section 5 to an NPE, which does not compete in the market of standard 
compliant goods, and has no intent to harm competition in it.  
In sum, EU competition law and US antitrust law are likely to lead to different 
results when scrutinizing the SEP owner’s licensing practices that harm rivals’ ability 
to compete. Liability is more likely to arise in the EU, where Article 102 TFEU 
enables the Commission to address the conduct of a dominant undertaking that only 
aims at harming rivals, without however excluding them from the market. The 
situation is different in the United States, where, in absence of any prospect of 
monopolization, the conduct falls outside the domain of US antitrust law. 
 
 
3. THE LIMITATION IN ADDRESSING THE STRATEGIC USE OF SEPs 
The analysis has shown that SEP owner’s strategic licensing practices might 
impose several negative effects on the market. The SEP owner might exclude 
manufacturers form the product market, exploit them, or impose on them licensing 
conditions that harm manufacturers’ ability to compete. The analysis also shows that 
neither jurisdiction has clearly defined the limits competition law poses on SEP 
owner’s licensing practices. In other words, the exact limits competition law imposes 
on the SEP owner’s licensing practices remain unclear. 
Applying existing principles and precedents suggests that the application of EU 
competition law and U.S. antitrust law might lead to different outcomes in several 
circumstances. First, the SEP owner might face a different liability for refusing to 
license its SEP. The SEP owner’s refusal to license might constitute an abuse of a 
dominant position in violation of Article 102 TFEU if the exceptional-circumstances 
requirement is met. A liability could arise under EU competition law even if the SEP 
owner has not committed to license its SEPs on FRAND terms. In the US, the outcome 
is less clear. Courts have been generally reluctant to consider a refusal to license 
anticompetitive, and a same patter might be adopted in the context of SEPs. However, 
                                                 
538 The Court was concerned that “enforcement of the FTC’s order here would give the FTC too much 
power to substitute its own business judgment for that of the monopolist in any decision that arguably 
affects competition in another industry.” Id. at. 927. 
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the analysis has shown that past doctrines do not necessarily exclude an antitrust 
liability for a refusal to license a FRAND-encumbered patent. Hence, a SEP owner’ 
refusal to license might considered anticompetitive also under US antitrust law, 
although such outcome is far less likely than in the EU. 
The two legal systems differ also in their approach to the SEP owner’s imposition of 
exploitative licensing conditions. A licensing practice that has mere exploitative effects 
does not constitute an anticompetitive conduct under the Sherman Act: it is not a 
harm that the antitrust law aims to prevent. Consequently, it is unlikely that the SEP 
owner would face a liability under Section 2 for imposing on the manufacturer 
exploitative licensing conditions. The FTC did challenge some exploitative licensing 
practices as a Section 5 standalone offense. In particular, it applied the provision to 
address the SEP owner’s use of injunctions. Those investigations have been however 
concluded with consent decrees, without determining whether, and under which 
conditions, the imposition of exploitative licensing conditions could trigger a liability 
under Section 5 of the FTCA.  
On the contrary, a SEP owner that imposes exploitative licensing terms on the 
manufacturer is more likely to face a liability under EU competition law, since Article 
102 TFEU prohibits not only practices that have exclusionary effects but also those 
that result in a mere exploitation. However, the intervention towards exploitative 
practices remains controversial. Even under EU competition law, where Article 102 
TFEU provides the legal basis to address a large spectrum of licensing practices, the 
desirability of such intervention remains questionable. The lack of a clear legal test 
that would allow the distinction between high, but legitimate licensing fees, and those 
that are exploitative, injects legal uncertain regarding the intervention, opens the door 
for erroneous decisions, and favors the strategic use of anticompetitive claims. At the 
same time, the antitrust intervention towards exploitative practices might have little 
added value, since manufacturers that believe that the SEP owner has made them a 
non-FRAND offer are generally able to challenge the licensing offer in court, as part of 
a contract law dispute. Therefore, even if the intervention towards exploitative 
licensing practices is legally possible, from a policy perspective competition law may 
not be the most adequate tool to address those practices.  
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Finally, the competition law provisions have also a different scope in challenging 
the SEP owner’s imposition of licensing practices that harm rivals’ ability to compete. 
A SEP owner is more likely to face a liability under EU competition law, since a lower 
standard of proof is generally required to show a violation of Article 102 TFEU. A 
liability is, on the other hand, much less likely under US antitrust law. Unless a 
licensing practice is likely to result in monopolization of the market, or there is a 
dangerous probability of such effect, courts will be reluctant to find a conduct that 
merely harms the rivals’ ability to compete (but has not exclusionary effect) in 
violation of the Sherman Act. The outcome could be perhaps different if the conduct is 
challenged as a Section 5 standalone violation, but the FTC has not yet applied the 
provision to address those types of practices.  
The differences between EU competition law and US antitrust law in addressing 
the SEP owner’s strategic licensing practices are not particularly surprising, given 
that similar divergences can be found outside the SEPs context. The divergent 
approach towards exclusionary practices is present also in other areas. Similarly, 
practices that harm to rivals’ ability are generally able to trigger an antitrust liability 
under EU competition law, whereas they are not considered an antitrust violation in 
the US.  
What is perhaps more interesting is that in both jurisdictions there is an increasing 
attention for exploitative licensing practices. For a long time, exploitative abuses have 
been considered as not being a relevant antitrust concern. The situation seems to be 
different in the context of SEPs, where both EU and U.S. competition authorities have 
shown their willingness to intervene. As explained, however, such intervention 
remains controversial.  
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Chapter VII 
INTERIM OBSERVATIONS: DIVERGENCES, LEGAL GAPS, 
AND LEGAL UNCERTAINTY  
The analysis of the SEP owners’ potential antitrust liability shows several 
important results. First, it is evident that SEP owners’ opportunistic conduct might 
have anticompetitive effects. Both deceptive practices during the standardization 
process, as well as the strategic licensing practices might have adverse effects on 
competition. It is consequently clear that competition law can play a role in addressing 
the SEP owners’ opportunistic conducts. The analysis however unveils that EU 
competition law and US antitrust law have different abilities to address the SEP 
owners’ conduct. The different scope of EU competition law and US antitrust law in 
addressing the SEP owner’s behavior is represented in Table 1.  
 
 TABLE I: SEP OWNERS’ LIABILITY UNDER ARTICLE 102 TFEU, SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT, AND 
SECTION 5 OF THE FTCA 
  
(≈) = the liability coincides with Section 2 
(*) = the result is merely speculative 
 
On one hand, there are important divergences between the role competition law 
plays in addressing the SEP owner’s deceptive practices during the standardization 
process. Article 102 TFEU applies only to the deceptive practice of a SEP owner that 
had a dominant position at the time of the deception. However, only a limited number 
of SEP owners fall in this group. The majority of the participants obtain strong market 
SEP OWNERS’ LIABILITY: Article 102 TFEU Section 2  Section 5 
Patent ambush  only dominant  YES (if exclusionary) ≈ 
False FRAND only dominant  YES (if exclusionary) ≈ 
Refusal to license YES  YES* ≈ 
Patent holdup  YES  NO NO* 
Request for an injunction  YES*  NO NO* 
Harm to rivals’ ability to compete YES*  YES* ≈ * 
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power only at a later stage, after the implementation of their patented technology in 
the standard. Therefore, Article 102 TFEU has a very limited ability to address 
deceptive practices that arise during the standardization process. Section 2 of the 
Sharman act, on the contrary, is able to address the deceptive practices of all 
participants, regardless of their initial level of market power. When the deception 
allows the SEP owner to monopolize the technology market, or there is at least a 
dangerous probability of success, Section 2 of the Sherman Act applies. The plaintiff 
needs to prove, nonetheless, the causal link between the deceptive behavior and the 
acquisition of market power. 
The competition law provisions of the two jurisdictions have also different scopes 
in addressing the SEP owner’s imposition of strategic licensing conditions. In these 
cases, however, a SEP owner faces stricter constraints under EU competition law. 
After the implementation of a patented technology in the standard, the SEP owner has 
presumably obtained a dominant position, and it is consequently subject to the 
prohibition of Article 102 TFEU. The provision provides the Commission the legal 
basis to address a wide spectrum of licensing practices, ranging from exploitative to 
exclusionary ones, as well as those that harm rivals’ ability to compete. Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act, on the contrary, imposes much narrower limitations on the SEP 
owner’s licensing practices. A SEP owner is less likely to face an antitrust liability for 
refusing to license its SEPs subsequent to a FRAND commitment. Similarly, no 
liability will arise for cases where the SEP owner’s strategic licensing practice results 
in a mere exploitation. Exploitative practices do not constitute an anticompetitive 
behavior under US antitrust law. Perhaps, a liability could arise for practices that 
harm rivals’ ability to compete, although in these cases, Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
has a narrower application than Article 102 TFEU.  
The analysis also shows that in none of the jurisdictions NPEs face a stricter 
antitrust liability than practicing entities. Although authors have suggested that their 
business structure might facilitate exploitative licensing practices, this aspect does not 
play a relevant role in the antitrust analysis. If anything, NPEs are less likely to face 
an antitrust liability, given that they will normally have fewer incentives to harm 
competition in the markets that are related to the standard. 
Further, the analysis has shown that in none of the jurisdictions competition law 
provides a complete solution to the SEP owners’ opportunistic conduct. Both legal 
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systems have gaps. In other words, in none of the systems competition law is able to 
fully address the concerns related to SEP owner’s conduct. 
The inability to address some licensing practices of the SEP owner under the 
Sherman Act seems to have stimulated plaintiffs to challenge the SEP owner’s conduct 
under a different theory of harm. At least in the earlier cases, plaintiffs often accused 
SEP owners of having monopolized the technology market by acting deceptively 
during the standardization process, although their real concern was the SEP owner’s 
imposition of exploitative licensing conditions. A good example is provided by the 
dispute between RIM and Motorola.539 As explained, Motorola initially licensed its 
SEPs to RIM. However, at the time of renegotiation, the two companies failed to reach 
an agreement. RIM brought an action against Motorola, maintaining that Motorola’s 
refusal to offer a FRAND license harmed RIM’s ability to compete.540 RIM nonetheless 
based its antitrust claim on the deception theory, suggesting that Motorola 
monopolized the technology market by falsely committing to license its technologies on 
FRAND terms during the standardization process. Although RIM was mainly 
concerned with the licensing terms for the use of Motorola’s patents, it challenged 
Motorola for acting deceptively during the standardization process and monopolizing 
the technology market. The decision to do so was perhaps motivated by the fact that 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act has only a limited ability to address practices that harm 
rivals’ ability to compete, whereas past cases have confirmed that a SEP owner might 
face an antitrust liability if it acts deceptively during the standardization process.541 
The limited scope of Section 2 of the Sherman Act has also stimulated the FTC to 
make a more aggressive use of the Section 5 of the FTCA. The FTC has in fact shown a 
strong intention to prosecute some SEP owner’s licensing practices that would fall 
outside the domain of the Sherman Act as a Section 5 standalone offense.542 The FTC 
                                                 
539 Research in Motion Limited v. Motorola Inc, 644 F.Supp.2d 788 (ND Texas 2008). 
540 Id. at 794. 
541 A similar point was made by G. Ohana in the F.T.C. & D.O.J., Sherman Act Section 2 Joint 
Hearing/Understanding single-firm behavior: Misleading and deceptive conduct Session (2006) (“When 
we talk about deception, we really ought to be talking about exploitation and not deception.[…] The 
analytical weakness of just focusing on deception is that you are really missing what matters, which is 
not the deceptive act itself, but the exploitation of the market power that that creates.”). 
542 Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc. FTC File No. 
121-0120, (2013) (While talking about the SEP owner ability to use injunctions as a tool to hold up 
manufacturers, the FTC stated “We take this action pursuant to the Commission’s authority under 
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has in particular applied Section 5 of the FTCA to address the SEP owner’s use of 
injunctions.543 All cases brought by the FTC were nonetheless concluded with consent 
orders, without thus determining the exact scope of Section 5 of the FTCA might have 
in addressing the SEP owner’s licensing practices. 
The analysis has also shows that the reason for the divergent results under EU 
competition law and under U.S. antitrust law does not reflect different views of the 
competition authorities. Rather the contrary. Competition authorities of the two 
jurisdictions have expressed very similar concerns in relation to the SEP owner’s 
opportunistic practices.544 They are however unable to reach similar results because of 
the divergences in the legal provisions. Article 102 TFEU can simply not be applied to 
non-dominant participants, and Section 2 of the Sherman Act does not apply to 
exploitative conducts.  
The difference between the two competition law systems are, however, not 
necessarily undesirable. A SEP owner is in fact subject to the limitation of both 
systems. To avoid a liability under EU competition law, the SEP owner might avoid a 
specific practice also in the US, and vice versa. For example, the SEP owner’s 
deceptive practice might constitute an anticompetitive behavior under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act. The prospect of facing an antitrust liability under US antitrust law 
might deter the SEP owner from engaging in deceptive practices when participating in 
an European SSO, given that also such conduct could be challenged under US 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Section 5 to prohibit unfair methods of competition, which both Congress and the Supreme Court have 
expressly deemed to extend beyond the Sherman Act”). 
543 Analysis Of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment In the Matter of Motorola Mobility 
LLC and Google Inc., File No. 121-0120 (2013) (“[…] under its standalone Section 5 authority, the 
Commission can reach opportunistic conduct that takes place after a standard is adopted that tends to 
harm consumers and undermine the standard-setting process.”). 
544 For US see, e.g., Statement of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division on Its Decision to 
Close Its Investigations of Google Inc.’s Acquisition of Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc. and the 
Acquisitions of Certain Patents by Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp. and Research in Motion Ltd. (Feb. 13, 
2012). “In light of the […] complex issues raised by the intersection of the intellectual property rights 
and antitrust law at issue here, […] the division will not hesitate to take appropriate enforcement 
action to stop any anticompetitive use of SEP rights.” For the EU see: Press Release, J. Almunia, 
Industrial policy and Competition policy: Quo vadis Europa?, SPEECH/12/83, Revue Concurrences, 
(Feb. 10, 2012) (“Standardization processes must be fair and transparent, so that they are not in the 
hands of established firms willing to impose their technologies. But it is not enough. We must also 
ensure that, once they hold standard essential patents, companies give effective access on fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. This is crucial if we want industries and businesses relying 
on such patents to develop freely to their utmost potential. I am determined to use antitrust 
enforcement to prevent the misuse of patent rights to the detriment of a vigorous and accessible 
market.”). 
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antitrust law. In this respect, EU competition law and US antitrust law might hence 
complement each other and fill some of the each other’s gaps when addressing the 
SEP owner’s conduct. 
Finally, it is also evident that in both jurisdictions there is a substantial amount 
of legal uncertainty concerning the SEP owners’ antitrust liability for their 
opportunistic practices. The applicability of competition law is particularly unclear 
when addressing the SEP owner’s strategic licensing practices. It remains for instance 
unclear whether the refusal to license a SEP could constitute an anticompetitive 
conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Similarly, it is also unclear whether, and 
under which conditions, the imposition of exploitative licensing conditions would 
constitute an anticompetitive behavior.  
 178 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART III 
 
 
 
 179 
 
 
Chapter VIII 
ANTITRUST REMEDIES 
The previous section evaluated the SEP owner’s antitrust liability for acting 
deceptively during the standardization process and/or licensing its SEP under 
strategic licensing terms. The present chapter takes a step further and evaluates the 
remedies that can be imposed on a SEP owner that has been found violating 
competition law. What remedies have been imposed? Are the remedies able to 
adequately address the anticompetitive concerns? Is there a risk that the imposed 
remedies will deter SEP owner’s pro-competitive conducts?  
The chapter starts by discussing the general goal of antitrust remedies and the 
process through which remedies are selected and imposed on the violator. Next, it 
analyzes the remedies adopted in the legal practice when addressing the SEP owner’s 
conduct. Finally, the chapter discusses the effects of adopting remedies through 
settlement procedures, a mechanism that has been prevalently used in the context of 
SEPs.  
 
 
1. REMEDIES AND SANCTIONS  
1.1. The goals of antitrust remedies 
Antitrust remedies aim at different goals. One of the primary goals of the 
antitrust intervention is to stop the anticompetitive conduct. Council Regulation 
1/2003 provides that “where the Commission finds that there is an infringement of 
Article 101 or of Article 102 of the Treaty, it may . . . impose . . . remedies . . . 
necessary to bring the infringement effectively to an end.”545 Similarly, the US 
Supreme Court maintained that the aim of the antitrust remedy is to stop the act of 
                                                 
545 Council Regulation No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation of the Rules on 
Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. L 1, Article 7. 
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monopolization or attempted monopolization, and in this way bring the 
anticompetitive practice to an end.546  
In both jurisdictions, the antitrust intervention has also a more general purpose: 
to prevent the recurrence of anticompetitive practices. The antitrust intervention aims 
to prevent future anticompetitive practices by the same undertaking (specific 
deterrence), as well as deterring other market participants to engage in similar 
conducts (general deterrence).547 The competition law apparatus provides various tools 
that aim at specific and general deterrence. The most direct tool is the imposition of a 
monetary sanction on the violator, either through a fine, or through damages awards 
that result from private litigation. The prospect of facing high financial loss will 
generally deter both the violator and other companies from engaging in 
anticompetitive practices. Behavioral or structural remedies might also have a 
deterrent effect.548  
Besides stopping the anticompetitive practice, and deterring future abuses, 
antitrust remedies might have also more specific goals. The U.S. Supreme Court noted 
that merely prohibiting the undertaking to further engage in an anticompetitive 
practice “is not adequate to protect the public interest.”549 It explained that if the 
remedy was limited to a prohibition of the anticompetitive conduct, “those who had 
unlawfully built their empires could preserve them intact”, and in this way profit from 
their anticompetitive conduct.550 The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that the 
imposed remedy should also aim other goals, such as “render impotent” the unlawfully 
obtained monopoly power,551 deny to the undertaking the fruits of its anticompetitive 
                                                 
546 See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp.,384 US 563, 577 (1966); United States v. United Shoe 
Machinery Corp., 391 US 244, 250 (1968).  
547 For EU see: Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of 
Regulation No 1/2003 § C 210/2, 2006, O.J., ¶ 4. (“That task not only includes the duty to investigate 
and sanction individual infringements, but it also encompasses the duty to pursue a general policy 
designed to […] steer the conduct of undertakings in the light of [competition law] principles. […] Fines 
should have a sufficiently deterrent effect, not only in order to sanction the undertakings concerned 
(specific deterrence) but also in order to deter other undertakings from engaging in, or continuing, 
behaviour that is contrary to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (general deterrence).”). For US see: 
Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981). (“The very idea of treble 
damages reveals an intent to punish past, and to deter future, unlawful conduct."). 
548 I. Lianos, Competition Law Remedies: In search of a theory, 14/2011 LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN 
EUROPE WORKING PAPER SERIES (2011) (pointing out that forward looking structural and behavioral 
remedies also aim at deterrence). 
549 Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 US 110, 128 (1948). 
550 Id.  
551 Id. at 128-129. See also: United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 US 563, 577 (1966). 
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conduct,552 cure (as far as practicable) the effects of the anticompetitive conduct,553 and 
“restore the conditions for a workable competition.”554  
There is no comparable general statement in the EU case law. Some 
commentators nevertheless suggest that also in the EU, antitrust remedies have other 
goals than stopping the anticompetitive conduct.555 In making this point, 
commentators often refer to Ufex v. Commission,556 where the ECJ maintained that 
the Commission cannot refuse to start an antitrust investigation simply because the 
anticompetitive conduct has ended. The ECJ argued that, if the anti-competitive 
effects continue even after the conduct has ceased, the Commission should intervene, 
and seek to eliminate or neutralize the effects that arose from the anticompetitive 
practice.557 In the view of those commentators, the ECJ statement confirms that EU 
antitrust remedies aim at other goals than merely stopping the anticompetitive 
conduct.558  
The specific goals of antitrust intervention are particularly evident when the 
antitrust remedy is negotiated between the parties, as part of the settlement 
procedure. The word settlement will be used to refer to both settlements between 
private parties as well as settlements with public prosecutors in the EU (in the legal 
jargon, commitment decisions) and in the US (in the legal jargon, consent agreement, 
order, or decree). Both jurisdictions provide the possibility to end the antitrust 
procedure with a settlement. In the EU, Article 9 of the Regulation 1/2003 provides 
that the Commission can formally end a case by accepting the commitments offered by 
the undertaking under investigation.559 Similarly, in the US both private and public 
                                                 
552 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 US 244, 250 (1968). 
553 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 340 US 76, 89 (1950).  
554 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 347 (D. Mass. 1953). 
555 See, e.g., P. Hellstrom, F. Maier-Rigaud, F. Wenzel Bulst, Remedies in European Antitrust Law, 76 
ANTITRUST L. J. 46 (2009). Ioannis Lianos, Competition Law Remedies: In search of a theory, 14/2011 
LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE WORKING PAPER SERIES (2011).556 Case C-l 19/97 P Ufex v 
Commission, ECR. I-1341 (1999).  
556 Case C-l 19/97 P Ufex v Commission, ECR. I-1341 (1999).  
557 Id. at 94. 
558Id. at 83, 95 (Note that the judgment does not refer, however, to remedies per se, but rather to the 
Commission ability to intervene). 
559 Council Regulation No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. L 1, Article 9. The Commission is 
not obliged to accept the commitments, but can proceed with the formal procedure. It will however 
consider to end a procedure with a commitment decision, if it believes that the offered commitments are 
sufficient to meet the anticompetitive concerns raised in the investigation.  
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litigation may be solved through a settlement. The ability to end an antitrust 
investigation is not expressively provided in a statute, but it is rather an implied right 
“derived from the historical right of prosecutors to initiate and conclude legal 
proceedings.”560 In both jurisdictions, antitrust settlements are becoming an 
increasingly common way to conclude antitrust investigations initiated by antitrust 
authorities.561  
The remedies agreed through antitrust settlements might depart considerably 
from those that could be adopted through an infringement decision. The competition 
authority or the private plaintiff might obtain a remedy that would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to achieve under a formal infringement decision or adjudicatory process.562 
Particularly remedies agreed with competition authorities often do not only aim at 
terminating the anticompetitive conduct and at preventing its reoccurrence, but also 
aim at stopping the harm that arises from the challenged conduct. As a result, they 
might aim at more specific goals, such as facilitating entrance in the market, fostering 
competition, rendering the market more competitive, or depriving the consumer of the 
unlawfully acquired market power. 563 
The settlement adopted in Norwegian Gas Negotiation Committee provides a 
clear example.564 The case concerned joint sales of Norwegian natural gas through a 
single seller, the so called GFU. In 2001, the Commission initiated formal proceedings 
against several Norwegian gas companies arguing that the GFU scheme was 
incompatible with European competition law, mainly Article 101 TFEU. The case was 
concluded through an informal settlement, which provided, inter alia, the reservation 
                                                 
560 C. F. Phillips Jr, The Consent Decree In Antitrust Enforcement, 18 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW 
REVIEW 39, 42 (1961). 
561 See, e.g., D. H. Ginsburg & J. D. Wright, Antitrust Settlements: The Culture of Consent (2012), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/antitrust-settlements-
culture-consent/130228antitruststlmt.pdf (stating that more than 90 percent of the antitrust 
investigations initiated by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
are concluded by a settlement); M. Mariniello, Commitments or Prohibition? The EU Antitrust 
Dilemma, BRUEGELPOLICYBRIEF (2014). 
562 See, e.g., : G. Monti, Managing the Intersection of Utilities Regulation and EC Competition Law, 
4(2) COMPETITION LAW REVIEW, 123 (2008).; M. Siragusa and E. Guerri, Antitrust Settlements under 
EC Competition Law: The Point of View of the Defendants, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 
2008 : ANTITRUST SETTLEMENTS UNDER EC COMPETITION LAW (C.-D. Ehlermann and M. Marquis ed. 
2008). 
563 E. Hjelmeng, Competition Law Remedies: Striving For Coherence or Finding New Way? 50 
COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 1007, 1019-1021 (2013). 
564 Press Release, Commission successfully settles GFU case with Norwegian gas producers, 
IP/02/1084 (Jul. 2002). 
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of certain gas volumes for new customers, who in the past had not bought gas from 
Norwegian gas producers. Statoil agreed to make available 13 BCM of gas to new 
customers on commercially competitive terms. The remedy imposed on the concerned 
undertaking was an obligation that went beyond what the Commission could have 
imposed if finding an anticompetitive agreement. It is also evident that the remedy did 
not only aim at stopping the anticompetitive agreement, but also tried to facilitate the 
development of competition in the market. This is a clear illustration how remedies 
adopted through settlements might add a different perspective to the goals of the 
antitrust intervention, a goal that goes beyond the mere aim of stopping the 
anticompetitive conduct and preventing its re-occurrence.565 
Finally, both EU competition law and US antitrust law provide also remedies 
that aim at the compensation of victims that suffer a loss because of the violator’s 
anticompetitive conduct. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that “[a]ny person who 
shall be injured in his business or property by . . . anything forbidden in the antitrust 
laws may sue . . . shall recover threefold damages by him sustained, and the cost of 
suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee”.566 The EU Treaties, on the contrary, do not 
provide explicitly for the right to compensation. The ECJ has nonetheless clarified 
(although referring to a collusive practice) that “[t]he full effectiveness of [the 
competition law provisions] would be put at risk if it were not open to any individual 
to claim damages for loss caused to him by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or 
distort competition.”567 It consequently concluded that the injured party has a right to 
damages against the violator. Parties injured by the anticompetitive conduct can 
recover, nevertheless, only compensatory damages, as opposed to punitive (treble) 
damages available under US antitrust law. 
In sum, both jurisdictions seem to share similar objectives when imposing 
antitrust remedies. Termination of the anticompetitive conduct and deterrence of 
future anticompetitive practices seem to be the main goals. Antitrust remedies, 
particularly those adopted through a settlement procedure, might nonetheless also 
                                                 
565 See also British Airways/American airlines case COMP/39596, Decision of 14 July 2010 (facilitating 
market entry by involving slot-surrender). 
566 Clayton Antitrust Act, § 4. 
567 Case C-453/99 Courage v Crehan, ECR I-6314,¶ 26 (2001). 
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aim at other goals, such as stopping the anticompetitive harm that has arisen from the 
anticompetitive practice. 
 
1.2. Types of remedies 
Antitrust remedies can be divided into two major groups: behavioral remedies 
and structural remedies. The first group–behavioral remedies–includes remedies that, 
as the name suggests, aim to shape the violator’s behavior. Behavioral remedies might 
be either prohibitory or affirmative. Prohibitory behavioral remedies, as the cease and 
desist order, prohibit the undertaking to engage in a specific anticompetitive practice. 
The remedy might prohibit a specific unlawful act, or might include the prohibition 
the engage in similar conducts that may result in the recurrence of the violation (so-
called “fencing in” provisions). A prohibitory remedy is generally not difficult to design 
and administer. It is also unlikely to be overbroad, or impose unnecessary inefficiency 
on the market, given that it typically does not have a significant effect on the violator’s 
structure and functioning in the market. The imposition of a behavioral remedy might 
nonetheless require the adoption of a monitoring mechanism, given that even after the 
intervention, the violator might still have the incentive to circumvent the imposed 
remedy and continue its anticompetitive conduct.568 
The imposition of a prohibitory remedy is not always sufficient to achieve the 
goals of the antitrust intervention. In some circumstances, the enforcer might have to 
impose an affirmative behavioral remedy on the violator.569 An affirmative behavioral 
remedy was for example imposed in the Microsoft case, where the European 
Commission ordered Microsoft to un-tie the supply of Windows and Windows Media 
Player, by offering a version of its Windows operating system without the Media 
Player program.570 Affirmative behavioral remedies are generally more difficult to 
design. The enforcer will have to define precisely the obligation imposed on the 
violator, a task that usually requires a deeper understanding of the market dynamics.  
                                                 
568 OECD, Remedies and Sanctions in Abuse of Dominance Cases (2003). 
569 For EU see: Case 6-7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. and Conmercial Solvents Corp. v. 
Comm'n, ECR 223, at. 45 (1974); For US see: International Salt Co. v United States, 332 U.S. 392, 
401 (1947). 
570 Press release, European Commission, Commission concludes on Microsoft investigation, imposes 
conduct remedies and a fine, IP/04/382 (Mar. 24, 2004). 
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Access remedies are one of the possible affirmative behavioral remedies. They 
impose on the violator a duty to grant access to a specific facility. Access remedies are 
considered “regulatory” in nature, given that they generally require the enforcer to 
determine the exact access terms, including the determination of the access price, a 
function that is generally performed by regulatory agencies, rather than competition 
authorities or courts.571 As other affirmative remedies, access remedies might also 
require monitoring mechanisms. In some cases, it might be even necessary to adopt a 
mechanism that allows the remedy to be adjusted in light of changing market 
conditions. It is plausible that a request for modifying an access remedy may come 
from the party having the obligation or from the party benefiting from it, and an 
independent means of adjudicating such requests is essential.572 As a result, access 
remedies are often considered as the most complex remedies to design and supervise. 
The second group of remedies—structural remedies–does not focus on the 
violator’s behavior, but rather affects its business structure. The enforcer might for 
example impose on the violator the obligation to divest part of its business.573 A 
structural remedy was initially suggested by Judge Jackson in the Microsoft case, 
where it ordered the breakup of Microsoft in two separate units, one unit for the 
Windows operating systems, and other for the remaining parts.574 Structural remedies 
are generally easier to administer than behavioral remedies. There is generally no 
need to adopt monitoring mechanisms that verify whether the violator is still engaging 
in the anticompetitive practice, given that by changing the violator’s business 
structure, successful structural remedies alter the undertaking’s ability and its 
incentive to engage in anticompetitive conduct.575 Structural remedies are 
nevertheless very intrusive. They interfere substantively with the violator’s existing 
                                                 
571 See, e.g., Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 
(2004) (where the Supreme court pointed that imposing a duty to deal may require “antitrust courts to 
act as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing--a role for 
which they are ill-suited.”). 
572 G. J. Werden, Remedies For Exclusionary Conduct Should Protect And Preserve The Competitive 
Process, 76 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 65(2009). 
573 S. Papon, Structural v Behavioral Remedies in Merger Control: a Case to Case analysis, 30(1) 
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW REVIEW (2009). 
574 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F.Supp.2d 59, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
575 P. Hellström, F. Maier-Rigaud, F. Wenzel Bulst,, Remedies In European Antitrust Law, 76 
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 43 (2009). 
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business model, and consequently impose a higher risk of inefficiencies, which can 
harm the violator, its shareholders, labor, and consumer interests.576 
Besides behavioral or structural remedies, a company that has violated 
competition law might also face other consequences. As mentioned, the European 
Commission can impose on the violator (and often does) a financial penalty, up to 10 
percent of the violator’s turnover.577 In the US, there are no monetary sanctions for 
the violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act at the Federal level.578 The violator 
might nonetheless face a comparable financial loss because of the treble damages 
awarded in private damages actions.  
In sum, a vast set of antitrust remedies is available to address the undertaking’s 
unilateral practices with the prospect of achieving the goals of the antitrust 
intervention. No particular kind of remedy is “automatic”. The enforcer needs to tailor 
the remedy to the circumstances of the specific case, and the effects the 
anticompetitive practice imposed on the market.  
 
1.3. The selection of the antitrust remedy 
Competition authorities and courts enjoy a significant discretion in selecting the 
antitrust remedy to be adopted in each specific case. It is nonetheless possible to 
observe that several principles govern the selection process.  
First, in both jurisdictions behavioral remedies are more commonly adopted in 
cases addressing the infringer’s unilateral conduct. Although structural remedies are 
not rare in antitrust enforcement, their use is most prominent in the cases of mergers 
and acquisitions, where competition authorities consider structural remedies effective 
in addressing the competitive concerns raised during the merger clearance procedure, 
but also adequate because they require less supervision.579 The use of structural 
                                                 
576 S. W. Waller, Past, Present, And Future of Monopolization Remedies, 76 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 
1 (2009). 
577 Council Regulation No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. L 1, Article 23.  
578 State antitrust laws might nonetheless include provisions for civil penalties, whether in the form of 
civil fines, restitution, disgorgement, or forfeitures. See: H. First, The Case for Antitrust Civil Penalties, 
08-38 LAW & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER SERIES NEW YORK UNIVERSITY (2008).  
579 For the EU, the Commission made clear that in merger cases it will only accept remedies that 
capable of being implemented effectively within a short period of time. Structural remedies will 
normally meet these conditions, given that they are generally effective in addressing the 
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remedies is on the contrary less common in cases addressing unilateral practices. 
Courts and competition authorities have been generally more cautious in ordering a 
division of a company that has always operated as a single entity. As explained by the 
court in United States v. Alcoa, “a corporation, designed to operate effectively as a 
single entity, cannot readily be dismembered of parts of its various operations without 
a marked loss of efficiency.”580 US courts have consequently emphasized that 
divestiture is a remedy that is imposed only with great caution, and preference should 
be generally given to behavioral relief. 581 Similarly, in the EU, the preference for 
behavioral remedies is clearly stated in Article 7 of the Regulation 1/2003, which 
determines that the Commission can impose a structural remedy only where there is 
no equally effective behavioral remedy, or where an equally effective behavioral 
remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking.582  
Second, courts and competition authorities should also select a remedy that is 
proportional to the harm caused by the anticompetitive conduct. The imposition of a 
harsh, broad remedy is indeed able to stop the anticompetitive conduct and have a 
strong deterrent effect. It might however also hinder procompetitive practices, and 
through this, harm, rather protect competition in the market. The antitrust remedy 
should thus aim to achieve the goals of the antitrust intervention, without 
unnecessarily chilling legitimate competitive practices. In the EU, the principle of 
proportionality of the antitrust remedy is affirmed in Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
anticompetitive concerns and do not require further monitoring. “[C]ommitments which are structural 
in nature, such as the commitment to sell a business unit, are, as a rule, preferable from the point of 
view of the Merger Regulation's objective, inasmuch as such commitments prevent, durably, the 
competition concerns which would be raised by the merger as notified, and do not, moreover, require 
medium or long-term monitoring measures.” (Commission notice on remedies acceptable under Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004, 2008 O.J. C 267).. 
For the US see: “[S]tructural remedies, often preferred in merger cases where they can be simple, 
relatively easy to administer, and sure to preserve competition, are less favored in Section 2 cases 
where they often would require structural change to an existing unitary firm that had not grown by 
acquisition.” (U.S. DOJ, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE 
SHERMAN ACT REPORT, Chapter 9. (2008)) 
580 United States v. Alcoa, 91 F. Supp. 333, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). 
581 See, e.g., United States v Microsoft, 253 F. 3d 34, 80, (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Absent some measure of 
confidence that there has been an actual loss to competition that needs to be restored, wisdom counsels 
against adopting radical structural relief.”).  
582 Council Regulation No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. L 1, Article 7 (“Changes to the 
structure of an undertaking as it existed before the infringement was committed would only be 
proportionate where there is a substantial risk of a lasting or repeated infringement that derives from 
the very structure of the undertaking.”). 
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The principle or proportionally applies also when imposing the fine. Not only must the 
Commission set a proportional level of fine,583 but it also needs to evaluate whether 
the imposition of a fine is appropriate in the first place. When, for example, the 
competitive conduct is a novel type of abuse, the Commission might decide not to 
impose a fine–or impose only a symbolic fine.584 The U.S. Supreme Court also 
emphasized that the remedy should go no farther than the violation or the threat of 
violation.585  
Finally, the imposed antitrust remedy should ideally be easy to administer and 
not require an extensive supervision from the part of the enforcer. This consideration 
seems particularly important in the US, where the Supreme Court stated that “[n]o 
court should impose a [remedy] that it cannot . . . adequately and reasonably 
supervise.”586 It further added that “the problem should be deemed irremedia[ble] by 
antitrust law when [the remedy] requires the court to assume the day-to-day controls 
characteristic of a regulatory agency.”587 Judge Posner suggested that “[t]he nature of 
the remedy sought in an antitrust case is often an important clue to the soundness of 
the antitrust claim.”588 In the U.S., the difficulty in designing and administering the 
antitrust remedy might affect the antitrust intervention. A remedy that is too difficult 
to administer might thus suggest that the conduct should not be addressed through 
antitrust law. The situation is however different in the EU, where Commission’s 
representatives have explained in several occasions that “the finding of an antitrust 
infringement is not dependent upon the ease of finding or designing a suitable remedy 
for that conduct.”589 In other words, the difficulty in designing the remedy does not 
affect the antitrust liability under EU competition law. 
                                                 
583 The criteria for the determination of a fine have been laid out in the Guidelines on the method of 
setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, 2006 O.J. C/210 2.  
584 See, e.g., T-99/04 Treuhand v Commission, judgment of 8 July 2008 (where the Commission 
condemned the consultancy firm AC-Treuhand for facilitating the coordination among cartel members. 
The Commission imposed a fine of 1.000EUR on account of the novelty of the approach taken by the 
Commission in the matter. The decision was confirmed by the General Court). For general discussion 
see: I. Lianos, Competition Law Remedies: In search of a theory, Law and Governance in Europe 
Working Paper Series (2011). 
585 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 400 (1947). 
586 Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP;Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. 
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 415 (2004). 
587 Id. 
588 Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 267, (7th Cir. 1984).  
589 P. Hellstrom, F. Maier Rigaud, F. Wenzel Bulst, Remedies in European Antitrust Law, 76 
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 1, 49 (2009). 
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It is worth noting that the considerations listed above might be sometimes in 
contradiction to each other. What is proportional might be difficult to administer, and 
what is easier to administer might be disproportional. In this case, the determination 
of the remedy will depend on the importance the specific consideration bears in the 
individual case. The relevance of each consideration might vary between the two 
jurisdictions, but also depending on the procedure through which the enforcer adopts 
the remedy. The ECJ has clarified that the principle of proportionality has a different 
impact when a remedy is adopted through a commitment decision under Article 9 of 
Regulation 1/2003 than when part of an infringement decisions under Article 7 of 
Regulation 1/2003. It emphasized that, although the principle of proportionality 
applies also to commitment decisions, the Commission has only the duty to verify that 
the commitments address the expressed anticompetitive concerns and that the 
undertaking has not offered less onerous commitments that those necessary to 
adequately address those concerns. 590 
It should hence come as no surprise that remedies agreed through commitments 
may depart considerably from those that could be adopted through an infringement 
decision. This has been confirmed also by the ECJ, which maintained that 
“[u]ndertakings which offer commitments […] consciously accept that the concessions 
they make may go beyond what the Commission could itself impose on them in a 
decision adopted under [an infringement decision].” The ECJ however noted that an 
undertaking might prefer such option, given that “the closure of the infringement 
proceedings brought against those undertakings allows them to avoid a finding of an 
infringement of competition law and a possible fine.”591 Agreeing on stricter remedies 
might be hence a price to pay to end a lengthy and expensive legal action. 
 In sum, similar considerations govern the selection of remedies under EU 
competition law and U.S. antitrust, although their relevance might different between 
                                                 
590 Case C-441/07 European Commission v Alrosa Company Ltd, 2010 E.C.R. I-05949, ¶ 36, 41 
(“Although Article 9, unlike Article 7 of Regulation No 1/2003, does not expressly refer to 
proportionality, the principle of proportionality, as a general principle of European Union law, is none 
the less a criterion for the lawfulness of any act of the institutions of the Union, including decisions 
taken by the Commission in its capacity of competition authority […] The specific characteristics of the 
mechanisms provided for in Articles 7 and 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 and the means of action available 
under each of those provisions are different, which means that the obligation on the Commission to 
ensure that the principle of proportionality is observed, but has a different extent and content, 
depending on whether it is considered in relation to the former or the latter article.”). 
591 Case C-441/07 European Commission v Alrosa Company Ltd., ECR I-05949, at 38 (2010). 
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the two systems, as well between the procedures through which the remedy is 
imposed. 
 
1.4. Procedural matters  
Before evaluating the antitrust remedies that were adopted in the context of 
SEPs, it is worth discussing some procedural matters. Who can impose antitrust 
remedies on the violator? Through which procedures are remedies imposed? Are there 
significant differences between the EU and the US systems?  
In the EU, the power to impose antitrust remedies lies in the hands of the 
European Commission, for cases prosecuted at the EU level, and in the hands of 
national competition authorities (NCAs), if the prosecution takes place at the national 
level. It is for the Commission and an NCA to determine the antitrust remedy to be 
applied against a company that has abused its dominant position. The Commission or 
an NCA are also empowered to impose an eventual fine on the violator.592 Further, if 
the Commission or an NCA finds it necessary, it might also adopt an interim measure 
on the basis of a prima facie finding of infringement.593 Interim measures are adopted 
before a decision whether the challenged conduct amounted to an abuse of a dominant 
position. National courts might, on the other hand, award damages to those that have 
been injured by an anticompetitive conduct. They also have the ability to impose 
antitrust remedies, if, as part of a litigation, they find that a company has violated 
antitrust law. If the court finds that the undertaking has engaged in an 
anticompetitive conduct, it may issue a permanent injunction, with the purpose to stop 
the anticompetitive practice. However, remedies imposed by national courts have 
generally only an inter partes effect, and normally involve only a limited behavioral or 
structural relief. It is thus understandable that the most relevant antitrust remedies 
are generally imposed by the European Commission. Furthermore, it is easier for the 
                                                 
592 Council Regulation No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. L 1, Article 23. 
593 Council Regulation No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. L 1, Article 8. The imposition of 
interim measures is based on a prima facie finding of infringement, without the need to establish the 
existence of an antitrust offence; this measure can be however used only when the Commission shows 
that the damage “could no longer be remedied by the decision to be adopted by the Commission upon 
the conclusion of the administrative procedure.” 
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Commission than for an NCA to impose and monitor a remedy that is to be applied 
across the EU. 
In the United States, on the contrary, the power to impose remedies for 
infringements of U.S. antitrust law lies in the hands of courts. This is true for cases of 
both private and public enforcement.594 Private plaintiffs may ask the court to order 
the payment of threefold the damage caused by the anticompetitive conduct, as well as 
issue injunctions that will stop the anticompetitive conduct.595 Private actions, 
however, rarely involve significant injunctive or structural relief.596 More extensive 
injunctive relief is generally sought in the cases of public enforcement, where the legal 
action is brought by the FTC or the DOJ.  
Besides seeking judicial remedies, the FTC also has the ability to adopt remedies 
through an administrative procedure. If the undertaking under investigation decides 
to contest the charges brought by the FTC, the complaint is adjudicated before an 
administrative law judge (ALJ) in a trial-type proceeding. The ALJ issues an “initial 
decision,” which can recommend the defendant an order to cease and desist from using 
the method of unfair competition. If the decision is appealed, the case is reviewed by 
the FTC, which issues its own final decision and that order that can be then appealed 
to a court of appeals.597  
Cases where the antitrust remedy is agreed through a settlement follow a 
different procedure. In the EU, the company under investigation might offer 
commitments to the European Commission. If the Commission believes that the 
offered commitments are sufficient to address the anticompetitive concerns, and 
considers accepting them, it publishes the offered commitments and invites the 
interested parties to provide their comments. If the offered commitments pass the 
“market test,” the Commission can formally accept the commitments and make them 
                                                 
594 See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 400–01 (1947). 
595 U.S. DOJ, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN 
ACT REPORT Chapter 9: Remedies (2008) (withdrawn on May 2009). 
596 S. Weber Waller, Remedies for Monopolization and Abuse of Dominance: A Little History and Some 
Thoughts on Disclosure and Access, available at 
http://www.biicl.org/files/3412_antitrust_marathon_(weber_weller).pdf. 
597 A Brief overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, 
Federal Trade Commission, Washington D.C. 20580 (July 2008), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/brfovrvw.shtm.  
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binding.598 It is important to notice that the Commission is not obliged to accept the 
offered commitment, but can decide to follow the ordinary infringement procedure. 
Regulation 1/2003 also provides that the Commission should not consider solving the 
antitrust investigation through a Commitment decisions under Article 9, if it intends 
to impose a fine.599  
In the United States, different settlement procedures are provided for cases of 
public or private enforcement. In the case of public enforcement, the DOJ can settle 
the dispute through a consent decree. The proposed consent decree must be filed with 
a US district court and published, giving in this way the opportunity to the interested 
parties to submit their comments.600 The reviewing court must then decide whether 
the proposed consent is in the public interest. Once a consent settlement has been 
confirmed, it has the same legal effect as a judgment in a fully litigated action.601 
Similarly, the FTC might end a case with a consent order, if the company decides to 
settle the charges (without admitting liability). The FTC’s Bureau of Competition and 
Bureau of Economics review the consent order, and when the majority of the FTC 
Commissioners provisionally accept it, the agreement is published, giving the public 
the opportunity to comment on it. After the comment period, the FTC may withdraw 
its acceptance of the agreement, modify it, or accept it as final. Once the consent order 
is accepted, it has the same force as FTC’s final order. Where, on the other hand, 
negotiations fail, or the FTC does not offer a consent order procedure, the FTC may 
initiate a formal adjudicatory proceeding.602  
Also private antitrust disputes may be solved through settlements. Nonetheless, 
the parties of the disputes have a wider discretion in drafting their agreement, 
consistent with contract law principles.603 The situation is different in the case of class 
actions, where courts have an active role in reviewing the settlement. The purpose of 
                                                 
598 If the “market test” reveal that the offered commitments are not appropriate, the Commission can 
re-evaluate them, or abandon the commitment decision all together. 
599 Council Regulation No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. L 1, ¶ 13. 
600 The procedure is outlined in the Tunney Act 15 U.S.C. § 16 (b) to (h). 
601 See, e.g., C. Phillips, The Consent Decree in Antitrust Enforcement, 8 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW 
REVIEW 39 (1961). 
602 For general discussion see A. J. Miller, A Procedural Approach to “Unfair Methods of Competition”, 
93 IOWA LAW REVIEW 1485 (2008). 
603 S. Goldfein and T. Pak, Negotiated Antitrust Settlements: Some Perspectives from U.S. 
Defendants, in 13th Annual EC Competition Law and Policy Workshop (2008).  
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such supervision is to protect the interest of the vast majority of class members who 
are absent and hence have no direct representation in the litigation.  
In summary, there are substantive procedural difference between the EU and the 
US system. In the EU, the remedies are imposed by the competition authorities, and, 
only in limited occasions, by national courts. In the US, on the contrary, the authority 
to impose antitrust remedies lies largely in the hands of courts, which are in charge to 
impose antitrust remedies in cases of both public and private enforcement. The 
difference between the two systems is nevertheless less prominent in case where the 
antitrust dispute is solved through a settlement. In those cases, the remedy is agreed 
between the parties of the disputes, often involving some form of collaboration of the 
public (generally through comments).  
Having now reviewed the many type of remedies, their goals and the procedure 
through which they are set, the chapter now analyzes the remedies that have been 
adopted in cases addressing the SEP owner’s conduct.  
 
 
2. REMEDIES IN THE EXISTING LEGAL PRACTICE 
The SEP owner’s conduct has been challenged under the provisions of 
competition law both in the European Union and in the United States. What remedies 
have been adopted to address the concerns related to the SEP owner’s conduct? Were 
they able to effectively address the problems that arise in the context of SEPs? Were 
different remedies applied in the European Union and in the United States? 
 
2.1. Remedies for the SEP owner’s deceptive conduct  
US courts have recognized that the SEP owner’s deceptive conduct during the 
standardization process can trigger an antitrust liability.604 The US cases triggered 
the adoption of two type of remedies. In some cases, the remedy prevented the SEP 
owner from enforcing the SEP that was implemented in the standard because of a 
deception. In Dell, for example, where Dell was accused of falsely certificating that the 
                                                 
604 See discussion in: Chapter IV.  
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discussed standard does not infringe any of Dell’s patents, Dell entered in a consent 
agreement, pursuant to which the FTC prohibited Dell to enforce its SEP.605 As a 
result, Dell could not collect any royalty from manufacturers using its SEPs. In a 
different occasion, the FTC did not completely prevent the SEP owner from enforcing 
its SEP, but rather limited the SEP owner’s freedom in determining the licensing 
conditions. This was the case in Rambus, where the FTC imposed a cup on the 
royalties that Rambus could charge for its SEPs. (The remedy was subsequently 
dismissed by the D.C. Circuit, which reversed the finding of infringement, by 
maintaining that the FTC failed to prove that Rambus conduct was anticompetitive. 
Consequently no remedy was imposed.)606  
The two types of remedies that the FTC imposed against the deceptive SEP 
owners have similar objectives. Neither of the remedies aims to stop the 
anticompetitive conduct, given that the deception took place in the past−during the 
standardization process−and it had already ended at the time when the remedy was 
adopted. Both remedies however aimed to constrain the use of the unlawfully obtained 
monopoly power. In doing so, they use different tools. On one hand, the prohibition to 
enforce the SEP prevented the SEP owner from exercising any market power that the 
SEP owner might have enjoyed from the SEP. The duty to license a SEP on FRAND 
terms, on the other hand, is a more lenient remedy. It does not completely eliminate 
the SEP owner’s ability to generate income from licensing, but only limits it to a 
“reasonable” level. Such remedy is nonetheless more difficult to design, given that it 
requires the enforcer to determine the exact licensing terms to calculate the royalties. 
It might also require a subsequent revision, if the market conditions significantly 
change, and there is a need to re-evaluate the appropriateness of the determined 
licensing conditions.  
                                                 
605 Press release, Dell Computer Settles FTC Charges; Won’t Enforce Patent Right for Widely Used 
Computer Feature, F.T.C. (Nov. 2, 1995), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1995/11/dell.shtm.  
Similarly, also the consent decrees adopted in the in the Unocal case prohibited the enforcement of 
SEPs (Union Oil Co. of Cal., F.T.C., No. 9305 (Jul. 27, 2005).  
606 Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F. 3d 456, 462 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Note, that the SEP owner’s deceptive 
conduct has been condemned in several private disputes (see, e.g., Research in Motion Limited v. 
Motorola Inc, 644 F.Supp.2d 788 (ND Tex, 2008); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F3. d. 297 (3rd 
Cir, 2007). Most litigated cases were concluded with a settlement agreement solving the disagreement 
between the parties of the dispute and do not provide a relevant basis for our analysis (See, e.g., Brooke 
Crothers, Qualcomm, Broadcom reach $891 million settlement (Apr. 26, 2009), available at 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13924_3-10227815-64.html.; Andrew Munchbach, Motorola and RIM reach 
patent deal (Jul 11, 2010), available at http://bgr.com/2010/06/11/motorola-and-rim-reach-patent-deal/). 
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At first sight, the choice between the two remedies seems a choice between a 
remedy that is easier to design, but more intrusive, and a remedy that is more 
proportional, but more difficult to design and administer. A deeper evaluation of the 
FTC’s reasoning nonetheless reveals a different explanation. In the Rambus case, the 
FTC explained that it had in principle the authority to impose on Rambus a 
compulsory license on a royalty free basis, but it considered that the imposition of such 
remedy was not appropriate given the circumstances of the case. The FTC explained 
that there was insufficient evidence that absent Rambus’ deception, the SSO would 
have implemented in the standard a different technology.607 It thus considered that 
completely prohibiting Rambus to enforce its SEPs was not appropriate. In other 
words, the FTC opted for a more lenient remedy, because it was not clear whether the 
deceptive behavior allowed Rambus to obtain the implementation of its technology in 
the standard, and consequently acquire market power. Later developments in the 
Rambus case however showed that doubts concerning the effect the deceptive behavior 
had on the standardization process, and on the acquisition of market power, are not a 
reason for a more lenient remedy, but rather a reason for the rejection of the antitrust 
claim.608 If it is not clear whether the SEP would be implemented in the standard in 
absence of the SEP owner’s deceptive conduct, no antitrust liability should arise, and 
no remedy imposed. This suggests that when evidence support the finding of an 
antitrust liability for the SEP owner’s deceptive behavior, the prohibition to enforce 
the SEPs is a more likely remedy. 
Policy considerations support the adoption of a strict remedy, such as the 
prohibition to enforce the SEPs. The SEP owner would not have anything to lose in 
acting deceptively during the standardization process, if the only remedy it would face 
                                                 
607 Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F. 3d 456, 462 (D.C, Cir. 2008). (“[T]he Commission refused to compel 
Rambus to license its relevant patents royalty-free because there was insufficient evidence that “absent 
Rambus's deception” JEDEC would have standardized non-proprietary technologies instead of 
Rambus's; thus, Complaint Counsel had failed to show that such a remedy was “necessary to restore 
competition that would have existed in the ‘but for’ world.[…] Instead, the Commission decided to 
compel licensing at “reasonable royalty rates”, which it calculated based on what it believed would have 
resulted from negotiations between Rambus and manufacturers before JEDEC committed to the 
standards. The Commission’s order limits Rambus’s royalties for three years to 0.25% for JEDEC-
compliant SDRAM and 0.5% for JEDEC-compliant DDR SDRAM (with double those royalties for 
certain JEDEC-compliant, non-DRAM products); after those three years, it forbids any royalty 
collection.”). 
608 As explained, an antitrust liability can arise only in the plaintiff shows that the SEP would not be 
included in the standard but for deception. For discussion see: Chapter III, at 2.2. Liability under 
U.S. antitrust law.  
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was the duty to license the SEP on FRAND terms, an obligation that the SEP owner 
that does not act deceptively would have to accept anyway. One could argue that the 
imposition of a strict remedy could deter the participation in the standardization 
process. If the SEP owner loses the ability to enforce its SEP, just because of a 
negligent failure to disclose a patent, the remedy might indeed discourage the SEP 
owner from participating in the standardization process. It can thus deter a pro-
competitive practice. However, this argument disregards the fact that courts have 
adopted a strict standard of proof when condemning the SEP owner’s deceptive 
practices. No liability arises in a case of an involuntary failure to disclose the patent 
interest. Courts will condemn only cases, where the SEP owner engaged in an 
intentionally deceptive practice, which allowed an anticompetitive acquisition (or 
maintenance) of market power. When those conditions are met, the SEP owner’s 
deceptive conduct has no pro-competitive effect, and there is consequently no risk that 
the imposition of a strong remedy would deter practice that are beneficial for 
consumers.  
It is also worth noting that neither of the remedies (neither the prohibition to 
enforce a SEP, nor the duty to license under fair terms) is able to fully remove the 
effects of the SEP owner’s anticompetitive conduct. Absent the deception, the SSO 
would implement an alternative technology in the standard (or at lease exclude the 
technology in question from the standard).609 Technologies that were competing for the 
implementation in the standard, but were excluded because of the SEP owner’s 
deceptive conduct, will not be implemented in the standard. None of the available 
remedies is thus able to restore the “but for market.” 
The inability to restore the “but for market” is not particularly uncommon in 
antitrust law. Also when addressing other anticompetitive practices, the remedy is not 
necessarily able to restore the condition that would exist in the but for world. For 
example, if the dominant undertaking’s tying practice excluded companies form the 
market, or prevented their entrance, the remedy will not necessary allow the excluded 
companies to (re)enter the market. However, the inability to restore the but for 
market does not indicate that the antitrust intervention against the deceptive SEP 
owner is ineffective. It still protects consumers from the exercise of an illegitimately 
                                                 
609 For detailed discussion see: Chapter IV: 2.2.A. Section 2 liability. 
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obtained market power, and it might have both a specific and general deterrent effect. 
The inability to restore the but for market after the intervention does nonetheless 
suggest that it is desirable to develop mechanisms that prevent the SEP owner’s 
deceptive conduct ex ante, that is, before the anticompetitive injury arises. This again 
weights in favor of the adoption of a stricter remedy, which has a stronger ability to 
deter future deceptive practices. Therefore, the prohibition to enforce the SEPs seems 
the appropriate remedy in cases where the SEP owner’s deceptive conduct amounts to 
an anticompetitive conduct. 
 
2.2. Remedies for the strategic use of SEPs 
Competition authorities and private plaintiffs have challenged also the SEP 
owner’s strategic licensing practices, such as the departure from a previously made 
licensing commitment, the imposition of excessive licensing fees, and the use of 
injunctions. Although those practices were rarely condemned as anticompetitive, 
remedies were often adopted as part of antitrust settlements. Those cases triggered 
the application of different antitrust remedies, depending on the effects the challenged 
conduct imposed on the market.  
2.2.A. Prohibitory remedies 
Prohibitory behavioral remedies were often sufficient to address the 
anticompetitive concerns related to the SEP owner’s licensing practice. In cases 
concerning a departure from a previously made licensing practice, the enforcer simply 
prohibited the SEP owner to depart from the licensing commitment made by the 
previous SEP owner. In N-Data, for example, the SEP owner entered in a consent 
order and agreed not to enforce its SEPs, unless it first offered a paid-up, royalty free 
license in exchange for a one-time fee of $1.000, a licensing offer made by the previous 
SEP owner.610 Similarly, in IPCom the Commission welcomed the declaration of 
                                                 
610 Decision and Order, Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, Docket No. C-4234, F.T.C. (Sep. 23, 2008). 
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IPCom that it was ready to honor the FRAND commitments made by the previous 
SEP owner, before the transfer of SEPs in question.611  
Lately, the authorities’ attention has focused on the SEP owner’s use of 
injunctions, where the primary concern is that the use of injunctions could allow the 
SEP owner to hold up manufacturers and force them to accept exploitative licensing 
terms. Also in those cases, a prohibitory remedy was sufficient to address the 
anticompetitive concerns. In the US Motorola/Google case, for example, Google entered 
in a consent order, whereby it agreed to not employ injunctions and exclusion orders 
against licensees that were willing to agree to licenses on FRAND terms.612 A similar 
remedy was adopted in Bosch, where the SEP owner agreed to abandon its claims for 
injunctive relief against its potential licensees.613 Also in the EU, Samsung proposed 
to commit (for a period of five years) not to seek any injunction on the basis of any of 
its SEPs that relate to technologies implemented in smartphones and tablets, under 
the conditions that the licensees agree to a specific negotiation framework. This 
framework consists of: (1) a negotiation period of up to 12 months and (2) if no 
agreement is reached, a third party determination of FRAND terms by either a court 
or an arbitrator, as agreed by the parties.614  
The described prohibitory remedies were not difficult to design and administer. 
They might nonetheless have significant effects on the market, if applied against a 
licensing practice that had no anticompetitive effect. For example, if the SEP owner 
had a legitimate reason to depart from a previously made licensing offer, a prohibitory 
remedy that prevents a departure from such offer might unduly limit the SEP owner’s 
ability to obtain a fair compensation for its SEP.  
Similarly, the prohibition to use an injunction against an infringer of a SEP 
might have negative effects, if applied in inappropriate circumstances. Although the 
SEP owner might use the injunction opportunistically, as a tool to hold up 
manufacturers, it is also possible that the SEP owner uses the injunction for a 
                                                 
611 Press Release, Antitrust: Commission welcomes IPCom’s public FRAND declaration, 
MEMO/09/549, (Dec. 10, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-09-
549_en.htm. 
612 Decision and Order, Motorola Mobility LLC, and Google Inc., 1210120, F.T.C. (Jul 24, 2013). 
613 Decision and Order, Robert Bosch GmbH, Docket No. C-4377, F.T.C. (Apr 23, 2013). 
614 Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Consults on Commitments Offered by Samsung Electronics 
Regarding Use of Standard Essential Patents, IP/13/971 (Oct. 17, 2013).  
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legitimate purpose. The SEP owner might use the threat of an injunction as a tool to 
coerce an unwilling licensee to enter in a licensing negotiation. A remedy that unduly 
prevents the SEP owner’s use of an injunction could distort the negotiation process. 
An antitrust intervention that unduly limits the SEP owner’s ability to obtain an 
injunction would stimulate free-riding on the side of the manufacturer. At the same 
time, it would diminish the SEP owner’s ability to enforce its SEP in a timely manner. 
A delay of the SEP owner’s compensation might in turn decrease both the SEP owner’s 
ability and incentives to invest in innovation, as well as the willingness to further 
contribute its technologies to SSOs. Some companies have in fact emphasized that, 
because of the difficulty in enforcing their SEPs, they have stepped back from the 
standardization process, by either not joining certain SSOs or not contributing certain 
technologies to the discussed standards.615  
Therefore, although prohibitory remedies are often perceived as mild, and having 
limited effects on the market, they might, in some circumstances, deter pro-
competitive practices. The enforcer should hence adopt a cautious approach also when 
imposing prohibitory remedies on SEP owners. In particular, the argument that the 
imposed remedy is merely prohibitory in nature should not justify the reliance on a 
low standard of proof. Also prohibitory remedies should be imposed only in cases 
where evidence shows that the challenged licensing practice has anticompetitive 
effects on the market. 
2.2.B. Access remedies 
SEP owner’s strategic licensing practices have in some occasions also triggered 
the adoption of access remedies. In the Rambus case addressed by the European 
Commission, for example, Rambus offered to put a cap on its royalties, agreeing to 
charge a royalty of not more than 1.5% for its SEPs. 616 The Commission tested the 
offered commitments, and, after receiving comments, accepted the commitments and 
made them binding. However, the EU decision was not uncontroversial. Hynix 
                                                 
615 K. Oglethorpe, Nokia counsel: major companies “willfully infringe” FRAND, Global Competition 
review, at 2 (June 2013), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/33655/nokia-
counsel-major-companies-wilfully-infringe-frand/. 
616 Press Release, Antitrust, Commission Accepts Commitments from Rambus Lowering Memory Chip 
Royalty Rates, IP/09/1897 (Dec. 9, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-09-
544_en.htm.  
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appealed the commitment decision, arguing that the agreed remedy did not go far 
enough.617 At the same time, Hynix brought an action to the ECJ, seeking the 
annulment of the Commission decision to reject the antitrust complaint brought 
against Rambus.618 Both Hynix’s actions were however unsuccessful. The Commission 
rejected the complaint brought by Hynix, maintaining that the remedies offered by 
Rambus were “adequate to meet the competition concerns expressed in the Statement 
of Objections.”619 The case in front of the ECJ was on the other hand withdrawn, once 
Hynix and Rambus solved their disputes through a settlement.620  
Designing an access remedy is an onerous task. This is particularly true in the 
context of SEPs, where the evaluation may require an extensive analysis of variables 
such as the value of the patent, its contribution to the standard, the value of the 
standard. A more than 200 pages long decision in the Microsoft v. Motorola case (the 
first court decision defining a FRAND royalty) clearly shows that the determination of 
access terms is a case-specific, fact-intensive exercise, which requires a detailed 
analysis.621 As of April 2014, courts have not developed yet a generally accepted 
methodology for the determination of a FRAND royalty. 
Further, Rambus pointed out that even when similar information is available, 
enforcers might reach different conclusions on what constitutes a FRAND royalty. It is 
worth noting that an access remedy was adopted in the US, although Rambus’ conduct 
was challenged under a different theory of harm.622 In both jurisdictions, the adopted 
remedy imposed on Rambus the duty to license its SEPs on fair and reasonable terms. 
There was, however, a considerable difference in what the two competition agencies 
considered a fair royalty. Whereas in the US the royalty imposed on Rambus was less 
than 0.5%, the commitment adopted in the EU provides for a royalty of 1.5%.623 
Although the competition authorities of both sides of the Atlantic addressed the same 
                                                 
617 Rejection Decision, Case COMP/C-3/38 636 Rambus (Jan. 2010), 54-80. 
618 Case T-149/10 Hynix Semiconductor v Commission OJEU 148/42(2010). 
619 Id. 82. 
620 Press Release, Rambus and SK Hynix Sign Patent License Agreement (Jun. 2013), available at 
http://www.rambus.com/us/news/press_releases/2013/130611.html. 
621 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Mobility Inc., Case No. C10-
1823JLR, (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013). 
622 See discussion in Chapter VIII; Remedies for the SEP owner’s deceptive conduct. 
623 Compare: Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F. 3d. 456, 462 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Press Release, Antitrust, 
Commission Accepts Commitments from Rambus Lowering Memory Chip Royalty Rates, IP/09/1897 
(Dec. 9, 2009). 
 201 
 
conduct, concerning the exact same circumstances, they reached divergent conclusions 
of what constitutes a fair and reasonable royalty. The divergent conclusions reached 
by the two competition authorities point out how controversial can be the 
determination of an access remedy in the SEPs context. 
Erroneous decisions on what constitutes a FRAND royalty do not come without 
costs. On one hand, a remedy that is too lenient, might not address sufficiently the 
anticompetitive conduct. On the other hand, a remedy that is too strict could affect in 
a negative way the incentives to invest in innovation, and in the case of SEPs, the 
incentives to contribute the technology to the standard.624  
The difficulty in designing remedies might affect the agency’s decision to 
intervene against the SEP owner’s conduct in first place. As explained, under US 
antitrust law, the difficulty in designing adequate antitrust is often an argument 
against the antitrust intervention.625 The fact that the imposition of an antitrust 
remedy is particularly onerous might suggest that the intervention is not desirable in 
the first place. In the EU, on the contrary, the Commission has often emphasized that 
the difficulty in defining the adequate remedy does not affect the finding of an 
antitrust violation. The European Commission can in fact apply various mechanisms 
that might help in designing the adequate remedy, such as delegate the determination 
of the remedy to a third party, or a court or a specialized body, which would than 
determine the adequate licensing fee.626 However, the developments in the context of 
SEPs shows a different trend. Despite the legal basis for an intervention, the 
Commission seems to have taken a step back from prosecuting cases where the SEP 
owner allegedly imposed excessive royalties. Since the Rambus case, the Commission 
has not initiated any investigation for the imposition of excessive royalties, although 
such concerns were often raised in private disputes between the SEP owner and 
licensees. Further, in October 2013, the Commission stated that “[n]ational courts and 
                                                 
624 Bruce Lyons, The Paradox of the Exclusion of Exploitative Abuse, CCP Working Paper No. 08-1 
(2007). 
625 Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 US 398, 415 (2004). 
 The use of an independent expert opinion has been suggested by the European Commission (EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements § C(2010) 9274/2, ¶ 290 (2010)). 
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arbitrators are generally well equipped to do [define what is a FRAND royalty],”627 
signaling that disputes over FRAND royalties might be better addressed by courts (as 
part of private litigation) than by competition authorities. Therefore, it seems that also 
in the EU, the difficulties in designing an antitrust remedy has influenced the 
Commission’s willingness to cases concerning the imposition of excessive royalties.  
 
 
3. THE CONTROVERSIAL EFFECT OF SETTLEMENTS  
The analysis of the remedies imposed of SEP owners unveils another important 
aspect of the antitrust intervention. In most cases, antitrust remedies were adopted 
through settlements, including EU commitment decisions, US consent orders, and 
private settlements. Although a settlement of a private dispute is a legitimate decision 
of the parties in the dispute, one could question whether ending a public antitrust 
investigation through a commitment decision or a consent order is always a desirable 
solution as a matter of public policy.  
Ending the antitrust legal action through a settlement indeed has several 
beneficial aspects. Given that there is no need to prove that the challenged conduct 
constitutes an anticompetitive behavior, the procedure is faster, and requires less 
administrative resources.628 A settlement allows a more timely adoption of remedies, 
an aspect that might be particularly valuable in innovative markets, where 
technological changes are rapid and there is need for quick actions. Both the 
undertaking under investigation (that is, the SEP owner) and the competition 
authority have normally strong incentives to reach a settlement, and conclude the 
case. 629 The settlement allows the SEP owner to avoid a lengthy and expensive legal 
procedure, and the related reputational damages. It also avoids the formal finding of 
                                                 
627 Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Seeks Feedback on Commitments 
Offered by Samsung Electronics to Address Competition Concerns on Use of Standard Essential 
Patents – Questions and Answers (Oct. 17, 2013). 
628For the EU see: Case C-441/07 European Commission v Alrosa Company Ltd., 2010 ECR. I-05949, ¶ 
35 (2010). For the US see: C. F. Phillips, The Consent Decree in Antitrust Enforcement, 8 WASHINGTON 
AND LEE LAW REVIEW 39 (1961). 
629 H. hence, Schweitzer, Commitment Decision under Article 9 of the Regulation 1/2003: The 
Developing EC Practice and Case Law, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2008 : ANTITRUST 
SETTLEMENTS UNDER EC COMPETITION LAW (C.-D. Ehlermann and M. Marquis ed. 2008). 
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an infringement, which could be used in private damage claims.630 The use of 
settlements is favorable also for the antitrust authority, given that it does not need to 
meet the standard of proof required to show the existence of an anticompetitive 
conduct. There is consequently no need to engage in a full fact finding procedure. The 
savings of time and money allows the competition authorities to focus on other 
anticompetitive practices. Another advantage of a settlement is that it allows 
interested parties to participate in the enforcement action, by providing comments to 
the suggested remedies.631 Particularly when determining complex remedies, public 
comments may be helpful in evaluating the adequateness of the chosen remedy. 
Concluding the antitrust investigation through a settlement has nonetheless also 
negative aspects. Most importantly settlements do not contribute to the development 
of clear legal doctrines.632 In the case of a fully prosecuted infringement, there is a 
clear determination of whether the challenged conduct constitutes an anticompetitive 
behavior prohibited by competition law. This clarifies the scope competition law 
provisions have in addressing a specific conduct and contributes to the general 
deterrence of anticompetitive practices.633 Settlements, on the contrary, do not 
determine whether the challenged conduct constitutes a violation of the antitrust 
provisions. They maintain a substantive level of legal uncertainty, particularly in 
cases of novel conducts, where the borders of legitimacy have not been yet clearly 
defined.634 Exactly for this reasons, several commentators have emphasized that 
                                                 
630 In the EU, a commitments decision does not determined the existence of an infringement; hence, 
parties seeking private damages need to prove the illegality of the SEP owner’s conduct. In the US, 
statements in the settlements are generally not admissible as evidences in subsequent litigations 
between private parties. (S. Goldfein and T. S. Pak, Negotiated Antitrust Settlements: Some 
Perspectives from U.S. Defendants, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2008 : ANTITRUST 
SETTLEMENTS UNDER EC COMPETITION LAW (C.-D. Ehlermann and M. Marquis eds. 2008). 
631 C. F. Phillips, The Consent Decree In Antitrust Enforcement, 8 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW 
39 (1961). 
632 H. Schweitzer, Commitment Decision under Article 9 of the Regulation 1/2003: The Developing EC 
Practice and Case Law, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2008: ANTITRUST SETTLEMENTS UNDER 
EC COMPETITION LAW (C.-D. Ehlermann and M. Marquis ed. 2008). 
633 J. Fingleton, The Use of Settlements in Public Antitrust Enforcement: Objectives and Principles, in 
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2008 : ANTITRUST SETTLEMENTS UNDER EC COMPETITION LAW 
(C.-D. Ehlermann and M. Marquis ed. 2008). 
634 Wagner-Von Papp argues that: “The resulting decrease in infringement decisions breeds further 
legal uncertainty about what the law demands. This results in an even greater demand for commitment 
decisions and accordingly fewer infringement decisions. Lacking authoritative statements of the law, 
undertakings look to previous commitment decisions and non-binding guidelines to estimate the threat 
points in the bargaining process. This reliance on ‘quasi case law’ increases the Commission’s discretion 
in future negotiations.” F. Wagner-Von Papp, Best and Even Better Practices in the European 
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settlements are generally not appropriate in cases where the application of 
competition law is unclear.635 Forrester for example points out that some jurisdictions 
have limited the competition authorities’ ability to rely on settlements to cases, where 
the existence of an anticompetitive concern can be easily identified.636  
When antitrust remedies are adopted though settlements, there is also a higher 
risk that the adopted remedy will deter a pro-competitive practice. Ibáñez Colomo 
emphasizes that settlements often lack a thorough analysis of the effects the 
challenged conduct imposes on the market.637 There is consequently the risk that the 
agreed remedy will stop a conduct that is actually not harmful to consumers. The 
threat of a long public investigation, with a possible imposition of a substantial fine or 
damages, may stimulate the incumbent to offer to stop a practice that has no 
anticompetitive effects.638 Imposing a remedy against a conduct that is not 
anticompetitive restricts the means through which incumbent competes in the 
market.639 In such circumstances, the antitrust intervention is likely to harm, rather 
than protect, competition in the market.640  
Several of the mentioned concerns fit aptly in the context of SEPs. As shown in 
the previous chapters, the ability of the antitrust provision to address the SEP owners’ 
conduct remains in many aspects unsettled. And part of the reason why the law 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Commitment Procedure after Alrosa: The Dangers of Abandoning the Struggle for Competition Law, 49 
COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 929-970 (2012) . 
635 I. S. Forrester, Creating New Rules of Closing Easy Cases? Policy Consequences for Public 
Enfrocement of Settlements under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW 
ANNUAL 2008 : ANTITRUST SETTLEMENTS UNDER EC COMPETITION LAW (C.-D. Ehlermann and 
M.Marquis ed. 2008). 
636 Id. (The OFT has indicated, for example, that the acceptance of binding commitments is 
appropriate only where competition concerns are readily identifiable, which would seem to exclude 
commitments for novel cases.). 
637 P. IBÁÑEZ COLOMO, EUROPEAN COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND TECHNOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE (Alphen 
aan den Rijn ed., Kluwer Law International. 2010). 
638 H. Schweitzer, Commitment Decision under Article 9 of the Regulation 1/2003: The Developing EC 
Practice and Case Law, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2008 : ANTITRUST SETTLEMENTS 
UNDER EC COMPETITION LAW (C.-D. Ehlermann and M. Marquis ed. 2008). 
639 F. Wagner-von Papp, Best and Even Better Practices in the European Commitment Procedure after 
Alrosa: The Dangers of Abandoning the Struggle for Competition Law, 49 COMMON MARKET LAW 
REVIEW 929-970 (2012). 
640 A similar point was made by Commissioner Plat Majors (although referring the settlement in 
merger cases): “Parties often propose remedies prior to the conclusion of the Division’s investigation, 
which can efficiently save the taxpayers, the parties, and third parties time and expense. But the 
Division will not accept remedies simply to avoid investigative work. Consumers would not be 
benefitted if we secured a “scalp” when there was no violation. Indeed, if we do, they could, in fact, be 
harmed.” (Deputy Assistant Attorney General Deborah Platt Majoras, Antitrust Remedies in the United 
States: Adhering To Sound Principles in a Multi-Faceted Scheme (2002)). 
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remains unclear can be attributed to the fact that past investigations were often 
concluded through settlements, without providing clear legal doctrines.  
At the same time, it is also possible that some of the agreed remedies deterred a 
SEP owner’s pro-competitive conduct. For example, there is a substantial 
disagreement in the legal and economic theory on the effects the use of injunctive 
relief poses on the market. Without a thorough evaluation it is unclear whether in the 
concrete case the conduct was anticompetitive. It is thus possible that the agreed 
remedy prohibited a licensing practice that was actually pro-competitive.  
Finally, remedies agreed through settlements might also not have the desired 
deterrent effects. They do not provide for a monetary sanction (in the EU), nor they 
enable private parties the ability to recover damages. There is consequently the risk 
that the antitrust intervention will not sufficiently deter future SEP owners’ 
anticompetitive practices. 
These criticisms certainly do not imply that the legal actions brought against 
SEP owners should never be solved through settlements. They nonetheless indicate 
that competition authorities should be cautious in selecting cases they are willing to 
settle. The decision should be taken in light of the possibility of stopping a pro-
competitive practice, the need for legal clarity, and the need to deter future 
anticompetitive practices.  
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
The analysis has shown that the SEP owners’ opportunistic practices have 
triggered the application of both prohibitory and access remedies. The determination 
of an access remedy might be nonetheless particularly onerous in the context of SEPs. 
As shows by cases as Rambus and Microsoft v Motorola, it might be very difficult to 
determine what constitutes a FRAND royalty. It should hence come as no surprise 
that competition authorities, particularly in the US, have mainly focused their 
intervention to conducts that do not require the imposition of an access remedy.  
The analysis has also shows that although prohibitory remedies are easier to 
design and administer, they might have negative effects on the market, if applied 
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incorrectly. Those concerns are less strong in cases challenging the SEP owners’ 
deceptive practices. Deceptive practices have no pro-competitive effects and there are 
consequently less concerns that the imposed antitrust remedy will deter a conduct 
that is beneficial for consumers. The situation is different in cases that challenge the 
SEP owner’s licensing practices, such as the request for an injunction, where there is a 
disagreement concerning the actual effect the SEP owner’s conduct might have on the 
market. Particularly where the remedy is adopted through a settlement, without a 
thorough evaluation of the actual effects the challenged conduct imposes on the 
market, there is a risk that the imposed remedy will deter a pro-competitive conduct.  
The analysis also shows that the adoption of an antitrust remedy through a 
settlement is not always an optional solution. Although solving an antitrust 
investigation through a settlement allows the competition authority to addresses the 
anticompetitive concerns related to the SEP owner’s conduct in a timely manner, 
settlements might have also some negative consequences. On one hand, they maintain 
a significant level of legal uncertainty, given that they do not clarify the exact scope 
the antitrust provisions have in addressing the SEP owner’s conduct. At the same 
time, because of the absence of a detailed analysis of the effects the challenged conduct 
has on the market, remedies agreed to in a settlement might stop a practice that has 
no anticompetitive effects.  
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Chapter IX 
MECHANISMS PREVENTING DISPUTES IN THE SEP 
CONTEXT: THE INFORMAL ANTITRUST INTERVENTION  
The analysis presented in the previous chapters demonstrates that competition 
law is not able to provide a complete solution to the problems arising in the context of 
SEPs. Some conducts, although opportunistic, falls outside the domain of competition 
law. Others, provide the basis for an intervention, but such intervention remains 
controversial. The limitations competition law faces in addressing opportunistic 
practices in the context of SEPs suggest that mechanisms outside the sphere of 
competition law need to complement the antitrust intervention.  
Competition authorities on both sides of the Atlantic have devoted considerable 
attention in discussing mechanisms that could mitigate disputes related to SEPs. 
They have organized workshops, conferences, issued recommendations and policy 
papers with the general goal of promoting mechanisms that would mitigate the risk of 
opportunisms related to SEPs. As it will be explained, however, the approaches the 
competition authorities adopted in the two jurisdictions differs in several aspects. The 
aim of the chapter is not to provide a complete overview of the adopted mechanisms, 
but rather to assess what role competition law plays (and should play) in stimulating 
the implementation of those mechanisms. Should competition law be used as a tool to 
stimulate the adoption of mechanisms that could avoid opportunistic practices in the 
context of SEPs?  
The chapter is structured as follows. Frist, the chapter discusses the actions 
competition authorities have taken in stimulating the revision of SSOs’ rules. Next, 
the chapter evaluates the steps competition authorities have taken in promoting the 
ex ante discussion of licensing terms for SEPs. Further, the chapter evaluates the 
approaches competition authorities adopted with respect to the judicial remedies 
available to SEP owners. In conclusion, the chapter evaluates the role competition law 
should play in stimulating the adoption of further mechanisms that could address 
opportunistic practices in the context of SEPs.  
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1. REVISION OF THE SSOs’ RULES  
Both EU and U.S. competition authorities emphasized the importance SSOs’ 
rules play for the well-functioning of the standardization process. They noted that 
SSOs’ rules ensure that the pro-competitive effects on the standardization process are 
preserved, and that competition is not unduly restrained.641 The competition 
authorities of the two jurisdictions nonetheless adopted different approaches when 
stimulating SSOs to revise their internal rules in a way to avoid opportunistic 
conducts that might arise in the SEPs context.  
 
1.1. The EU approach toward SSOs’ rules  
In the EU, the Commission used its soft law mechanisms to stimulate SSOs to 
adopt specific procedural safeguards that could prevent opportunistic practices in the 
context of SEPs. Already 2001, the Commission issued the Guidelines on the 
Applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements 
(2001 Guidelines),642 a document that discussed, inter alia, the applicability of 
competition law provisions—mainly Article 101 TFEU—to standardization 
agreements. The document did not have a binding nature. It nonetheless aimed at 
stimulating SSOs to adopt procedural provisions that would avoid anticompetitive 
practices related to the adoption of the standard. The rationale for such 
recommendations was the following. A standardization agreement represents an 
agreement between market players―often horizontal competitors—concerning their 
future conduct in the market. It necessarily limits competition in the market and 
would, in principle, fall under the prohibition of Article 101(1) TFEU (at the time 
Article 82 EC)—the provision prohibiting anticompetitive agreements. Economic 
theory has recognized, nonetheless, that standards can have substantial pro-
competitive effects which are consistent with the goals of competition law. As a result, 
competition authorities have allowed standard-setting activities, on the condition they 
                                                 
641 For EU see: Commission Communication Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, O.J. C 11/1, 
¶268 (2010) ; For the US see: U.S. D.O.J. & F.T.C., ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 42-48 (2007). 
642 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Horizontal 
Cooperation Agreements, C 3/2 2001/C 3/02, ¶ 163 (2001). 
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are conducted through a procedure that permits the preservation of the pro-
competitive effects of standardization, and avoids unnecessary limitations to 
competition.643 The 2001 Guidelines suggested the procedural rules SSOs should adopt 
to preserve the pro-competitive effect of the standardization agreement, and in this 
way, avoid that the agreement would be considered anticompetitive (and thus void) 
under Article 101 TFEU.  
At the time of the adoption of the 2001 Guidelines, the main concerns with the 
standardization activities were collusion among SSO’s participants, and their ability 
to use the standard as a tool to foreclose third parties from the market.644 The 
Commission consequently tried to stimulate the adoption of rules that would reduce 
the risk of collusion and foreclosure. The 2001 Guidelines provided that 
standardization agreements that have a legitimate object do not fall under Article 101 
TFEU, if they meet specific procedural requirements.645 First, the standardization 
agreement must be determined through an unrestricted and transparent 
standardization procedure, and the SSO must not impose an obligation on participants 
to comply with the standard.646 Further, the 2001 Guidelines clarified that in cases 
where the standard becomes a de facto standard 
 
[t]he main concern will . . . be to ensure that th[e] standar[d] [is] as open as 
possible and applied in a clear non-discriminatory manner. To avoid 
elimination of competition in the relevant market(s), access to the standard 
must be possible for third parties on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory 
terms.647  
 
The openness and the transparency of the standardization procedure aimed to ensure 
that no company would be arbitrarily excluded from the standardization process, 
whereas an open access to the standard aimed preventing third party foreclosure.  
                                                 
643 Id at 163.  
644 Id. at 174-175. 
645 On the contrary, the 2001 Guidelines emphasized that standardization activities that are part of a 
broader practice that aims at excluding actual or potential competition constitute a clear antitrust 
violation, and is thus prohibited (Id. at. 165).  
646 Id. at 163. 
647 Id. at 174.  
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The Commission assumed that when the SSO implemented the suggested 
procedural requirements, there was a lower risk that SSO members could use the 
standard setting activities as a tool for collusion or foreclosure. There was 
consequently a legal presumption that the standardization agreement was not in 
violation of Article 101 TFEU. On the contrary, the legality of agreements adopted by 
an SSO which internal rules did not meet the procedural requirements determined in 
the 2001 Guidelines was evaluated on a case by case basis. Therefore, the threat of a 
competition law scrutiny was used as a tool to stimulate SSOs to implement the 
procedural requirements suggested in the 2001 Guidelines. 
In response to cases of patent ambush and patent holdup that arose in the years 
after the adoption of the 2001 Guidelines, the Commission issued revised guidelines in 
2011 – the Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements (the 2011 
Guidelines).648 The 2011 Guidelines confirmed the principles outlined in the old 
document, but addressed concerns related more specifically to SEPs. They clarified 
that the implementation of patented technologies in an industry standard is generally 
pro-competitive.649 The Commission however emphasized that the SSO needs to 
ensure effective access to the standard, by adopting a clear and balanced IPR policy, 
which “increases the likelihood that the implementers of the standard will be granted 
effective access to the standards elaborated by the [SSO].”650  
The 2011 Guidelines clarified that the SSO can promote the access to its 
standards through two main pillars. First, the SSO’s policy should require 
participants to make a good faith disclosure of the IPRs that might be relevant for the 
discussed standard.651 At the same time, the 2011 Guidelines suggested that SSOs 
should adopt an IPR policy that demands a participant wishing to have its IPR 
included in the standard to irrevocably commit to make its technologies available on 
FRAND terms.652 Further, the Guidelines suggested that the FRAND commitment 
                                                 
648 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, 2011 O.J. C 11/1 (2010).  
649 Id. at 269. 
650 Id. at 284. 
651 Id. at 268. 
652 Id. at 285. 
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should be binding even for companies to which SEPs are transferred at the later stage, 
that is, after the patented technology has been implemented in the standard.653  
Although the industry applauded the adoption of the 2011 Guidelines, one could 
question whether the Commission did not go too far in defining the procedural rules 
that an SSO needs to be met in order to avoid a liability under Article 101 TFEU. The 
general role of the guidelines is to provide directions regarding the way in which the 
Commission intends to interpret and apply EU competition law, and in this way 
increase transparency and ensure consistency in the application of the competition law 
provisions.654 The conditions of the safe harbor seem to nonetheless go beyond such 
intention. It seems that the Commission tried to use the guidelines as a tool to 
stimulate SSOs to adopt specific internal rules, a task that one would expect to be 
done by a legislator, but not by a competition authority.  
The Commission nonetheless explicitly emphasized that SSOs remain free to 
adopt internal rules different from the one suggested in the 2011 Guidelines. The 
Guidelines itself clarified that “[t]he non-fulfillment of any or all of the principles set 
out in this section will not lead to any presumption of a restriction of competition 
within Article 101(1).”655 When the SSO’ rules do not meet the requirement of the safe 
harbor, the legality of standardization agreement is evaluated on case by case basis, 
by analyzing the effects the agreement imposes on the market.656 In other words, the 
SSOs can adopt different procedural rules than the one suggested in the 2011 
Guidelines. However, in this case, the antitrust analysis will evaluate whether the 
adopted rules allowed an informed choice between technologies competing for the 
implementation in the standard.657 Recognizing the SSO’s ability to adopt different 
rules that the one suggested in the 2011 Guidelines indeed lessens the concerns that 
the Commission used the guidelines as a tool to “regulate” the standardization 
process. 
                                                 
653 Id. at 280. 
654 On Commission’s use of guidelines see: P. LAROUCHE, COMPETITION LAW AND REGULATION IN 
EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, (Hart Publishing 2000); B. EGELUND OLSEN & K. ENGSIG SØRENSEN, 
REGULATION IN THE EU (Thomson Sweet & Maxwell. 2006); H. A. Cosma and R. Whish, Soft Law in the 
Field of EU Competition Policy, 14 EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 1 (2003). 
655 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, 2011 O.J. C 11/1 (2010), 
¶279, 298.  
656 Id. at 279.  
657 Id. at 298. 
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It is also worth noting that after the adoption of the 2011 Guidelines, the 
Commission did not initiate any procedure against an SSO for the failure to 
implement specific procedural requirements. In 2005, the Commission signaled a 
possible intervention against ETSI, which, in the Commission’s view, did not adopt 
internal rules that would sufficiently protect against the risk of patent ambush.658 The 
Commission closed the investigation following ETSI’s change in the procedural rules, 
which strengthen the requirement for an early disclosure of essential patent rights. 
Since the adoption of the 2011 Guidelines, Commission has not brought any case 
against an SSOs for the failure to adopt an adequate IP policy. This suggests that 
although the Commission has tried to use competition law to stimulated SSOs to 
adopt specific procedural requirements, it does not intent to hold SSOs liable for every 
opportunistic practice that might arise in the standardization context.  
  
1.2.  The U.S. approach toward SSOs’ rules  
U.S. competition authorities adopted a less interventionist approach towards 
SSOs’ rules than their EU counterpart. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a private 
standard setting activity is permitted under the antitrust laws “only on the 
understanding that it will be conducted in a nonpartisan manner offering 
procompetitive benefits.”659 It nonetheless also emphasized that standardization 
activities of SSOs that do not have specific procedural requirements do not necessarily 
infringe antitrust law. The Supreme Court explained that  
 
the absence of procedural safeguards can in no sense determine the antitrust 
analysis. If the challenged concerted activity of [an association’s] members 
would amount to a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, no amount of 
procedural protection would save it. If the challenged action would not 
amount to a violation of § 1, no lack of procedural protections would convert 
                                                 
658 Europa Press Release, Commission Welcomes Changes in ETSI IPR Rules to Prevent ‘Patent 
Ambush, IP/05/1565 (Dec. 2005). 
659 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc. 486 U.S. 492, 506-07 (1988).  
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it into a per se violation because the antitrust laws do not themselves impose 
. . . a requirement of process.660  
 
The legality of the standardization agreement is thus evaluated under the “rule of 
reason”, by analyzing the effects the agreement imposes on the market. The absence 
or presence of specific procedural requirements can in no way predetermine the 
outcome of such analysis. 
It should consequently come as no surprise that the U.S. antitrust agencies have 
been more hesitant in suggesting to SSOs the implementation of specific procedural 
rules. The DOJ and the FTC did issue several documents addressing the problem of 
deceptive practices and holdup in the standard setting context. However, they did not 
issue a document comparable to the 2001 and 2011 Guidelines adopted in the EU.  
Some commentators have suggested that U.S. antitrust agencies should adopt a 
stricter approach towards SSOs. The American Antitrust Institute (AAI) for example 
submitted a petition to the FTC and the DOJ entitled “Request for Joint Enforcement 
Guidelines on the Patent Policies of Standard Setting Organizations”661 in which it 
urged the two antitrust agencies to step up their enforcement of the antitrust laws 
with respect to SSOs themselves. To that end, the AAI suggested the FTC and the 
DOJ to (1) issue specific guidelines for what should be included in SSO patent policies, 
and (2) hold SSOs liable for not adopting procedural safeguards to prevent patent 
holdup behavior. The AAI suggested the adoption of very specific rules. First, it 
suggested that SSOs should provide a mandatory disclosure of relevant patents 
(including anticipated and pending patent applications), supported by good faith 
reasonable inquiry (in contracts with disclosure in good faith currently required by 
most SSOs).662 Second, the AAI suggested that SSO’s rules should mandate a royalty-
free license for patents that are not disclosed during the standardization process.663 
                                                 
660 Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 293 (1985).  
661 American Antitrust Institute (AAI), Request for Joint Enforcement Guidelines on the Patent 
Policies of Standard Setting Organizations (May 2013), [hereinafter AAI Request for Joint Enforcement 
Guidelines] available at: 
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/~antitrust/sites/default/files/Request%20for%20Joint%20Enforcement
%20Guidelines%20on%20the%20Patent%20Policies%20of%20Standard%20Setting%20Organizations.p
df.  
662 Id. at 13. 
663 Id. at 14. 
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Third, SSOs should require that participants commit to license their SEPs on RAND 
terms, with a RAND royalty reflecting “a patent’s incremental value to the standard 
before adoption and commercialization”—the so-called “ex ante” value of the patent.664 
Fourth, the AAI suggested that SSO’s rules should prohibit the use of injunctions and 
exclusion orders against any willing licensee infringing a SEP. Fifth, the AAI 
suggested that the SSOs provides for an efficient, cost-effective process to resolve 
disputes over RAND royalty and non-royalty terms (for example, a baseball-style 
arbitration).665  
Therefore, the AAI’s proposal suggested that U.S. antitrust agencies should adopt 
a similar approach as the one adopted in the EU, where the competition authorities 
use the threat of an antitrust liability as a tool to stimulate SSOs to adopt specific 
procedural rules. However, the rules suggested by the AAI were much more detailed 
than those found in the EU. The AAI suggested that the antitrust agencies should 
adopt also a stricter approach towards SSOs than the one adopted in the EU, and 
considered them liable if they fail to adopt rules that would adequately prevent the 
SEP owner’s opportunism. As of April 2014, however, U.S. antitrust agencies did not 
adopt an official position toward the suggestions, and did not initiate any formal 
procedure against an SSO that has failed to adopt rules that would prevent 
participants’ opportunistic practices. 
One could also question whether the unilateral conduct of a SEP owner could 
truly trigger the liability of the SSO. The AAI argument is clear. The SEP owner’s 
opportunistic practice returns the standardization agreement to its anticompetitive 
status, and could thus trigger the SSO’s antitrust liability. However, can the SSO be 
held liable for the unilateral conduct of one of its members? 
The issue was partially discussed in the American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers v Hydrolevel, where the Supreme Court found the SSO liable for the 
anticompetitive conduct of its agent.666 The American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers, Inc. (ASME) was a nonprofit SSO, which inter alia promulgated and 
published standards for heating boilers. McDonnell & Miller, Inc. (M&M) was the 
leading company in the market for low-water fuel cutoffs. M&M’s vice president, was 
                                                 
664 Id.  
665 Id. at 15. 
666 American Society of Mechanical Engineers v Hydrolevel Corp., 456 US 556 (1982). 
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also an agent of the ASME, more precisely a chairman of one of ASME’s 
subcommittees. The vice president allegedly used its position at ASME to harm the 
ability of other companies to compete with M&M. He did so, by replying in the name of 
ASME to a public inquiry concerning one ASME’s standards, and providing a 
deceptive interpretation of that standard. The Supreme Court found the SSO liable for 
its agent’s conduct. It emphasized that by imposing civil liability on the SSO for the 
antitrust violations of its agents acting with apparent authority, “it is much more 
likely that similar antitrust violations will not occur in the future. Only ASME can 
take systematic steps to make improper conduct unlikely.”667 The Supreme Court 
concluded that  
 
a rule that imposes liability on the standard-setting organization—which is best 
situated to prevent antitrust violations through the abuse of its reputation—is 
most faithful to the congressional intent that the private right of action deter 
antitrust violations.668 
 
The Hydrolevel decision thus confirmed that the SSO can be held liable for the 
conduct of its members. 669 
However, the decision is not necessarily applicable to all situations in the 
standardization context. In Hydrolevel, the Supreme Court relied upon general 
principles of principle agent relationship when determining the SSO’s liability. The 
case did not concern only a membership in an SSO, but a situation where the person 
engaging in the anticompetitive practice acted under the SSO’s authority—in its name 
(although for the benefit of its employer). Hydrolevel thus might not apply to the 
                                                 
667 Id. at 572. 
668 Id. at. 573.  
669 The possibility to held an SSO liable for the anticompetitive conduct of its participant was recently 
confirmed also in the TruePosition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Telephone Co.. TruePosition alleged that 
Ericsson, Qualcomm Inc., and Alcatel-Lucent USA, abused their positions of authority within an SSO, 
by violating its rules and procedures in order to conspire to exclude the TruePosition’s technology form 
the 4th generation ("4G") global standard for mobile telecommunications technologies. TruePosition 
argued that such conspiracy constituted a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The company 
brought an action against SSO, noting that the three companies acted under the authority of SSO as 
Chairmen and a Vice Chairman of key subcommittees in order to manipulate the standardization 
process. TruePosition alleged that the fact that the three companies acted as agents of the SSO makes 
the Hydrolevel judgment directly applicable. The court agreed, finding that the Complaint plausibly 
alleges that the SSO joined the alleged conspiracy (TruePosition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Telephone Co., 
899 F.Supp.2d 356 (ED Penn. 2012)). 
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standardization context where participants do not act in the name of the SSO. 
Consequently, a mere participation in an SSO might be not sufficient to prove a 
principal-agent relationship, and absent such relationship, it might be difficult to 
prove the SSO’s responsibility for the SEP owner’s conduct.  
It is worth noting that, despite the absence of an intervention on the side of 
competition authorities, also U.S. SSOs have adopted procedural safeguards similar 
the one suggested in the EU guidelines. Several reasons explain the SSOs’ voluntary 
implementation of such procedural rules. First, an SSO willing to develop a standard 
that can be referred by U.S. public agencies (for example in a regulation) needs to 
comply with specific procedural requirements. These requirements are determined in 
the Standards Development Organization Advancement Act,670 and in the OMB 
Circular A-119. The two documents provide, inter alia, that an SSO should ensure 
that the technology owner makes its IPR available on a non-discriminatory, royalty-
free or reasonable royalty basis to all interested parties. Only the standards adopted 
by SSOs that comply with such procedural requirements can be referred by the public 
authorities in their legislation. Hence, the U.S. government—in the role of the SSOs’ 
customer—imposed on the SSOs the obligation to respect specific requirements, if they 
wish their standards to be referred by public agencies. 
Second, an SSO that wants to obtain the accreditation from American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI) is encouraged to implement specific procedural rules. This 
includes requirements of due process, openness of the standardization procedure, and 
consensus.671 ANSI also encourages SSOs to adopt a policy that invites participants to 
                                                 
670 The Guidelines for Collaborations among Competitors, later amended by the Standards 
Development Organization Advancement Act (SDOAA), discussed the applicability of antitrust law to 
SSOs that develop standards to which public agencies refer to in the regulation. The increasing reliance 
of public agencies on standards developed by private SSOs was perceived as having unfairly increased 
the potential liability of those SSOs. Such liability was consequently reduced through the adoption of 
the SDOAA, which clarifying that activities of SSOs will be evaluated under the rules of reason. At the 
same time, it also limited the antitrust liability of SSOs to actual, as opposed to treble, damages. In 
order to benefit from the limited liability, however, the SSO must file a proper notification with the 
FTC, and must comply with the due process requirements described in OMB Circular A-119. This 
requires that the standardization process is based on a principles of openness, balance of interests, due 
process, appeal process and consensus, and require IP owners to make their rights available on non-
discriminatory, royalty-free or reasonable royalty basis to all interested parties.(Standards 
Development Organization Advancement Act amend. 118 Stat. 661 ANTITRUST DIVISION DEPARTMENT 
OF JUSTICE, Justice Department Implements the Standards Development Organization Advancement 
Act of 2004 (2004). 
671 American National Standards Institute (ANSI), Essential Requirements: Due Process 
Requirements for American National Standards (2006) [herinafter ANSI Essential Requirements], 
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disclose whether they hold any relevant patents, and in the case they do, to clarify 
whether they are willing to license their patented technologies on reasonable terms.672 
SSOs are not required to obtain ANSI’s accreditation and implement the suggested 
rules. However, market forces often stimulate them to do so. In fact, SSOs accredited 
by ANSI are the primary source of many U.S. standards. The accreditation has hence 
a market value, given that it allows the SSO to signal a reliability and quality of its 
standards.  
Third, evidence shows that also SSOs that are not accredited by ANSI often 
comply with the suggested procedural requirements.673 Updegrove explains that in the 
late 1980s, in the information technology industry, there was an increasing number of 
SSOs that operated in the information technology industry and followed a model 
similar to the one promoted by ANSI, although these SSOs did not require 
accreditation. Those SSOs often complied with procedural requirements that are as 
stringent as the one required to obtain ANSI accreditation. A voluntary adherence to 
procedural requirements confirms that SSOs have a self-interest to adhere to the 
suggested procedural requirement. Compliance can represent a tool to signal to the 
market the credibility and reliability of the SSO, and thus facilitate the development 
of successful, widely implemented standards.  
In sum, although U.S. competition authorities adopted a less interventionist 
approach in stimulating the revision of the SSO’s’ rules, U.S. SSOs have adopted 
similar procedural requirements as the SSOs based in the EU.  
 
1.3. Did competition law have a role in the revision of SSOs’ rules?  
A review of the recent developments in the SEPs context shows that most SSOs 
have adopted procedural rules that mitigate the risk that companies will engage in 
opportunistic practices while participating in the standardization process. For 
example, SSOs have adopted clear disclosure policies, which require the participants 
in the standardization process to disclose ex ante the existence of any patent and 
                                                                                                                                                                  
available at http://www.asce.org/uploadedFiles/Codes_and_Standards_-
_New/ansiessential06updates.pdf. 
672 Id. at § 3.1.  
673 A. Updegrove, Chapter 8: Creating a Standard Setting Organization Technical Process, § III, in The 
Essential Guide to Standards, available at http://www.consortiuminfo.org/essentialguide/creating.php. 
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patent application that might be relevant for the discussed standard.674 The obligation 
to disclose up front the patent interest increases the transparency of the 
standardization process, allowing participants to make an informed choice about the 
technologies to be implemented in the standard.675 Further, precise disclosure rules 
avoid cases as Rambus, where it was not clear whether participants had to disclose 
only granted patents or also patent applications and other forms of patent interest.  
SSOs have also adopted rules that require the participant to clarify whether it is 
willing to license its patents under specific terms (generally FRAND terms), if 
implemented in the standard.676 A FRAND commitment facilitates an open access to 
standard. In the absence of such commitment, a SEP owner would have a statutory 
right to refuse to license its SEPs, and could thus prevent the access to the standard. 
Further, some SSOs have adopted a “general FRAND commitment,” a commitment 
through which the participant offers to license on FRAND terms any of its patented 
technologies implemented in the standard, regardless of whether it was disclosed 
during the standardization process.677 As a result, any patent implemented in the 
standard is subject to the FRAND commitments, irrespectively from whether the 
existence of the patent has been disclosed during the standardization process.  
Finally, most SSOs also included a rule concerning the transferability of the 
FRAND commitment. According to this provision, when the SEP owner transfers a 
FRAND-encumbered patent to a new entity, the latter is bound by the FRAND 
commitment given by the previous SEP owner.678 This provision addresses cases such 
as N-Data and IPCom, where it was not clear whether the new SEP owner was bound 
by the FRAND commitment made by the previous SEP owner. 
                                                 
674 See, e.g., VMEbus International Trade Association (VITA), VSO Policies and Procedures, § 10.1 
(Nov. 2009), available at http://www.vita.com/home/VSO/vso-pp-r2d6.pdf [hereinafter VITA internal 
policy]; Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (JEDEC), JEDEC Manual of Organization and 
Procedure, § 8.2. (Nov. 2011) [JEDEC internal policy]; European Telecommunication Standard Institute 
(ETSI), Annex 6: ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy (Mar. 2013), available at 
http://www.etsi.org/images/files/IPR/etsi-ipr-policy.pdf [ETSI internal policy]. 
675 Id. at 286.  
676 See, e.g., VITA internal policy at § 10.3; JEDEC internal policy at § 8.2.4: ETSI internal policy at § 
6.1. 
677 See, e.g., International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Guidelines for Implementation of ITU-T 
Patent Policy, § 2.5 (June 2002), available at http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/ipr/Pages/revpatent.aspx [ITU 
internal rules]; ETSI internal policy at § 6.2. (referring to a patent family). 
678 See, e.g., ETSI internal policy at § 6.1bis. 
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Therefore, subsequent to the disputes that arose in the context of SEPs, most 
SSOs revised their internal rules in a way to mitigate the risk of opportunistic 
practices. However, was the revision of the rules stimulated by the antitrust 
intervention? Were the adopted of new SSOs’ rule stimulated by the issuance of 
documents, such as the Commission’s 2011 Guidelines? Would we observe a similar 
development even in absence of the antitrust intervention?  
There is unfortunately no clear cut answer to these questions. Indeed, one could 
argue that the antitrust actions initiated by the competition authorities against SEP 
owners, coupled with the Commission’s Guidelines, did point out at the deficiencies of 
the SSOs’ rules and did stimulate SSOs to revise them. A different explanation is 
however also possible. SSOs have an interest in adopting clear procedural rules. 
Avoiding participants’ deceptive practices allows the SSO to make an informed 
selections of the technologies to be implemented in the standard, and thus select a 
standard of a higher quality. Further, FRAND commitments ensure that the standard 
will be accessible to all parties interested in the implementation of the standard. 
Developing a successful standard is clearly in the interest of the SSOs, given the more 
successful the standard is, the more profit will the SSO normally generate. In other 
words, SSOs had a clear interest in revising the rules in a way to avoid opportunisms. 
It is therefore possible that the revision of the SSOs’ rule would have occurred even in 
absence of an antitrust intervention. The U.S. experience supports this suggestion. In 
the United States, in fact, SSOs have adopted similar procedural requirements as the 
one applied by SSOs in the EU, although there was not intervention of the side of the 
competition authorities. It is thus possible that the competition authorities’ 
intervention did not have a major role in stimulating the revision of the SSOs’ rules.  
Surprisingly, SSOs did not adopt any mechanism to address the SEP owner’s 
ability to impose exploitative licensing practices. Rather the contrary. SSOs generally 
state that any dispute concerning the licensing terms should be solved between the 
parties of the licensing agreement, outside the standardization context.679 SSOs did 
                                                 
679 See, e.g., ITU internal rules § 6.3 (“ITU should not engage in settling disputes on patent rights; this 
should be left - as in the past - to the parties concerned. This viewpoint is reaffirmed by the fact that 
none of the standardization organizations which use a similar code of practice as the ITU have departed 
from this principle.”). The only exception is VITA, an SSO which has adopted an internal dispute 
resolution mechanism, through which parties can solve their disagreement regarding FRAND terms. 
VITA internal policy at § 10.5. 
 220 
 
also not adopt any mechanisms to address the risk of royalty stacking, or provisions 
that would prohibit the SEP owner to use injunctions against infringers of SEPs. 680  
What is the reason for the SSOs’ failure to adopt mechanisms that would address 
the SEP owner’s ex post opportunism? One argument could be that the SSO’s 
incentives are not aligned with those of consumers, and that the SSO has 
consequently no interest in adopting such mechanisms. Cases of patent holdup harm 
consumers, if exploitative licensing conditions are passed on them. However, the SSO 
does not necessarily have an incentive to prevent consumers’ harm. A different 
explanation is nonetheless also possible. One could argue that cases of patent holdup 
are not that frequent in practice, and that there is consequently no need for the SSO to 
intervene. SSOs are business entities, driven by a clear business goal: develop 
successful standards which are widely implemented by the market. It is thus 
reasonable to expect that the SSO would address practices that harm the success of 
the standard. The fact that SSOs did not take any action in relation to cases of alleged 
patent holdup suggests that, in practice, cases of patent hold up (if they arise at all) 
did not have a significant effect on the standards’ success.  
In sum, although SSOs’ have revised their internal rules in a way that decreases the 
possibility of opportunistic practices, it remains unclear whether such changes have 
been stimulated by the intervention of the competition authorities. SSOs have a clear 
interest in preventing deceptive practices that could harm the success of the standard, 
and are consequently interested in adopting adequate procedural rules, even in 
absence of an antitrust stimulus. 
 
 
                                                 
680 SSOs’ internal rules do generally not provide that by making a FRAND commitment the SEP 
holder waves its right to seek an injunction in cases of infringement. ETSI discussed the possibility to 
implement in its internal policy a prohibition to seek an injunction for FRAND encumbered patent. The 
Interim IPR policy adopted in 1993 limitation to the SEP holder’s use of injunctions. This provision was 
however later excluded from the policy adopted in 1994, and, to this day, it has not been implemented 
again. (See: R. G. Brooks & D. Geradin, Taking Contracts Seriously: The Meaning of the Voluntary 
Commitment to Licence Essential Patents on “Fair and Reasonable” Terms, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND COMPETITION LAW: NEW FRONTIERS (Steven Anderman & Ariel Ezrachi ed., 2011)). 
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2. EX ANTE DISCUSSION OF LICENSING TERMS 
The concerns with patent holdup have stimulated competition authorities to 
change their approach towards the discussion of licensing terms during the 
standardization process. Competition authorities were traditionally suspicious toward 
the discussion of licensing terms, because of the risk of collusion. As a result, SSOs 
have generally prohibited participants to discuss the licensing terms during the 
standardization process. The licensing terms have to be determined in bilateral 
negotiations between the SEP owner and the manufacturer, outside of the 
standardization process. 
With time, however, competition authorities recognized that allowing the 
discussion of the licensing terms for SEPs ex ante could mitigate the risk of patent 
holdup. They recognized that if participants revealed the exact licensing terms for 
their technologies during the standardization process, the SSO would be able to base 
the selection of the technology both on quality and price.681 An ex ante determination 
of licensing terms would also avoid the risk of ex post opportunism, preventing the 
SEP owner to hold up the licensee and demanding unfair royalties after the licensees 
are locked-in the use of the SEPs.682 Competition authorities have thus announced 
their willingness to adopt a more flexible approach toward the discussion of licensing 
terms during the standardization process.  
Competition authorities were particularly supportive towards SSOs’ rules that 
would allow participants to make an ex ante unilateral declaration of the licensing 
terms. In the EU, the Commission clarified this position in the 2011 Guidelines, where 
it maintained that a technology owner is authorized to reveal the maximum level 
royalty that it intends to charge for the use of its SEP.683 The DOJ and the FTC 
expressed a similar position in the 2007 document Antitrust Enforcement And 
Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition, where they 
suggested that a voluntary and unilateral disclosure of its licensing terms, including 
                                                 
681 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, 2011 O.J. C 11/1, ¶ 299 
(2010). 
682 U.S. D.O.J. & F.T.C., ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 49 (2007). 
683 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, 2011 O.J. C 11/1, ¶ 299 
(2010). 
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royalty levels, will generally not trigger the application of Section 1 or Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.684 The two agencies clarified that that the ex ante negotiations of 
licensing terms will be analyzed under the rule of reason, evaluating whether the 
restraints imposed by the negotiation are likely to have anticompetitive effects and, if 
so, whether the restraints are reasonably necessary to achieve pro-competitive 
benefits that outweigh those anticompetitive effects.685  
The DOJ confirmed this approach in two business review letters.686 The first 
letter concerned the IP policy of VMEbus International Trade Association (VITA), 
which imposed on its members the duty to state the maximum (and most restrictive) 
royalty rate for its patents that could be implemented in the standard.687 The second 
letter referred to International Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) 
policy, which unlike VITA, provided that members could, but were not forced to, 
declare the maximum royalty rates and most restrictive licensing terms. In both 
occasions, the DOJ recognized that ex-ante consideration of licensing terms can be 
pro-competitive, and thus concluded that the policies suggested by the two SSOs 
would not be considered anticompetitive.688 
Competition authorities maintained a less permissive approach towards a 
collective discussion of licensing terms. In the EU, the Commission has made clear 
that it remains unfavorable to any form of collective negotiation of royalties.689 On the 
other hand, the U.S. antitrust agencies indicated that a collective negotiation would 
not be considered as a per se violation, but evaluated under the rule of reason. The 
                                                 
684 U.S. D.O.J. & F.T.C., ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 54 (2007).  
685 Id. at 16. 
686 A business review letter is the DOJ’s response to a request of a private party to clarify the 
enforcement intentions relative to the party's proposed conduct. They reflect the enforcement positions 
of the antitrust agency and are based on the existing case law and the current economic thinking of the 
authority. Business review letters are however not binding upon the courts. (For a general discussion 
see: L. E. Barrows, Why The Enforcement Agencies’ Recent Efforts Will Not Encourage Ex Ante 
Licensing Negotiations In Standard-Setting Organizations, 89 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 967(2011)). 
687 Letter from Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. DOJ, to Robert A. Skitol, 2006 
[hereinafter VITA Business Review Letter] available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/219380.pdf.  
688 Letter from Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. DOJ, to Michael A. Lindsay (Apr. 
2007), [hereinafter IEEE Business Review Letter], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/222978.htm. 
689 Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, 2011 O.J. C 11/1, ¶ 299 (2010) (presenting a favorable 
approach only to the unilateral disclosure of licensing terms). 
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DOJ emphasized that also joint negotiations of licensing terms could have pro-
competitive effects, given that they could, inter alia, mitigate the risk of holdup. 690 In 
the view of the DOJ. an ex ante joint negotiation of the licensing terms could reduce 
uncertainty over the licensing terms, decrease ex post litigation, prevent delays in the 
implementation of standard, and perhaps increase the efficiencies in the development 
of standards.691  
Commentators in the legal and economic literature have expressed divergent 
opinions on the authorities’ approach toward ex ante negotiation of licensing terms, 
particularly in relation to cases of a joint negotiation. Some authors have pointed out 
that a joint negotiation could give raise to anticompetitive practices. There is the risk, 
for example, that the negotiation of licensing terms becomes a tool for price fixing, but 
also for the exercise oligopolistic power on technology providers.692 A group of licensees 
could use the strong bargaining power to reduce the SEP owners’ royalties below 
competitive levels. This can deprive the SEP owner from receiving adequate 
compensation, and consequently decrease its willingness to participate in future 
standardization activities.693  
Empirical data unveils that the ex ante disclosure of licensing terms (both 
unilateral and collective) had a relatively low success in practice. Although SSOs, such 
as IEEE and ETSI, implemented policies that allowed participants to disclose their 
most restrictive licensing terms, SSOs’ members have shown a general resistance to 
make such disclosure.694 Participants have often emphasized that it is difficult for 
companies to make an ex ante determination of a licensing fee. The licensing 
conditions are contingent on several variables, such as the patent portfolio of the 
licensee, the patent portfolio of the SEP owner, the business structure of both the 
                                                 
690 VITA Business Review Letter. 
691 D. Platt Majoras, Recognizing The Procompetitive Potential of Royalty Discussions In Standard 
Setting, speech prepared for Standardization and the Law Developing the Golden Mean For Global 
Trade (Sep. 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050923stanford.pdf. 
692 See, e.g., R. Gilbert, Deal or no Deal? Licensing negotiation By Standard Development 
organizations (Jun. 2011), available at: 
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/users/gilbert/wp/Gilbert_Deal%20or%20No%20Deal_15%20June%202011.pdf.  
693 See, e.g., D. Platt Majoras, Recognizing The Procompetitive Potential of Royalty Discussions In 
Standard Setting, speech prepared for Standardization and the Law Developing the Golden Mean For 
Global Trade (Sep. 2005).  
694 See, e.g., J. Contreras, An Empirical Study of the Effects of Ex Ante Licensing Disclosure Policies 
on the Development of Voluntary Technical Standard (National Institute of Standard and Technology, 
Jun. 2011), available at http://gsi.nist.gov/global/docs/pubs/NISTGCR_11_934.pdf. 
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licensor and licensee, all factored which are often unknown at the time of the 
discussion of the standard. This renders the ex ante declaration of licensing term 
impractical. Therefore, although competition authorities showed a favorable approach 
toward the ex ante declaration of licensing term, the technique did not have a big 
success in practice. Most licensing terms are still determined at the bilateral level, 
typically after the adoption of the standard.695  
 
 
3. JUDICIAL REMEDIES 
Competition authorities devoted a considerable attention also to the discussion 
on the judicial remedies that a SEP owner might be able to obtain against infringers of 
SEPs. The major concern expressed by the competition authorities is that SEP owners 
could use judicial remedies, as for example an injunction, to distort the negotiation of 
the licensing terms and extract exploitative licensing conditions. Competition 
authorities suggested that a revision of the available remedies could mitigate the risk 
of the SEP owners’ opportunism. Also in this case, however, there are important 
differences between the approach adopted in the EU and in the United States. 
 
3.1. Injunctions and exclusion orders  
One of the issues of major concern is the SEP owner’s ability to obtain injunctive 
relief against an infringer of a FRAND-encumbered patent. The DOJ and the FTC 
recognized that granting injunctive relief in case of patent infringement is in general 
procompetitive.696 They nonetheless added that, in some circumstances, the threat of 
an injunction can favor holdup, and deprive consumers from the benefits brought by 
standardization.697 They consequently suggested that SEP owners should have only a 
limited ability to obtain injunctions. 
                                                 
695 Such bilateral agreements are normally permitted under antitrust law, given that they represent a 
regular negotiation between the SEP holder and the licensee. 
696 Id. at 26. 
697 Id. at 5, 26. 
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Under U.S. law, eBay provides the framework for the determination whether the 
issuance of an injunction is appropriate.698 In eBay, the Supreme Court emphasized 
that a patent owner is not automatically entitled to an injunction upon the finding of 
an infringement, but rather, it must demonstrate that (1) it has suffered an 
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are 
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of 
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and 
(4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.699 Only 
when the listed requirements are met, the patent owner will be able to obtain an 
injunction. 
The DOJ and the FTC suggested that the existence of a FRAND commitment 
may suggest that “denial of an injunction in favor of ongoing royalties will not 
irreparably harm the [SEP owner].”700 They added that in evaluation the public 
interest factors, courts may consider  
 
grant[ing] . . . an injunction would deprive consumers of interoperable products; 
raise costs above the incremental value of the invention compared to alternatives 
at the time the standard was set; or threaten to undermine the collaborative 
innovation that can result from the standard setting process.701  
 
Hence, the two agencies suggested that the remedy available against infringers of 
FRAND-encumbered patents should be monetary compensation, rather than 
injunction. They added that monetary damages might be particularly appropriate 
when the SEP owner is an NPE.702  
Further, the DOJ and the FTC addressed also the SEP owner’s ability to obtain 
an exclusion order from the International Trade Commission (ITC). A patent owner 
that believes that a specific product imported in the United States infringes its patent 
                                                 
698 Id. at 28. 
699 eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange LL, 547 US 388, 391 (2006). 
700 Id. at 28. 
701 Id.  
702 Id. at 27. (“Conventional wisdom assumes that patentees that do not compete in a product market 
cannot obtain injunctions because money damages will adequately compensate any harm they may 
suffer from infringement.”). 
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may file a complaint with the ITC under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. If an 
infringement is found, the ITC will issue an exclusion order against the infringing 
product, preventing in this way its import in the United States. Unlike cases where 
the SEP owner request an injunction, the patent owner does not need to meet the 
eBay requirements in order to obtain an exclusion order. The DOJ and the FTC 
suggested that the ITC should nonetheless take into account the risk of patent holdup 
when deciding whether to grant an exclusion order against an infringer of a SEP.703 
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 requires the ITC to take into account whether the 
exclusion order will have an effect on “the public health and welfare, competitive 
conditions in the United States economy, the production of like or directly competitive 
articles in the United States, and United States consumers.”704 The FTC and the DOJ 
suggested that an exclusion order against an infringer of a SEP may be in some 
circumstances inconsistent with the public interest, given that it may harm 
competition and consumers “by degrading one of the tools [SSOs] employ to mitigate 
the threat of SEP owners’ opportunistic actions.”705 When this is the case, the two 
agencies suggested that the ITC should reject to issue an exclusion order against 
infringers of SEPs.706  
The suggestions of the two antitrust agencies were partially followed by relevant 
courts. Some courts have been reluctant issue injunctions against infringers of 
FRAND encumbered patents. 707 They reasoned that the SEP owner might not be able 
to show that the payment of monetary damages is not an adequate remedy for the 
infringement.708  
                                                 
703 US D.O.J. & THE F.T.C., THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES 
WITH COMPETITION at 30 (2011). (A similar position was expressed also in later documents. See, e.g., 
U.S. Dept. of Justice & U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-
Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments (2013)). 
704 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1). 
705 The DOJ and the US Patent Office confirmed this position in a later document discussing the 
remedies available to SEP owners (U.S. Dept. of Justice & U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Policy 
Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments, 
at 6 (2013). 
706 US D.O.J. & THE F.T.C., THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES 
WITH COMPETITION at 242-243 (2011). 
707 See, e.g., Opinion and Order at * 18, Apple Inc. v. Motorola Inc,, 1:11-cv-08540, (N.D. Ill. June 22, 
2012) (“ I don’t see how, given FRAND, I would be justified in enjoining Apple from infringing the ‘898 
unless Apple refuses to pay a royalty that meets the FRAND requirement.”). 
708 See, e.g., Opinion and Order at * 18 & 19, Apple Inc. v. Motorola Inc,, 1:11-cv-08540, (N.D. Ill. June 
22, 2012) (“By committing to license its patents on FRAND terms, [the SEP owner] implicitly 
acknowledged that a royalty is adequate compensation for a license to use that patent.”). 
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On the contrary, the ITC was less willing to follow the suggestion of the two 
agencies. In 2013, the ITC for example issued an exclusion order again Apple’s 
products that violated Samsung’s SEPs.709 However, the exclusion order finally did not 
take place in practice. The United States Trade Representative (USTR) used an 
extraordinary measure and issued a notice (veto) to disapprove the exclusion order of 
the ITC. The USTR maintained that issuing an exclusion order against Apple could 
result in patent holdup and was thus not appropriate.710 The veto nonetheless 
emphasized that the decision was fact specific and did not imply that the SEP owner 
should be never able to obtain an exclusion order. Rather, the USTR suggested that 
the ITC should evaluate the specific circumstances of each case, consider the risk of 
patent holdup and reversed patent holdup, and evaluate whether based on such 
considerations the issuance of an exclusion order is appropriate.711 The USTR veto 
indeed strengthens the recommendation of the antitrust agencies, and suggest that it 
might be more difficult for a SEP owners to obtain an exclusion order against infringer 
of SEPs.  
The situation is different in the European Union. The Commission has not 
directly discussed the SEP owner’s ability to obtain an injunction in front of national 
courts. As explained earlier, the Commission found that by requesting and enforcing 
an injunction against Apple Motorola abused its dominant position. However, the 
Commission did not directly suggest that courts should not issue injunctions to SEP 
owners. In other spheres, such as private enforcement, the Commission has shown 
itself ready to issue guidance to national courts, so its silence in this context is 
surprising. 
The analysis of the decisions taken at the national level indicates that the 
national courts decisions are not completely in line with the position expressed by the 
European Commission.712 The standards applied by national courts seem different 
                                                 
709 See, e.g., Notice of Final Determination, Certain Electronic Devices Including Wireless 
Communication Devices Portable Music and Data Processing Devices, and Tablet Computers, I.T.C. 
(Jun 2013).  
710 USTR’s notice to the USITC, Disapproval of the U.S. International Trade Commission’s 
Determination in the Matter of Certain Electronic Devices, Including Wireless Communication Devices, 
Portable Music and Data Processing Devices, and Tablet Computers, Investigation No. 337-TA-794, at 3 
(August 3, 2013). 
711 Id. at 3-4. 
712 See discussion in Chapter VI, 2.2.B. The SEP owner’s request for an injunction . 
 228 
 
from the standard suggested by the European Commission. In particular, German 
courts have required a more proactive conduct on the side of the licensee in order to be 
considered “willing” and thus be able to avoid an injunction. As explained, those 
divergences have been pointed out by the Düsseldorf court, which referred several 
questions to the ECJ. As of April 2014, the ECJ did not provide yet an answer. It is 
nonetheless evident that the European Commission’s suggested approach was not 
unconditionally accepted by national courts.  
In sum, competition authorities of both jurisdictions seem to agree that the use of 
injunctions for FRAND-encumbered patents (including exclusion orders) should be 
limited to rare occasions. In addition to their intervention against SEP owners, they 
used their advocacy role to stimulate both courts and government agencies to limit the 
availability of such remedies. In none of the systems, however, there is an agreement 
regarding the exact circumstances in which a SEP owner should be able to obtain an 
injunction. The US veto towards the ITC’s exclusion order shows that even public 
institutions disagree on when exactly is the use of such remedy legitimate. Similarly, 
the approach of the European Commission and national courts did not adopt a 
coherent approach. It should hence come as no surprise that the solutions suggested 
by the competition authorities have not be completely implemented by courts and 
administrative agencies. 
 
3.2. Definition of FRAND terms  
Finally, competition authorities expressed also the view that a clearer definition 
of FRAND terms may be desirable to avoid opportunisms in the context of SEPs. Most 
SSOs require participants to commit to license their technologies on FRAND terms if 
implemented in the standard. SSOs do not provide however an exact definition of 
FRAND. It remains consequently unclear what are the exact obligations that such 
commitment imposes on the SEP owner.  
Competition authorities have devoted considerable attention to the definition of 
FRAND terms, providing, in a way, their own interpretation of a FRAND 
commitment. In the United States, the DOJ and the FTC addressed the issue in the 
document The Evolving IP Marketplace, where they discussed, inter alia, the patent 
damages that should be awarded to a SEP owner subsequent to an infringement of the 
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SEP. The DOJ and the FTC suggested that courts should award damages based on a 
hypothetical ex ante negotiation, that is, the licensing term the SEP owner and the 
licensee would agree before the technology was implemented in the standard. Further, 
the two agencies suggested that when the SEP faced competition from alternative 
technologies before the implementation in the standard, the potential licensees would 
not agree to pay for the SEP more than the incremental value to the next best 
alternative.713 The DOJ and the FTC consequently suggested that “courts should cap 
the royalty at the incremental value of the patented technology over alternatives 
available at the time the standard was chosen.”714 This has been identified in the legal 
jargon as the “incremental value rule.” 
Also in his case, however, economists are no unified regarding the 
appropriateness of the suggested solution. Some commentators emphasized the 
necessity to cap the SEP owner’s compensation to the incremental value, and in this 
way prevent the SEP owner’s ability to hold up manufacturers715 Other commentators 
have however criticized such a rule, suggesting that limiting the SEP owner’s 
compensation would result in undercompensating SEP owners.716 Sidak for example 
emphasized that the incremental value rule erroneously assumes that the alternatives 
to the SEP were available at no cost. He emphasizes that the incremental value rule 
would result in the determination of suboptimal royalties, which would decrease the 
SEP owner’s incentive to innovate and continue to contribute its technologies to 
SSOs.717  
So far, U.S. courts have been asked only in few occasions to determine what 
constitutes a FRAND royalty, as part of patent infringement and contract law dispute 
                                                 
713 Swanson and Baumol were among the first commentators to propose to extend the theory of 
incremental value pricing to patent licensing. Their paper focuses on how to best deﬁne FRAND 
licensing in light of the potential that SEP owners could gain market power through the 
implementation in the standard, which by deﬁnition eliminates alternatives. They argue that the SEP 
owner FRAND licensing terms should be commensurate with the licensing terms the SEP owner could 
have obtained during the standard setting process, if there had been an auction among competing 
technologies. (D. G. Swanson and W. J. Baumol, Reasonable and Non-discriminatory (RAND) Royalties, 
Standards Selection, and Control of Market Power, 73 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 1 (2005).).  
714 US D.O.J. & THE F.T.C., THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES 
WITH COMPETITION 23 (2011). 
715 See, e.g., M. Lemley & C. Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 
1991, 1996 (2007).  
716 See, e.g., G. Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties (May 2013), 9 JOURNAL 
OF COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS 931 (2013). 
717 Id. at 43. 
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between the SEP owner and the licensee. Judge Robart, for example, determined a 
FRAND royalty in the dispute between Microsoft and Motorola.718 Judge Holderman 
determined a FRAND rate in Innovatio.719 The two judgments differ from each other. 
None of the decisions seems to accept, however, the incremental value rule, at least 
not in the way suggested by the FTC and the DOJ. Judge Robart explained that the 
incremental value rule is hard to implement in practice.720 Judge Holderman similarly 
pointed out the drawbacks on the incremental value rules.721 He instead applied what 
can be defined a “revised incremental value approach”, which did not limit the FRAND 
compensation to a marginal benefit over the next alternative technology, but took into 
account also the implementation costs on alternative technologies.722  
Without entering in the merits of the two decisions, it is evident that courts 
have only partially followed the interpretation of a FRAND commitment suggested by 
the DOJ and the FTC. Nonetheless, the FTC’s and DOJ’s actions did have an influence 
on the courts’ decisions, given that in both occasions, the courts emphasized the need 
to interpret a FRAND royalty in a way to mitigate the risk of patent holdup and 
royalty stacking.723  
Also the European Commission attempted to provide a clearer definition of a 
FRAND commitment, though adopting a very different approach from the one 
suggested by the US antitrust authorities. In the 2011 Guidelines, the Commission 
suggested that in case of a dispute (perhaps referring to a dispute between the SEP 
owner and the potential licensee), the determination of whether the licensing 
conditions are unfair or unreasonable should be based on the determination whether 
the licensing fee “bears a reasonable relationship to the economic value of the IPR”—
implicitly referring to the EU case law on excessive prices.724 Further, the Guidelines 
suggested a non-exhaustive list of methods that could be used in evaluating whether 
                                                 
718 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., Case No. C10-
1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Microsoft Motorola decision]. 
719 Memorandum Opinion, Findings, Conclusions, and Order, Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent 
Litigation, 1cv-09308 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) [hereinafter Innovatio decision]. 
720 Microsoft Motorola decision, supra note 718, ¶ 79 (“In practice, approaches linking the value of a 
patent to i719ts incremental contribution to a standard are hard to implement.”). 
721 Innovatio decision, supra note 719, * 72-73. 
722 Id. (noting that the court should not ignore the implementation costs of the alternative 
technologies).  
723 Microsoft Motorola decision, supra note 718, * 14 & 17, Innovatio decision, supra note 719, * 110. 
724 Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, 2011 O.J. C 11/1, ¶ 289 (2010).  
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the imposed licensing conditions are FRAND: (1) a comparison between the licensing 
fee demanded after the implementation in the standard, to the one demanded before 
the industry has been locked-in the use of standard; (2) a comparison with a licensing 
fee declared in an ex ante disclosure of licensing terms; (3) the fee charged for 
licensing the same patents in other comparable standard, (4) independent expert 
assessment.725  
The Commission suggestions are valuable, given that they provide a clearer 
understanding of the benchmarks that could be used in a potential dispute among the 
SEP owner and the licensee. The Commission’s definition of FRAND terms can be 
nonetheless criticized on several grounds. To begin with, the definition of FRAND 
commitment seems misplaced in the 2011 Guidelines, a document addressing the 
application of Article 101 TFEU to collusive practices. The part of the document 
addressing the definition of FRAND is clearly directed towards the SEP owners’ 
unilateral conduct (in particular to the unilateral imposition of excessive prices) which 
should be addressed under Article 102 TFEU, rather than Article 101 TFEU.726 If the 
Commission wanted to clarify how it intends to address the SEP owners’ unilateral 
conduct, it would be more appropriate to do so in a document addressing the 
application of Article 102 TFEU. Turning to the substantive merits of the 2010 
Guidelines, the Commission’s focus on excessive royalties was incomplete. Later cases 
concerning the SEP owners’ conduct have shown that the strategic use of SEPs goes 
beyond the mere imposition of exploitative licensing fees, and might include licensing 
strategies that have exclusionary effects, or harm rivals’ ability to compete. It seems 
therefore inappropriate to limit the concept of unfair royalties to excessive licensing 
fees. It is also interesting to observe that the methodologies suggested in the 
Guidelines differ from the incremental value rule suggested by the DOJ and the FTC. 
They are also different from the methodologies Judge Robart and Judge Holderman 
adopted when determining a FRAND royalties in the context of U.S. FRAND disputes.  
In sum, competition authorities of both jurisdictions tried to suggest their own 
interpretation of the FRAND commitment. None of the suggestions was however able 
to provide an ultimate answer to what constitutes a FRAND license.  
                                                 
725 Id. at. 289-290. 
726 Id.  
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4. THE WAY AHEAD 
Competition authorities on both sides of the Atlantic have taken active steps in 
promoting the adoption of mechanisms that could mitigate the risk of opportunism in 
the context of SEPs. In the European Union, the Commission used its guidelines as a 
tool to stimulate SSOs to adopt specific procedural requirements that could decrease 
the risk that participants act deceptively during the standardization process. Further, 
both in the United States and in the European Union, the competition authorities 
used their advocacy role to stimulate courts and other institutions to adopt a cautious 
approach when granting remedies against infringers of SEPs. At the same time, 
competition authorities provided their own perspective on how courts could interpret 
FRAND commitments.  
The analysis shows that several of the suggested mechanisms have been adopted 
in practice. SSOs did revise their internal rules, mitigating in this way the risk that 
participants will act deceptively during the standardization process. One could 
nonetheless question whether the mechanisms would have been adopted even in the 
absence of the antitrust intervention. In fact, a revision of SSOs’ rule occurred both in 
the European Union and in the United States, despite the fact that in the United 
States the competition authorities did not undertake specific actions that would 
stimulate SSOs to revise their rules. This suggests that market forces may well play a 
significant role in shaping the SSO s’ practices.  
The actions undertaken by the competition authorities had some influence on 
courts’ decisions. Particularly in the United States, several courts aligned their 
position with the one expressed by the FTC and the DOJ. In particular, when ruling 
on FRAND disputes, they emphasized the need to prevent patent holdup. In the EU 
Member States, on the contrary, courts were less willing to align their approach with 
the one expressed by the European Commission. They were for example willing to 
grant injunctions against infringers of SEPs. The investigations initiated by the 
Commission did raise, nonetheless, a general awareness about the risk of SEP owner’s 
opportunism, and pointed out the need to harmonies the approach between Member 
States and the European Commission. It is therefore possible to state that the legal 
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actions initiated by the competition authorities against SEP owners did have an 
influence on the courts’ ruling, although the solutions suggested by the competition 
authorities were not always directly implemented. 
In suggesting the adoption of further mechanisms, competition authorities should 
adopt a cautious approach. By stimulating the discussion about SEPs, competition 
authorities increase the understanding of the problems related to SEPs. Through this, 
they contribute to the development of mechanisms that are better able to address the 
problems that arise in the standardization context. They should nevertheless avoid 
suggesting the adoption of mechanisms that could introduce imbalance in the 
standardization context. Although it is true that there is a need to prevent 
opportunism on the side of the SEP owner, it is equally import to avoid opportunistic 
practices on the side of the licensee.727 The suggestion of an inadequate mechanisms 
might however distort the equilibrium and inject negative consequences in the 
standardization process.  
A good example is provided by the SEP owner’s ability to obtain an injunction 
against an infringer of SEPs. An approach that prevents, or renders very difficult for 
the SEP owner to obtain an injunction could prevent opportunism on the side of the 
SEP owner. It could, however, also stimulate opportunism on the side of the licensee. 
The potential licensee might have little incentive to accept promptly a FRAND 
licensing offer, if it is already using the SEPs, and the only remedy it is facing is the 
duty to pay royalties it would have to accept ex ante. Introducing a categorical bad on 
injunction might hence destroy the licensee’s incentives reach a prompt agreement 
FRAND licensing terms. Mechanisms that diminish the SEP owner’s ability to 
effectively enforce its SEPs, decrease the SEP’s value. As a result, companies might be 
reluctant to contribute their technologies to SSOs, if, their fear that after doing so, 
they will not be able effectively enforce their SEPs and obtain a fair compensation for 
their innovative effort.  
Therefore, although the competition authorities’ involvement in the SEPs 
discussion is desirable, there is a need for balanced approach when suggesting the 
implementation of further mechanisms. Only a mechanism that avoids opportunisms 
                                                 
727 U.S. DOJ & U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-
Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments, at 8 (2013). 
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both on the SEP owner’ and on the licensee’ side will, in the long run, preserve the 
functioning of the standardization process, to the benefit of the consumer. 
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Chapter X 
CONCLUSION 
Standards are important engines of our economy. They can have significant 
procompetitive benefits, particularly in industries with strong network effects. 
Standards might nevertheless also open the door for practices that can be harmful for 
consumers. Concerns may arise in relation to standards that rely on technologies 
unavailable in the public domain, but that are protected by patent rights. Once a 
patented technology is implemented in the standard, the use of the patent becomes 
essential for all manufacturers producing standard-compliant goods—a standard-
essential patent (SEP).  
Two distinctive practices have triggered concerns in the context of SEPs. First, 
companies might act deceptively during the standardization process, with the aim to 
favor the implementation of their patented technology in the standard. Such practices 
can distort competition in the technology market—the market where technologies 
compete for the implementation in the standard. Second, concerns have arisen with 
respect to the SEP owner’s opportunistic behavior after its patented technology has 
been implemented in the standard. The SEP owner can take advantage of the obtained 
position and impose on the manufacturer licensing terms that the manufacturer would 
not accept otherwise. Such licensing terms may have exclusionary effects, exploitative 
effects, or that can harm the manufacturer’s ability to compete with the SEP owner. 
Both types of opportunism−the deceptive conduct during the standardization process 
and the imposition of strategic licensing terms−may have also broader negative 
consequences. They can affect in a negative way the success of the standard and of the 
standardization process, and thus deprive consumers from the benefits brought by 
standard-setting activities.  
The thesis examined the role competition law plays in addressing the SEP 
owner’s opportunistic conduct, comparing the approaches adopted in the European 
Union and the United States. The analysis re-enters within the broader context of the 
IPR–competition law relationship. There is by now a broad consensus that competition 
law and IPRs are complementary polices, aiming at the same goals: promote 
innovation and benefit consumers. There are nonetheless areas where conflicts 
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between the two bodies of law arise. In such cases, both EU competition law and U.S. 
antitrust law confirm that a patent owner is in no way immune from the prohibitions 
of competition law. The exercise of a legitimately obtained patent right can, in specific 
circumstances, constitute an anticompetitive behavior. A SEP owner’s licensing 
behavior can thus trigger an antitrust liability.  
EU competition law and U.S. antitrust law have traditionally adopted different 
positions when defining the border between patent rights and competition law. The 
European Commission and the ECJ did generally not hesitate to limit the exercise of 
patent rights through the competition law provisions. Conversely, U.S. courts have 
been more cautious in restricting the patent owner’s rights through competition law. A 
patent owner was traditionally much more likely to face an antitrust liability under 
EU competition law than under US antitrust law. Nonetheless, the analysis showed 
that this pattern does not always hold in the context of SEPs. A practice found 
anticompetitive under U.S. antitrust law, might trigger no antitrust concerns in the 
European Union. 
EU competition law and U.S. antitrust law adopt a similar approach in 
evaluating of the SEP owner’s market power. As a general principle, both systems 
recognize that there is no presumption of market power, and that the SEP owner’s 
market power needs to be evaluated on a case by case basis. However, in both 
jurisdictions, there are cases where courts and competition authorities were willing to 
conclude that the SEP owner had significant power without providing a thorough 
evaluation of the direct and indirect evidence of market power. Rather, they defined 
the relevant market around the individual SEP, which resulted in SEP owner being 
considered almost per se dominant or a monopolist. Such an approach is not in line 
with economic principles. The analysis has shown that even after the implementation 
in the standard, the SEP owner might still face competition for alternative standards, 
or from standard-noncompliant goods. There is hence no reason to assume that the 
SEP owner holds a dominant position or monopoly power simply because of the 
ownership of a SEP.  
EU competition law and U.S. antitrust law show stronger divergences when 
scrutinizing the SEP owner’s opportunistic conduct. The thesis analyzed separately 
the antitrust liability for the SEP owner’s deceptive practices during the 
standardization process, and for the SEP owner’s strategic licensing practices. 
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Although the literature rarely discusses the two types of practice separately, the 
analysis has shown that these practices impose different types of harm and they affect 
competition in different markets. The SEP owner’s deceptive conduct during the 
standardization process may have exclusionary effects in the technology market, 
where technologies compete for the implementation in the standard. On the other 
hand, the SEP owner’s imposition of strategic licensing terms is likely to have 
exploitative (and only rarely exclusionary) effects on the downstream market—that is, 
the market for standard-compliant goods. Given those differences, it is understandable 
that competition law has a different role in addressing the two types of conduct.  
EU competition law and U.S. antitrust law have different scopes in addressing 
the SEP owner’s deceptive conduct during the standardization process. U.S. courts 
have largely recognized that a deceptive conduct that distorts the standardization 
process and allows the SEP owner to obtain market power constitutes an act of 
monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. To bring a successful 
Section 2 claim, the plaintiff needs to prove that the technology would not have been 
implemented in the standard, and no market power would be acquired, but for 
deception. On the other hand, Article 102 TFEU has a limited applicability in 
addressing the SEP owner’s deceptive practices. The provisions applies only to 
companies that are dominant at the time of deception. However, the majority of 
participants of the standardization process are not dominant at the time of deception. 
Therefore, on difference of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Article 102 TFEU has a very 
limited scope in addressing deceptive practices during the standardization process. 
This is an interesting result, given that is departs from a general pattern where 
EU competition law poses stricter constrains than U.S. antitrust law. Cases 
concerning SEP owner’s deceptive practices during the standardization process are 
one of the rare examples where a company is more likely to face an antitrust liability 
under U.S. antitrust law than under EU competition law. The reason for the divergent 
outcomes does not lie in the application of different legal standards, but rather reflects 
the difference in the text of the two legal statutes. Whereas Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act addresses the unlawful acquisition or maintenance of market power, Article 102 
TFEU is not concerned about the way in which companies obtain their dominant 
position. It only prohibits the abuse of a dominant position, once such position has 
been obtained. Although this difference did generally not play an important role in 
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contexts of other antitrust interventions, it becomes particularly relevant when 
addressing the deceptive behavior during the standardization process. Cases 
addressing the SEP owner’s deceptive behavior during the standardization process 
thus point out at a fundamental difference between the EU and U.S. antitrust 
provisions addressing the company’s unilateral conduct. 
EU competition law and U.S. antitrust law have different scopes also when 
addressing the second type of opportunism—the SEP owner’s strategic licensing 
practices. In this case, however, the results are more predictable. SEP owners are 
more likely to face an antitrust liability under EU competition law. Article 102 TFEU 
has a wider scope, given that it enables the competition authority the address a large 
spectrum of licensing practices, including those that result in a mere exploitation. To 
the contrary, the imposition of exploitative licensing conditions does not constitute an 
anticompetitive behavior actionable under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Therefore, a 
SEP owner is unlikely to face an antitrust liability for imposing exploitative licensing 
conditions on manufacturers. The narrower scope of the Sherman Act has led the FTC 
to consider if a different outcome is possible under Section 5 of the FTCA. The FTC 
has challenged the SEP owner’s exploitative licensing practices as a Section 5 
standalone offence. Nonetheless, the cases addressed so far have been concluded with 
consent decrees, without thus determining whether, and under which conditions, the 
SEP owner’s conduct constitutes a Section 5 standalone offence. For now, it seems 
therefore that both Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 5 of the FTCA have a 
limited ability to address SEP owner’s exploitative licensing practices. 
EU competition law and U.S. antitrust law thus lead to different results also 
when addressing the SEP owner’s imposition of strategic licensing terms. Again, the 
different results are not attributable to the application of different legal standards, but 
rather reflect the differences in the legal provisions. Whereas Article 102 TFEU 
prohibits the abuse of a dominant position, Section 2 of the Sherman Act is not 
concerned about the way in which a company uses a legitimately obtained market 
power. It does consequently not capture practices that have merely exploitative effects. 
Therefore, even though EU and U.S. competition authorities have expressed similar 
concerns with the SEP owners’ exploitative licensing practices, they are unable to 
address those practices in a similar way, because of the difference in the text of the 
antitrust statutes.  
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This result is indeed less surprising. Also outside the SEPs’ context, EU 
competition authorities have condemned exploitative conducts of dominant 
undertakings (although such actions were relatively rare), whereas those conducts 
were not condemned under U.S. antitrust law. What is perhaps more surprising is 
that both in the European Union and in the United States there has been an 
increasing interest in addressing exploitative practices. In the past, the European 
Commission’s enforcement practice has focused on exclusionary conducts, and they 
were only few cases where the Commission challenged dominant undertakings’ 
exploitative practices. The situation is however different in the context of SEPs, where 
the European Commission initiated several investigations challenging SEP owner’s 
licensing practices that allegedly had exploitative effects. A similar trend is present 
also in the United States, where academics have increasingly called for a more 
interventionist approach towards SEP owner’s practices that result in an exploitation. 
The FTC has showed the intention to prosecute some of these cases through Section 5 
of the FTCA. The approach competition authorities adopted in the context of SEPs 
thus departs from what we observe in other areas, where exploitative conducts do not 
represent a major antitrust concern. 
The analysis has also shown that, regardless of the legal ability to intervene, the 
antitrust intervention towards SEP owner exploitative licensing practices remains 
controversial. There are several reasons for it. First, the absence of a clear test renders 
the distinction between an exploitative and a legitimate licensing practice difficult. 
The absence of a legal test leaves a substantial level of legal uncertainty both for the 
SEP owner—who does not know whether the licensing terms it suggests are within 
the borders of legality—and for the competition authority—which does not have clear 
guidelines in determining whether the challenged practices is anticompetitive. This 
factor is further complicated by the absence of an agreement in the economic literature 
on what constitutes a patent holdup and what effects it imposes on consumers. 
Second, the antitrust intervention towards exploitative practices is controversial 
because of the difficulty in designing the adequate antitrust remedy. Third, the 
necessity for an intervention is diminished by the fact that the legal system provides 
alternative mechanisms to address the SEP owner’s imposition of exploitative 
licensing terms. A manufacturer that believes that the licensing conditions demanded 
by the SEP owners are exploitative can bring a legal action and demand the court or 
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an arbitration body to solve the dispute over the licensing terms. The legal basis for 
such actions is not antitrust law, but rather contract law. Hence, even under EU 
competition law—where Article 102 TFEU provide a legal basis for an antitrust 
intervention—it remains questionable whether addressing the SEP owner’s 
exploitative practices through competition law is a wise decision as a matter of public 
policy.  
A comparative analysis of the two systems also showed that neither EU 
competition law nor U.S. antitrust law provides a complete solution to the concerns 
related to SEPs. Both systems have gaps, in the sense that competition law provisions 
are not able to address all types of opportunism that may arise in the SEPs context. 
This has stimulated the competition authorities of both jurisdictions to use advocacy 
to encourage the adoption of mechanisms that could mitigate the risk of SEP owner’s 
opportunism. In particular, they aimed at strengthening the SSOs’ internal rules and 
revise the patent remedies available to SEP owners against infringer. The analysis 
showed that SSOs did revise their internal procedures, adopting mechanisms that 
make the participants’ deceptive behavior less likely. It is however questionable to 
what extent these changes were the result of the antitrust intervention. Similarly, also 
courts and other enforcements agencies have adopted a cautious approach when 
granting patent remedies to SEP owners. They nonetheless refused to apply directly 
the solutions suggested by the competition authorities. Therefore, the informal 
antitrust enforcement in the SEPs context was only partially successful.  
In conclusion, it is possible to state that competition law plays an important role 
in the context of SEPs, given that it is one of the essential mechanisms to assure the 
well-functioning of the standardization process. Besides ensuring that standardization 
activities are not used as a tool for collusion or foreclosure, competition law should also 
address certain unilateral practices that arise in the context of SEPs. First, U.S. 
antitrust provisions play an important role in preventing the SEP owner’s deception 
that subverts the competition in the technology market. Next, EU competition law can 
play a relevant role in addressing cases where the SEP owner imposes licensing 
practices that harm rivals’ ability to compete. Nonetheless, there will be cases where 
the SEP owner’s conduct, although opportunistic, will fall outside of the competition 
law domain. This does not necessarily indicate that competition law has gaps that 
need to be filed. Perhaps, some conducts simply do not impose the type of harm 
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competition law aims to prevent. In those circumstances, competition law should not 
aim to stretch its doctrines in the way to cover the existing gaps, but it should rather 
leave these conducts to be addressed by other areas of law. Stretching the reach of 
competition law, risks causing more harm than leaving the SEP owner’s conduct 
unaddressed by competition law.  
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